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INTRODUCTION

Early in the twentieth century, during a period of rapid industrial expansion and capital formation, a state far removed from the hub of the Industrial Revolution made the first attempt at comprehensive regulation of
transactions in securities.' Shortly thereafter, several other states followed
2
suit. Finally, in the aftermath of the stock market crash, Congress enacted
the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)3 to "provide full and fair disclosure of
the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof

....

-4 Congress amended

and supplemented this legislation in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act).5 Although the 1933 Act purported not to affect the jurisdiction
of the states," nor to preclude resort to existing rights and remedies,7 the
Act has had a pervasive impact on many types of transactions. 8
1. 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 133. Earlier, less comprehensive attempts at securities
regulation were made by Massachusetts (1852), California (1879), Connecticut (1903), Georgia
(1904), Nevada (1909) and Rhode Island (1910). See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 23-27
(2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969). In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, limited efforts at
this type of legislation date back to the latter part of the thirteenth century. Id. at 3. In
the United States, prior to the advent of direct statutory regulation, common law principles
governing personal obligations in tort and contract provided the general framework of
rights and responsibilities of participants in securities transactions. Id. at 20.
2. 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 28. Between 1910 and 1933, 47 states and Hawaii enacted
securities statutes. L. Loss & E. Cow=r, BLUE SKY LAW 17 (1958) (discussing the early
historical development of blue sky securities laws).
3. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (current version at 15 U.S.C.A.
§§77a-77aa (1971 & West Supp. 1978) (official version at 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1976)).
4. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74. Cf. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("to provide . . . full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud
and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of
honesty and fair dealing" is the purpose of the 1933 Act). See also H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (current version
at 15 U.S.C.A. §§78a-78jj (1971 & West Supp. 1978) (official version at 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78jj
(1976 8:Supp. I 1977)). This statute was initially intended "[t]o provide for the regulation
of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, [and] to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such
exchanges and markets ...." 1934 Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, Preamble, 48 Stat. 881. See alsp
1934 Act §2, 15 U.S.C. §78b (1976). Major substantive amendments to the 1933 Act were
enacted in 1954. Act of Aug. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-577, 68 Stat. 683.
6. 1933 Act §18, 15 U.S.C. §77r (1976) (state jurisdiction "over any security or person"
not affected). Cf. 1934 Act §28(a), 15 U.S.C. §78bb(a) (1976) (state jurisdiction over any
security or person not affected only "insofar as it does not conflict with the [1934 Act]
or the rules and regulations thereunder'. The differences in language between the two
sections appears to be semantic only; the jurisdiction of the states to regulate securities
transactions concurrently with the federal government is permissible only when not in
conflict with the 1933 Act. Travelers' Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d
263 (1949), afj'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). Although federal regulation is broad, the state role
has not been eliminated. All states regulate, to varying degrees, securities transactions made
within their borders. For a four volume annotated compilation of these laws, see BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH).
7. 1934 Act §28(a), 15 U.S.C. §7Bb(a) (1976); 1933 Act §16, 15 U.S.C. §77p (1976).
8. "Security" is defined at 1933 Act §2(l), 15 U.S.C. §77b(l) (1976): "[U]nless the
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The 1938 Act requires registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) of offers and sales9 of securities. 10 Exemption
context otherwise requires ...the term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." Securities have been found in
transactions involving, inter alia: orange groves, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946);
earthworms, Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979); discretionary commodities options
accounts, SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974), contra, Hirk
v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977), Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); multi-level distributorships,
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); whiskey warehouse receipts,
Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944), Securities Act Release No. 5018 (Nov. 4,
1969), 34 Fed. Reg. 18,160 (1969); coins, SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F.

Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), SEC No-Action Letter, Jim Halperin, Inc., available Aug. 23,
1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 180,715; percentage lease agree-

ments, Huberman v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972); oyster
shells, SEC v. Cultivated Oyster Farms Corp., 1 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 672 (S.D. Fla. 1939); franchise

agreements, In re Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947); rabbits, Stevens v. Liberty Packing
Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193 (Ch. 1932); diamonds, SEC No-Action Letter, Charles
Anthony Diamond Invs., Inc., available Sept. 27, 1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCII) 80,623; yachts, Carribean Sailing Yachts, Ltd., available Sept. 3, 1974,
[1974] SEC No-AanoN Lurrns (CCI), roll 9, frame 12122; condominium and other units
in a real estate development, Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 18, 1973), '38 Fed. Reg.
1,735 (1973). See generally 3 H. BLooMENTHAL, SEcuarrmnS AND FEDERAL CoRoRA' LAw
§ §2.02-.22 (1977).
In general, the proscriptions of the 1933 Act only affect transactions in securities which
use means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails. 1933 Act §§5, 12, 17(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§77e, 771, 77q(a)-(b) (1976). A liberal construction of these requirements is not uncommon, although the statutory language varies
from section to section and courts have differed as to the kinds of activities which ;wil
satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite under each of these sections. See, e.g., Schillner v. H.
Vaughn Clarke 9, Co., 134 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir. 1943) (§12(2)); Lennerth v. Mendenhall,
234 F. Supp. 59, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (§12(l)); United States v. Robertson, 181 F. Supp.
158, 163-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (§§5(a)(1), 17(a)); 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 207-11, 252-54 (pertaining to §5); 3 L. Loss, supranote 1, at 1521-28 (pertaining to §§12(2), 17(a), 1698 (pertaining

to §§5, 12(l)), 1706-08 (pertaining to §§12(2), 17(a)).
9. "Offer," "sale" and related terminology are defined to include, "unless the context
otherwise requires . . .. every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a
security, for value . . . (and] every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an
offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value." 1933 Act §2(3), 15 U.S.C. §77b(3)
(1976). This language was intended to include contracts to sell as well as contracts of safe;
that is, contracts to sell at some time in the future as well as executed contracts of sale.
1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 223-24.
As used herein, "offers" and "sales" are component parts of "offering," and "offerings"
are component parts of "transaction." A single "offer" or "sale" may constitute an "offering,"
and a single "offering" may constitute a "transaction."
10. 1933 Act §5, 15 U.S.C. §77e (1976). A registration statement, the filing of which
satisfies the registration requirement, must contain all information necessary under the
circumstances to enable a reasonable investor to make an informed decision whether to
buy the securities being registered. See 1933 Act §§l0(a)-(d), 11(a), 15 U.S.C. §§77j(a).(d),
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from registration is provided for particular types of securities1' and for securities offered and sold in specified transactions. 12 Securities transactions which
77k(a) (1976). Cf. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (involving a suit
brought under §14(a) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9, promulgated thereunder, in which
the Court adopted as the standard for disclosure in a joint proxy statement soliciting approval of a merger, the revelation of any fact as to which "there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote").
In recommending passage by the House of Representatives of H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1933), which was subsequently enacted as the 1933 Act, the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated: "The type of information required to be disclosed is of a character comparable to that demanded by competent bankers from their
borrowers . . . [and is], in the judgment of your committee, adequate to bring into the
full glare of publicity those elements of real and unreal values which may lie behind a
security. . . . [T]o require these disclosures fulfills the President's demand that 'there is
an obligation upon us to insist . . . that no essentially important element attending the
issue shall be concealed from the buying public."' H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1933).
There are also administrative guidelines specifying information required to be disclosed
to potential investors. SEC Rules 408-412, 421-423, 425-434(a), 434A(b)-(e), 434B-436, 438439, 470, 490-494, 17 C.F.R. §§230.408-.412, .421-.423, .425-.434(a), .434A(b)-(e), A34B-.436,
.438-.439, .470, .490-A94 (1979). These guidelines are supplemented by the general proscriptions of the civil liability and anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Act, 1933 Act §§ll(a), 12(2),
17, 15 U.S.C. §§77k(a), 771(2), 77q (1976), and of one of the anti-fraud provisions of the
1934 Act, 1934 Act §10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j (1976), and accompanying SEC Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1979).
The 1933 Act has been widely described as a "disclosure statute," that is, a statute
which conditions access to the capital markets solely upon the issuer's disclosure of information about itself. On the other hand, many state securities laws regulate directly
or through administrative agencies the merits of proposed securities transactions, including
inter alia the capital structure and business practices of the issuer, the amount and nature
of underwriters' compensation, and the terms upon which capital may be raised. As a
practical matter, however, the 1933 Act, and particularly the regulations promulgated
thereunder, contain significant incidents of merit regulation. E.g., 1933 Act §8(c), 15 U.S.C.
§77h(c) (1976) (post-effective amendments to registration statements "become effective on
such date as the Commission may determine having due regard to the public interest and
the protection of investors"); SEC Rule 253, 17 C.F.R. §230.253 (1979) (no access to Regulation A by persons who wish to sell securities of certain unprofitable issuers and limited
access by such issuers who wish to sell their own securities thereunder); Notes to SEC
Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. §230.460 (1979) (SEC practice of requiring more than mere disclosure
as a condition to acceleration of the effective date of a registration statement). Se R.
JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 215-16
(4th ed.
1977); 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 277-83. See also Board of Governors' Interpretation of
Article III, Section 1 of the National Association of Securities Dealers' Rules of Fair
Practice, N.A.S.D. MANUAL (CCH) 2151.02 (regulating the compensation of underwriters
for their participation in a public offering of securities).
11. 1933 Act §3(a)(2)-(8), 15 U.S.C.A. §77c(a)(2)-(8) (1971 & West Supp. 1978).
12. 1933 Act §§3(a)(l), (9)-(11), (b), 4, 15 U.S.C.A. §§77c(a)(1), (9)-(11), (b), 77d (1971 &
West Supp. 1978). Although §3 purports to exempt certain types of securities as distinguished
from types of transactions, a few of the exemptions contained in §3 are commonly and
more properly viewed as transactional exemptions. E.g., §3(a)(9) (exchange transactions),
§3(a)(ll) (intrastate transactions), and §3(b) (small issues). See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
supra note 10, at 461-64.
The dichotomy between exempt securities and transactional exemptions is not complete.
Section 3(c) has characteristics of both types of exemptions. I L. Loss, supra note 1, at
708. Similarly, there is conflicting authority on the precise nature of the exemption created
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would otherwise warrant registration may be exempt if application of the
1933 Act would significantly interfere or overlap with other governmental
regulation of the issuer' 3 or conflict with other important public policy considerations. 4 In addition, certain trading transactions are exempt.'5 Notwithstanding these exemptions, the registration provisions of the 1933 Act apply
to most interstate public offerings of nongovernmental securities36
Typically, the registration process is expensive, time-consuming, and
introduces uncertainty at a time when expediency and coordination of effort
are critical to management.' 7 Post-registration responsibilities may also involve
considerable expense and operational disruption, undermining management's
flexibility in the conduct of business and jeopardizing relations with existing
stockholders. 8 In contrast, an offering which has been structured to qualify
by §3(a)(10). Compare Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1117-18 (1940) wifh Shaw
v. United States, 131 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1942). See generally 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at
708-10.
13. See 1933 Act §3(a)(7), 15 U.S.C.A. §77c(a)(7) (West Supp. 1978). Except where
otherwise indicated or where the context requires an alternative meaning, the term "issuer"
as used herein refers not only to the "person" (individual, entity, association or organization) who "issues or proposes to issue any security," 1933 Act §2(2), (4), 15 U.S.C. §77b(2),
(4) (1976), but also to any "person" who proposes to engage or engages in any activity subject
to the registration provisions of the 1933 Act.
14. See 1933 Act §3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(4) (1976).
15. 1933 Act §4(1), 15 U.S.C. §77d(1) (1976). Trading transactions are defined in the
1933 Act as "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." Id. These
transactions are distinguished from "distributions," a term which is not defined by the statute
despite its importance therein but which has been interpreted to mean public offerings subject
to registration. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 896 (1959).
16. 1933 Act §3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(2) (1976). Securities guaranteed by federal, state or
local governments are also exempt. Id.
17. The complex process of raising capital through the sale of securities ordinarily involves
the efforts of a loosely knit team of lawyers, accountants and investment bankers, who impose
considerable burdens upon upper echelon members of the issuer's management to provide
information about the issuer which state and federal securities laws require to be disclosed
to prospective purchasers of the securities proposed to be offered. Timing is a crucial determinant of the success or failure of a foray into the capital markets. The state of the
market, which influences the degree of receptivity of investors to a particular offering, is a
product of the melding of economic, social, political and psychological factors by a formula
yet to be deciphered. Significant short-term fluctuations in the market are not uncommon.
Delays for adjustments in the planning or implementation of a proposed securities transaction in order to attempt to conform with imprecise legal requirements may, therefore, result
in an increase in the out-of-pocket costs of the transaction, lost opportunities attributable to
unproductive time of senior management and possible reduction in the price ultimately
received by the issuer for its securities. In some cases, a delay in the commencement of an
offering may cause the issuer to "miss the market" altogether. If the offering is underwritten, the underwriter ordinarily includes in its agreement with the issuer a so-called
"market out" provision permitting the underwriter to refuse, without liability, to consummate
the offering if in the underwriter's opinion market conditions are unfavorable at the time
of the offering. G. RoBINSON, GOING PUBLIc §51, at 204 (rev. 2d ed. K. Eppler 1974).
18. As to the nature of the registration process, including its expense and procedural requirements and the advantages and disadvantages to the issuer, management and security
holders of having the issuer's securities publicly held, see Schneider & Manko, Going Public Practice,Procedure and Consequences 15 ViLL. L. REV. 283 (1970) (4th rev. ed. Schneider,
Manko & Kant, reprinted by The Packard Press, Philadelphia, Pa., Mar., 1979).
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for a statutory exemption from registrationo ordinarily entails fewer, or at
least less onerous, impediments to compliance. 20 Consequently, complying
with the requirements for an exemption often presents an attractive alternative to registration. The decision to rely on an exemption must, however,
be made in the initial stages of the transaction, because the 1933 Act
stringently regulates activities calculated to promote the sale of securities in a
nonexempt transaction. 21 Moreover, the choice of the specific exemption to
be used must be made at the outset, because the requirements of each transactional exemption vary significantly, rendering quite difficult a switch from
one exemption to another in mid-transaction. Failure to satisfy the registration requirements in the absence of an exemption may subject the primary

19. The availability of an exemption for certain securities is usually a by-product of
fundamental business decisions unrelated to the securities laws. For example, the determination by the issuer to do business as a savings and loan association, 1933 Act §3(a)(5)(A), 15
U.S.C. §77c(a)(5)(A) (1976), or by a trustee in bankruptcy to compromise creditors' claims
through the issuance of certificates with court approval, 1933 Act §3(a)(7), 15 U.S.C.A. §77c
(a)(7) (West Supp. 1978), generally is not premised on a desire to avoid registration. In contrast,
the availability of a transactional exemption is ordinarily attributable to planning based upon
securities law considerations, compliance with which may even require adjustment or abandonment of legitimate proposed operational goals.
20. Certain out-of-pocket costs are endemic to virtually all securities offerings. Such
costs include accounting and legal fees, development of sales material, telephone and
postal expenses. Other quantifiable costs may also be borne by the issuer, such as a possible
reduction in offering price to compensate purchasers for legal restrictions on resale of the
securities. See, e.g., SEC Rules 146(h), 147(e), 240(g), 17 C.F.R. §§230.146(h), .147(e), .240(g)
(1979). In addition, some costs associated with offering securities pursuant to a transactional
exemption are difficult to evaluate with precision and may impact on the issuer during a
period which extends well beyond the period during which the securities are offered. Perhaps
the most significant of these costs is the flexibility in structuring future securities transactions
lost by attempting to avoid integration. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
21. Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §77e(c) (1976) provides in part: "It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . to offer to sell or offer to buy through
the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security .... " "Preliminary negotiations" between an issuer
or an affiliate of the issuer and any underwriter or among underwriters "who are or are to
be in privity of contract" with an issuer or its affiliate are excepted from the prohibitions of
§5(c). 1933 Act §2(3), 15 U.S.C. §77b(3) (1976). This exception enables the prospective issuer
to ascertain the feasibility of a proposed securities transaction and to enlist the services of
professional financial intermediaries. Section 5(c) is also inapplicable to a public notice of
an impending offering by the issuer which contains no more than the very limited information delineated in SEC Rule 135, 17 C.F.R. §230.135 (1979). See Chris-Craft Indus. v. Bangor
Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970). In addition, securities dealers and underwriters
are allowed certain prefiling communications regarding securities of issuers who must file
reports pursuant to §13 or §15(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§78m, 78o(d) (1976 & Supp. I
1977). This special dispensation accommodates the need of traders for professional guidance
with respect to securities in which there is substantial potential trading interest, so long as
there exists reliable, publicly available financial information about the issuer. See SEC Rules
137-139, 17 C.F.R. §§230.137-.139 (1979); Securities Act Release No. 5009 (Oct. 7, 1969), 34
Fed. Reg. 16,870 (1969).
The sale of a security, as well as the delivery of a security for the purpose of sale or for
delivery after sale, is proscribed prior to the effective date of a registration statement with
respect to such security.
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wrongdoer and other "collateral participants" 22 to civil or criminal liability
23
or to injunctive restraint.
Despite the importance of strict adherence to the statute from the outset
of a contemplated exempt offering, the 1983 Act provides only a broad framework which fails to specify the intricacies of compliance. 24 Therefore, SEC
rulemaking, pursuant to a general statutory delegation of power 2 5 establishes
virtually all of the detailed requirements of the most widely applicable exemptions. 26 Many aspects of compliance remain unclear notwithstanding recent
22. The term "collateral participants" as used in this context is borrowed from R.
& H. MARSH, supra note 10, at 1095.
23. 1933 Act §§12(l), 20(b), 24, 15 U.S.C. §§771(1), 77t(b), 77x (1976). Secondary liability,
or liability imposed upon persons other than primary wrongdoers as a result of the latter's
violation of a statutory duty, is becoming common under the securities laws. E.g., SEC v.
Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). For a discussion of the development of the various theories pursuant to which
such secondary liability has been imposed, see Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law
Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and ContriJENNINGS

bution, 120 U. PA. L. Rv.597 (1972). In addition, §15 of the 1933 Act imposes joint and

several liability on any person who controls any other person liable under §11 or 12 "to
the same extent as such controlled person... unless the controlling person had no knowledge
of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist." 1933 Act §15, 15 U.S.C. §77o (1976).
E.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).

A judicial or administrative determination that a person has violated or aided and abetted
a violation of the federal securities laws, including the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, has particular significance to anyone who appears or practices before the OEC
"inany way," insofar as that finding may form the basis for his temporary or permanent

suspension from appearing and practicing before the SEC. SEC Rules of Practice, Rule 2(e),
17 C.F.R. §201.2(e) (1979). See, e.g., SEC v. Ezrine, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FmD. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) 93,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (lawyer). Theoretically, SEC disciplinary action under
rule 2(e) can emanate from a non-willful collateral violation of the securities laws, such as
aiding and abetting a violation. See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC
Rules of Practice, Rule 2(e)(3)(i), 17 C.F.R. §201.2(e)(3)(i) (1979). See generally Daley & Karmel,
Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747, 762-65,
777-79 (1975).
24. The statute provides considerably more direction for registered than for exempt
offerings. See note 10 supra. Compare 1933 Act §§7, 10(a), 27 (Schedule A), 15 U.S.C. §§77g,
77j(a), 77aa (Schedule A) (1976) with 1933 Act §§3(a)(11), 4(2), 15 U.S.C. §§77c(a)(11), 77d(2)
(1976).
This disparity is further accentuated by the fact that registered offerings are normally
preceded by SEC review of the issuer's disclosure documents, while, except for exempt offerings under §3(b) or (c), no prior formal review is made of the issuer's compliance with the
statutory requirements for exemption.
25. Section 19(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §77s(a) (1976), provides in part: "The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend and rescind such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter, including
rules and regulations governing registration statements and prospectuses for various classes
of securities and issuers, and defining accounting, technical and trade terms used in this
subchapter."
26. While much of this rulemaking proceeds under the blanket authority granted in
§19(a) of the 1933 Act, several areas of regulation are governed by SEC rules promulgated
pursuant to direct delegation of responsibility to complete what Congress had explicitly left
to administrative expertise. E.g., 1933 Act §3(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §77c(b) (West Supp. 1978); Regulation A, SEC Rules 251-264, 17 C.F.R. §§230.251-.264 (1979).
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efforts by the SEC to provide added certainty for those relying upon these
exemptions. 27 Consequently, an issuer seeking to raise capital by offering
securities without registration faces a complex task of planning and executing
the issue to avoid incurring substantial penalties for failure to conform to
28
the statutory requirements.
Even if the issuer faultlessly complies with a specific exemption, an additional pitfall remains. The 1933 Act has been construed to require that unregistered offerings which comprise a single transaction satisfy a single exemption. 29 Hence, the issuer must determine whether a proposed unregistered
offering might be deemed part of a prior or planned securities transaction.3"
27.

Prompted by

DISCLOSURE PoucY STUDY, SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL

ACTS (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wheat
Report], the SEC throughout this decade has made a conscientious attempt to exercise its
rulemaking power to minimize perceived uncertainties and lacunae in the 1933 Act. See, e.g.,
SEC Rules 137-139, 144-147, 17 C.F.R. §§230.137-.139, .144-.147 (1979). Numerous commentators have suggested, however, that these efforts have not been entirely successful. See, e.g.,
Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: PracticalForeclosure
L.J. 1139, 1143, 1168-69; Heumann, Is SEC Rule 146 Too
from the Capital Market, 1977 Duo
Subjective to Provide the Needed Predictability in Private Offerings?, 55 NEB. L. REv. 1, 9
Further Narrowing of the Intrastate Offering Exemption,
(1975); Kant, SEC Rule 147 -A
30 Bus. LAw. 73, 91-93 (1974); Weinberg & McMannus, The Private Placement Exemption
Under the Securities and Exchange [sic] Act of 1933 Revisited, and Rule 146, 27 BAYLOR L.
REv. 201 (1975).
28. See note 23 supra. A defendant may be subject to civil liability for failure to register
an offering even if such omission occurred wholly without the fault of the defendant. See
1933 Act §12(1), 15 U.S.C. §771(l) (1976); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 10, at 839.
The same is theoretically true as to injunctive liability, except that the SEC must also
demonstrate that the defendant is reasonably likely to engage in future illegal conduct, SEC
v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1978). This additional burden
is not likely to be demonstrated where the defendant lacked culpability of the transgression.
See 1933 Act §20(b), 15 U.S.C. §77t(b) (1976); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457
F. Supp. 682, 715-17 (D.D.C. 1978). Although criminal liability will attach only to willful
conduct, a showing of specific intent to violate the registration provisions is not necessary.
It merely must be demonstrated that the defendant intended to do the act or acts which
constitute the violation. See 1933 Act §24, 15 U.S.C. §77x (1976); United States v. Custer
Channel Wing Corp., 247 F. Supp. 481, 490-94 (D. Md. 1965).
29. This requirement derives from the language which circumscribes the boundaries of
certain of the exemptions from registration and is frequently referred to as the "issue concept." See text accompanying notes 178-180 infra.
30. If the possibility of such a relationship exists, the proposed offering will not unquestionably conform with the statute unless conducted in such a manner that the offering,
together with all other prior and subsequent offerings which ultimately are determined to be
components of the same transaction, complies with a single exemption. See, e.g., Doran v.
Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 901 n.9 (5th Cir. 1977). On the other hand, where
any part of the transaction of which a proposed offering may be deemed a component is or
will be registered, the proposed offering must be registered if compliance is to be guaranteed.
See, e.g., In re Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630, 634 (1958). Thus, where a proposed
offering is intended to be registered but may be treated as part of a prior exempt transaction, the proposed offering may have to be abandoned in order to preserve an exemption
for the prior transaction.
When a registered offering is contemplated, the SEC staff will determine whether the
offering will be treated as part of a prior transaction before the registration statement becomes effective. The registration statement includes information which will assist the staff
OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34
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The process of combining offerings into a single securities transaction is known
as "integration."31
Integration under the 1933 Act is designed to prevent an issuer from
avoiding registration of a nonexempt transaction by accomplishing the transaction through two or more ostensibly distinct offerings each of which, if
treated as a separate transaction, would conform to the statute.3 2 Presumably,
integration is justifiable as a protective device for investors; however, other
significant interests are involved. From the issuer's standpoint, the importance
of precision in the structure and timing of securities offerings necessitates a
clear definition of the circumstances under which integration will be applicable. Inability to comprehend the scope or requirements of integration
should not result in either penalties for noncompliance with the securities
of the SEC in identifying and resolving such questions. See, e.g., SEC Form S-1, Item 25, 2
FED. SEc. L. RPt. (CCH) 7,124, at 6,209-13, which requires disclosure of all unregistered
sales of securities by the registrant during the three years preceding the filing of the registration statement.
In the situation posed in the text, if integration were appropriate the only alternative
to abandoning the offering would be to effectuate the proposed offering in such a way that
it and the prior offering of which it was a part together complied with a single exemption.
This may be very difficult because prevailing market conditions or the restrictions imposed
upon exempt offerings often might not be conducive to successful financing pursuant to an
exemption.
31. The term "integration" is used to describe an operative substantive legal principle
in many areas of law unrelated to securities regulation. See, e.g., Aboussie v. Aboussie, 441 F.2d
150, 153-54 (5th Cir. 1971) (concept of integrated writings in law of contracts); United States
v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) (integration of several criminal acts into single
criminal conspiracy); United Paperworks Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp.
610 (N.D. Me. 1977) (integration of parent and subsidiary corporations for purposes of
determining obligation of parent to arbitrate terms of collective bargaining agreement to
which only subsidiary is a signatory).
There are also certain aspects of the securities laws, not treated herein, which entail application of an integration concept. See, e.g., Heine v. Signal Cos., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FaD. Sac. L. RE. (CCII) 95,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (integration of privately negotiated offering
with public tender offer for purposes of determining violation of SEC Rule lOb-13 promulgated under the 1934 Act); Carolina Pipeline Co., available Sept. 2, 1977, [1977] SEC NoACTION Lmram (CCI), fiche 56, frame H17 t(integration of proposed merger of parent and
wholly owned subsidiary with other features of reorganization plan involving outside corporations to preclude availability of SEC Rule 145(a)(2) registration exception); SEC No-Action
Letter, William E. Hart, available May 6, 1979, [1979 Transfer Binder] FaD. Sac. L. RP.
(CCH) 82,106 (integration of offerings of two or more related investment clubs in determining whether they would qualify for the exclusion from the definition of V'investment
company" in §3(c)(l) of the Investment Company Act of 1940); SEC No-Action Letter,
Jammer Cycle Products, Inc., available July 26, 1973, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fan. Sac. L.
Rat. (CCH) 79,478 (integration of proposed intrastate sales of securities by two individuals
as broker-dealers with proposed interstate sales by issuer of same securities as part og same
offering so as to destroy the exclusively intrastate nature of the individuals' activities and
require them to register with the SEC as broker-dealers under §15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act).
32. For a graphic but slightly dated analysis of the effect of integration on the
financing plans of a hypothetical issuer, see Shapiro & Sachs, Integration Under the Securities
Act: Once An Exemption, Not Always. . ., 31 Mn. L. Ray. 3 (1971). A current and broad
discussion of integration practice, including many practical suggestions for minimizing integration problems during the initial financing phase of an enterprise, can be found in 3 H.
BLooMaNTHAL, supra note 8, §§4.14[5], [6].
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laws or sacrifice of a financing opportunity. Nevertheless, an issuer uncertain
of the applicability of integration to a proposed offering may be forced to
forego the proposed offering altogether or to adjust its characteristics significantly to avoid a potential violation of the registration requirements. 33
Either course of action may entail considerable hardship for the issuer.
Therefore, as long as the facilitation of commerce remains a countervailing
policy consideration to that of investor protection, any restrictions on an
issuer's modes of capital formation might properly be limited to instances in
which the benefit to investors and the public from integration outweighs the
resultant harm to the issuer and its beneficial owners.
Almost from the inception of the 1933 Act, the SEC has been primarily
responsible for defining the parameters of the propriety of integration. Until
recently, the SEC resorted exclusively to a five-factor formula to determine
when integration is appropriate. This formula has done little, however, to
fulfill the issuer's need for certainty. Partly in deference to that need, the SEC
has established objective criteria which, if satisfied, will ensure that integration is not applicable. This effort has fallen far short of its goal, however, and
the SEC's five-factor formula remains as the guidepost to compliance whenever it is uncertain whether an offering has been conducted consistently with
these objective criteria. Serious doubts can be raised with respect to the
efficacy of this formula in identifying circumstances in which the interests of
investors require imposition of the stringent limitations upon an issuer's
flexibility in financing its operations which integration entails. The importance
of this regulatory non sequitur is highlighted by the recent decision of the
34
SEC staff to refrain from rendering advice on integration questions.
This article traces the historical development of integration of securities
offerings and evaluates current applications, both formally by the courts and
the SEC and informally by the latter, from the standpoint of the respective
interests affected. The article suggests ways in which implementation of integration might be modified to achieve a more balanced protection of these
interests while continuing to serve the purposes of the applicable securities
laws. It also recommends an approach to solving integration questions under
current law and practice, principally to assist practitioners in structuring securities offerings. Finally, brief consideration is given to the codification of
the integration concept in the Federal Securities Code proposed by the
American Law Institute.
I.

TRANSACTIONAL EXEMPTIONS

Insofar as the principal transactional exemptions from registration under
the 1933 Act have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, detailed examination
in this article of the area is unnecessary. 35 Clearly, however, an understanding
33. For instance, the issuer might be required to register the proposed offering or to
comply with an exemption which lacks certain advantages of the originally contemplated
exemption. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
34.

See note 349 infra and accompanying text.

35. See generally 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 573-641; Bloomenthal, SEC Exemptions from
Registration-A New Look, 45 CIN. L. R v. 367 (1976).
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of integration, by which the SEC and the courts may "destroy" the purportedly
exempt status of certain offerings by refusing to treat them as distinct transactions,38 is not possible absent a functional comprehension of these exemptions. Each transactional exemption 37 has a statutory purpose that has been
modified by subsequent administrative 8 and judicial gloss.39 Each also has
distinct compliance requirements and, consequently, a distinct set of advantages and disadvantages to the issuer.
Certain features are common to all 1933 Act exemptions. The general
purpose of the transactional exemptions, for instance, is to limit application
of the registration provisions4 only to situations where there is a need for
investor protection. 1 Implicit in this general policy is the concept that, in some
situations, protection via disclosure pursuant to registration is burdensome
or unnecessary and must be subordinated to policies favoring capital aggregation and less restrictive access to securities markets. 42 Despite the importance
of these competing considerations the courts have taken the position that
in all instances the exemptions should be strictly construed,4 3 and the issuer
36. For a discussion of the origins and development of integration practice, see text
accompanying notes 178-219 infra.
37. See note 12 supra.
38. See notes 25-26 supra.
89. See generallyBloomenthal, supra note 35.
40. 1933 Act §5, 15 U.S.C. §77e (1976). Exemptions are only applicable to the registration requirements and not to the anti-fraud provisions. See 1983 Act §17, 15 U.S.C. §77q
(1976); Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 500
F.2d 1246 (1974), rev'd sub nor., United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
reh. denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
41. This approach is reflected in §3(b) of the 1933 Act, in which Congress granted the
SEC authority to develop exemptions on its own initiative "if it finds that the enforcement
of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest
and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited
character of the public offering...." 15 U.S.C.A. §77c(b) (West Supp. 1978). Similar language
is found in the introductions to rules 146 and 147, which state that Congress providediexemptions "where there was no practical need for registration or where the benefits were too
remote." SEC Rules 146-147, 17 C.F.R. §§230.146-.147 (1979). See also SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
42. It has been suggested that small issuers have been foreclosed from the securities
markets due to the high cost of registration. See Campbell, supra note 27, at 1140. To help
alleviate this problem, Congress recently amended §3(b) under the authorization discussed
in note 41 supra to permit the SEC to increase to $1,500,000 the aggregate offering price of
securities which an issuer may sell pursuant to this alternative to registration. Act of May
21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-283, §18, 92 Stat. 275. The SEC responded to this amendment by
increasing the aggregate offering price of securities which may be sold pursuant to Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§230.251-.264 (1979), to $1,500,000. See Securities Act Release No. 5977
(Sept. 11, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 41,383 (1978). Shortly thereafter, Congress increased the §3(b)
ceiling to $2,000,000, but to date this additional authority has not been exercised by the
SEC. See Act of Oct. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 962 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C.

§77c(b)).
43. Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.,
463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d
680 (5th Cir. 1971); Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969); SEC v. MA. Lundy
Assocs., 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973); SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. 4& (D.

Minn. 1972).
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must bear the burden of proving an exemption's applicability. 44
Each statutory exemption is drafted in relatively terse language, with
45
unclear application to the great variety and complexity of financing schemes.
Ultimately, the resultant ambiguity became a breeding ground of both litigation and pathological caution.46 The SEC has attempted to introduce some
certainty in the exemption area through its promulgatibn of the "140 series"
48
rules4? and by exercising its rulemaking authority under section 3(b). Al49
though the 140 series have been criticized as overly restrictive, their "safe
harbors" have proved extremely attractive to practitioners. Consequently,
the rules have been frequently utilized.50 Likewise, the popularity of section
3(b) has been considerably enhanced by the recent administrative broaden51
ing of the types of offerings which qualify for an exemption thereunder.
Also, the rules have increased in importance because the SEC has sought
to encourage their use,5 2 and the courts have relied upon them in interpreting
44. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Jenkins v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F.
Supp. 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
45. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
46. The vagueness of the statutory language is costly in that it may cause an issuer to
avoid utilization of the exemptions and forfeit what are intended to be advantageous means
of raising capital. See Campbell, supra note 27, at 1139, 1143-47, 1158-59, 1168-69, 1174-75.
47. E.g., SEC Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1979) (defining the private offering exemption under §4(2)); Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 2,353 (1974);
SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1979) (defining the intrastate exemption under §3(a)(ll)).
48. SEC Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1979); Regulation A, SEC Rules 251-264, 17
C.F.R. §§230.251-.264 (1979).
49. See generally Campbell, supra note 27.
50. See text accompanying notes 107-117, 166-177 infra.
51. Administrative expansion of the scope of §3(b) has occurred recently by amendment
of Regulation A and adoption of rule 240. See note 42 supra and text accompanying notes
60-66 infra. Additional rulemaking along these lines was in process at the time this article
was published. See note 431 infra.
52. The rules promulgated by the SEC to define certain statutory exemptions are nonexclusive. That is, the issuer may opt to satisfy the statutory language by complying with
the prevailing judicial and administrative interpretations thereof rather than by conforming
to the rules. Several factors militate strongly in favor of choosing to satisfy whenever
possible the requirements of one of the rules. The greater clarity of the rules versus the
vagueness of the statutory language provides substantial incentive to avoid reckoning with
the latter. Further, the SEC has indicated that its staff will render informal interpretative
advice with respect to compliance with the rules. Securities Act Release No. 5487 (Apr. 23,
1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261, 15,265 (1974) (adopting rule 146); Securities Act Release No. 5450
(Jan. 7, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 2,353, 2,356 (1974) (adopting rule 147). On the other hand, prior
to the adoption of the rules, the staff would, when requested, state its enforcement position
with respect to a proposed offering pursuant to one of the statutory exemptions. Upon
issuance of the rules, the staff radically amended its position, indicating that it would issue
such no-action letters "infrequently and only in the most compelling circumstances." Securities
Act Release No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261, 15,265 (1974). Accord, Securities
Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 2,353, 2,356 (1974). See also Securities Act
Release No. 5560 (Jan. 24, 1975), 40 Fed. Reg. 6,484 (1975) (adopting rule 240); SEC NoAction Letter, Sands Mfg. Co., available July 10, 1978, [1978] 462 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
C-1 (interpretative, but not enforcement, advice will be given concerning rule 240). Finally,
the rules insulate offerings made pursuant thereto from integration with other offerings.
In view of the ambiguous state of current integration law and the foregoing advantages
of the rules, the basis of the following observation by the United States Court of Appeals
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the statute. 53
A.

Small Issues

4

Section 3(b) provides an exemption for small public issues. 55 It empowers
the SEC to exempt from registration transactions with an aggregate public
offering price of up to $2,000,000 6 when the risk to the general public would
be minimal. 57 Pursuant to this authority, the SEC has promulgated inter alia
Regulation A 55 and rule 240. 59
Rule 240 was developed to provide an exemption for limited transactions
by closely held issuers.60 The rule can be particularly desirable for a start-up
or small business situation because there are no registration or explicit disclosure requirements to delay financing or inflate the cost of the transaction.61
A number of conditions must be satisfied in order to take advantage of the
for the Fifth Circuit is readily apparent: "It is probable . . . that practitioners will be unwilling to stray from the safe harbor the rule apparently affords ....
" Woolf v. S.D. Cohn
& Co., 515 F.2d 591, 612 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976). Accord,
Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 908 (5th Cir. 1977).
53. Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975): "[I]t [rule 146] does
provide a useful frame of reference for an appellate court in assessing the validity of §42)
exemptions .
Id. at 612. See also Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 906 (5th
Cir. 1977).
54. 1933 Act §3(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §77c(b) (West Supp. 1978).
55. An overview of the small issue exemption is presented in 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at
605. The House Committee report explaining the rationale for the small issue exemption
can be found at H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933).
56. Act of Oct. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 962 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C.
§77c(b)). See note 42 supra.
57. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
58. SEC Rules 251-264, 17 C.F.R. §§230.251-.264 (1979).
59. SEC Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1979). Rule 240, the more recent of the two
exemptions, became effective March 15, 1975. Securities Act Release No. 5560 (Jan. 24, 1975),
40 Fed. Reg. 6,484 (1975).
60. To meet the rule's requirements, "[b]oth immediately before and immediately after
any transaction in reliance on this rule, the issuer shall, after reasonable inquiry, have
reasonable grounds to believe, and shall believe, that the securities of the issuer . . . are
beneficially owned by 100 or fewer persons." SEC Rule 240(t), 17 C.F.R. §230.240(f) (1979).
For purposes of this limitation, certain persons and entities are not considered to be beneficial
owners. These include any relative or spouse of a beneficial owner, any trust or estate in
which those parties collectively have 1001 of the beneficial interest, and any corporation or
other organization of which those parties are beneficial owners of all equity interests. 4d.
§230.240(f)(l). The owners of such corporations or organizations will be considered as distinct
persons if the corporation or organization was created for the specific purpose of acquiring
the securities offered under the rule. Id. §230.240(f)(2).
Securities acquired in a rule 240 transaction are "restricted" in the sense that they have
the same status in the hands of the purchasers as securities sold in a §4(2) transaction. See
note 162 infra. See also SEC No-Action Letter, Hamelly Indus., available Nov. 29, 1976, [19761977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REi'. (CCH) 80,861.
61. It has been argued, however, that the rule 240 exemption is not as beneficial to the
small business as might initially appear, due to the restricted status of securities in the
hands of purchasers. Potential investors are therefore faced with a significant long-term investment. Under SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. §230.144 (1979), a two-year holding period is required, and thereafter, except under circumstances not likely to be met by small issuers, se-
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rule's protection. All sales must be made by the issuer 62 and must be ac6 3
complished without general advertising or general solicitation or payment
of a commission to anyone for offering or selling the securities.64 In addition,
the aggregate sales price of unregistered securities sold by the issuer within
the twelve months preceding the transaction in question must not exceed
$100,000.65 This dollar limitation includes not only securities sold under rule

240, but also those sold pursuant to Regulation A or any other
66
exemption and those sold in violation of the registration requirement.
Sales above $100,000, however, will not disqualify the entire transaction; the
exemption is lost only for those sales made in excess of the ceiling.67 Nevertheless, the sales which qualify under rule 240 may be integrated with the sales
in excess of the $100,000 ceiling or other sales6 8 in reliance on a different
exemption to destroy the latter's exempt status.
Regulation A is quite different in character from the rule 240 exemption.
Whereas rule 240 requires no formal disclosure, Regulation A essentially
curities may be resold to the public only in limited quantities. Rule 144 is, nevertheless,
rarely available to the investor in a small company because of the requirement that there
be "available adequate current public information with respect to the issuer." Id. §230.144(c).
This is not likely to occur where the issuer is small and its securities are not widely traded.
In the alternative, sales may be made pursuant to rule 237, which requires a five-year
holding period. SEC Rule 237(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. §230.237(a)(3) (1979). Few unaffiliated investors
are willing to commit a capital outlay in an incipient enterprise for such an extended time.
Campbell, supra note 27, at 1150. See also Bloomenthal, supra note 35, at 421 (stating that
rule 144 is available for resales, as a practical matter, only if the issuer subsequently goes
public).
62. SEC Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1979).
63. SEC Rule 240(c), 17 C.F.R. §230.240(c) (1979). The rule provides no definition of
"general advertising" or "general solicitation." The applicable standard is probably similar to
the definition of those terms as used in rule 146. See SEC Rule 146(c), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(c)
(1979) described in note 171 infra. The nature of this requirement is discussed in Securities
Act Release No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974), 89 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974).
64. SEC Rule 240(d), 17 C.F.R. §230.240(d) (1979).
65. SEC Rule 240(e), 17 C.F.R. §230.240(e) (1979). The rule lists certain exclusions from
the $100,000 ceiling computation, which include securities of the issuer sold prior to the
effective date of the rule in conformity with the 1933 Act. Evidences of indebtedness, such as
nonconvertible notes which represent a purchase money mortgage or are issued to specific
lending institutions, are excluded if sold unaccompanied by warrants and in reliance on another exemption. Finally, any securities similarly sold to promoters, directors, executive offcers
or full-time employees of the issuer are excluded from the monetary ceiling computation,
although these persons are included in the beneficial owner limit. Id. at Note 3(b)(ii)
and Note to Note 3(b)(ii). (These citations are to the rule as it appears in the Code of Federal
Regulations. The common citations, however, are SEC Rule 240(e)(2)(ii) and Note to (e)(2)(ii).
1 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 12,358D. Hereafter, the common CCH citation will be used
rather than the official C.F.R. citation, as practitioners, authorities and the SEC itself all
use the "(e)(2)(ii)" designation.) See also Schweitzer, Securities Regulation: An Explanation of
SEC Rule 240 and the Oregon Limited Offering Exemptions, 55 OR. L. REv. 81, 35 (1976).
66. SEC Rule 240(e), 17 C.F.R. §230.240(e) (1979).
67. Id. at Note 2. Thus, if the issuer sold $50,000 of its securities on January 1, $40,000
on June 1, and $30,000 on December 30, only the sale on December 30 would be
considered outside the scope of the rule. The exempt status of the first two sales would
remain intact.
68. Preliminary Note 6 to SEC Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1979). Rule 240 is the only
transactional exemption impervious to integration.
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constitutes a short-form registration procedureP It provides advantages to
the issuer of being both quicker and less expensive than formal registration,
and it is also the only transactional exemption which permits generalized interstate public offerings.7 0
Regulation A specifies a dollar ceiling of $1,500,000 for aggregate sales by
the issuer, its affiliates, and certain estates, 7 1 with an additional limitation of
$300,000 for sales by nonaffiliates and other estates.-2 All ceilings are calculated in terms of offering price to the public.7 3 All securities of the issuer sold
within the preceding year pursuant to any other exemption under section
3(b) as well as any sold in violation of the registration provisions are included in the aggregate sales price of securities which may be offered pursuant
to Regulation A. 74 Because Regulation A offerings require a filing with the
SEC and are public and interstate in nature, their compatibility when integrated with other offerings is very limited7 5
69. See SEC Rule 255, 17 C.F.R. §230.255 (1979); SEC Form I-A, 2 FED. SEc. L. RE!,. (CCH)
17,325. All persons to whom a written offer is made and all purchasers must receive an offering circular, the abbreviated counterpart of the prospectus in the registration statement. SEC
Rule 256(a), 17 C.F.R. §230.256(a) (1979).
70.

See generally Weiss, Regulation A Under the Securities Act of 1933- Highways and

Byways, 8 N.Y.L.F. 3 (1962).
71. SEC Rule 254(a)(1)(A), 17 C.F.R. §230.254(a)(1)(A) (1979). An "affiliate" is a person
in a control relationship with the issuer. SEC Rule 251, 17 C.F.R. §230.251 (1979); Securities
Act Release No. 5225 (Jan. 10, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 599 (1972).
72. SEC Rule 254(a)(1)(B), 17 C.F.R. §230.254(a)(1)(B) (1979). Any individual nonafiliate
or estate may sell only $100,000 of the $300,000 limit. Id.
73. Id. at (b). Thus, if a method of distribution is utilized in which a significant portion
of a Regulation A offering is acquired by insiders of the issuer or an underwriter, or
affiliates of either, with a view toward prompt public resale, any resales made by these insiders at prices in excess of the original purchase price will be included in the ceiling calculation at the resale price. See In re Atlantic Equities Co., 43 S.E.C. 354 (1967); In re Hamilton
Oil & Gas Corp., 40 S.E.C. 796 (1961); In re Lewisohn Copper Corp., 38 S.E.C. 226 (1958).
74. SEC Rule 254(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. §230.254(a)(1) (1979). Eligibility to use Regulation A
may be forfeited by improper conduct of certain persons. See SEC Rule 252(c)-(e), 17 C.F.R.
§230.252(c)-(e) (1979).
75. Thus, a §4(2) offering would almost certainly lose its exemption it integrated with a
Regulation A offering, because the Regulation A offering would in all likelihood have involved
general advertising and general solicitation. See notes 63 supra 8- 171 infra and accompanying
text. An additional impediment to combining successfully the §4(2) and Regulation A offerings would be that some, and likely most, of the offerees and purchasers in the Regulation
A offering could not meet the requisite qualifications for that status in a bona fide §4(2) offering. See text accompanying note 142 infra. In turn, if the two offerings are integrated; the
Regulation A offering ceiling would be reduced by the aggregate public offering price of the
§4(2) offering because that offering was consummated in violation of §5(a). SEC Rule 254(a)(1),
17 C.F.R. §230.254(a)(1) (1979). See note 212 infra.
Rule 240 offerings are uniquely protected against loss of the §3(b) exemption through integration with subsequent offerings. See note 338 infra and accompanying text. However, a rule
240 offering made within one year prior to the commencement of a Regulation A offering will
reduce the amount of securities which may be sold pursuant to Regulation A by the amount
of securities offered or sold pursuant to rule 240. SEC Rule 254(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. §230.254(a)(1)
(1979). On the effect of a Regulation A offering which precedes a rule 240 offering, see text
accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
In a rare instance, §3(a)(ll) and Regulation A offerings may be compatible. See note 106
infra.
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The features of these two very distinctive exemptions clearly reflect the
policy concerns underlying exemptions generally. Regulation A offerings are
almost certain to involve many more investors than offerings under rule 240,
due to the regulation's higher dollar ceiling limit and absence of limitation
on the number of post-offering beneficial owners. Additionally, because Regulation A has no restrictions concerning investor sophistication, as does section
4(2), or geographic location, as does section 3(a)(l1), the need for greater
federal regulation of disclosure to prospective purchasers is pronounced. The
cost incurred following these procedures is justified in view of the size of the
public offering. The quid pro quo for compliance with the more comprehensive requirements of Regulation A as compared with other transactional
exemptions is the freedom to advertise7 and to use the services of underwriters. One also obtains the benefit of SEC staff review of the proposed
offering. Moreover, because Regulation A closely resembles registered offering requirements, the SEC has not restricted the alienability of securities
77
acquired in a Regulation A offering.
The conditions of rule 240, in contrast, promote very different policy
considerations. Although the rule 240 offering is public in the sense that any
member of the investing public is an eligible offeree, formal disclosure is
not required in light of the limited nature of the offering. Rather, investor
protection rests on the $100,000 ceiling, the limitation on the number of
beneficial owners both before and after the offering, the restrictions on general
advertising and general solicitation, and the unavailability of the exemption
for sales by any party other than the issuer. These conditions combine to
limit purchasers to persons with personal contact with the issuer and to restrict
78
significantly the size of their purchases.
B.

Intrastate Transactions

One of the most useful exemptions from registration is the intrastate
exemption under section 3(a)(ll)79 and rule 147.80 Unlike securities transactions not subject to the registration requirements because facilities of interstate commerce are not used,8' the intrastate exemption is premised upon the
notion that transactions which use these facilities but are otherwise wholly
intrastate are adequately policed by state regulation.82 Additional theoretical
76. See SEC Rules 256(c)-(d), 258, 17 C.F.R. §§230.256(c)-(d), .258 (1979).
77. See note 60 supra and notes 162 & 173 infra.
78. The potential investor is in a good position to obtain information from the issuer, as
the pool of investors accessible to the issuer is restricted and the issuer's bargaining power is
not likely to be strong in view of its small size and the restrictions imposed on resale of the
securities. See note 61 supra.
79. 1933 Act §3(a)(ll), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(l1) (1976) provides that the subchapter provisions shall not apply to "Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only
to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a
person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing
business within, such State or Territory."
80. SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1979).
81. See Bloomenthal, supra note 35, at 372-73.
82. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1933).
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underpinnings of the exemption are the probability that investors in local
enterprise will have adequate familiarity with and access to information about
the investment opportunity, 3 and an acknowledgment that intrastate issuers
will be relatively small and thus less able to bear the burden of federal
registration.8 4 The paramount advantage of section 3(a)(11), compared to the
other transactional exemptions, is its allowance of public issues without limitation upon the magnitude of the transaction in terms of the aggregate price
of the securities offered or the number of offerees and purchasers.85
Section 3(a)(11) offers other potential advantages. For example, there are
no specific disclosure requirements," and the restrictions on when a resale
of the securities sold pursuant to the exemption may occur, and to whom
and in what quantity they may be resold, are less stringent than those ap87
plicable to resales of securities sold pursuant to certain other exemptions
Therefore, although structuring a transaction to conform with the requirements of this exemption may be difficult,88 section 3(a)(11) has significant
attraction. Moreover, the adoption of rule 147, which defines the exemption
in considerably greater detail than does the statutory language and provides
a "safe harbor" for conforming transactions, has reduced some of the uncertainty of compliance that previously existed.8 9
1. Section 3(a)(11) Outside Rule 147
In order to be eligible for the intrastate exemption under section
3(a)(11), noncorporate issuers must be residents of,90 and corporate issuers
83. See Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 2,353 (1974) (explaining the nature of the §3(a)(11) exemption as background for promulgation of rule 147).
Using geographical boundaries as a criterion for knowledge is dubious at best.
84. See id. See also Emens & Thomas, The IntrastateExemption of the Securities Act of
1933 in 1971, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 779, 783 (1971); Hicks, Intrastate Offerings Under Rule 147,
72 MiCH. L. lRv. 463, 499-503 (1974).
85. The §3(a)(1l) exemption has neither a limitation on the aggregate value of the
securities offered nor a limit on the number of offerees or purchasers. 1933 Act §3(a)(11), 15
U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (1976). See also Bloomentha, supra note 35, at 381-84 (discussing strategies
of large-scale financing under §3(a)(11)).
86. The anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and a civil liability provision of
the former will still apply to §3(a)(11) transactions. See 1933 Act §§12(2), 17, 15 U.S.C. §771(2),
77q (1976); 1934 Act §10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j (1976); McCauley, IntrastateSecurities Transactions
Under the Federal Securities Act, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 937, 955-59 (1959).
87. Compare In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935) and SEC Rule
147(e), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(e) (1979) with SEC Rules 144(d)-(e), 146(h), 240(g), 17 C.F.R. §§230.144(d)-(e), .146(h), .240(g) (1979).
88. See Bloomenthal, The Federal Securities Act Intra-stateExemption -Fact or Fiction?,
15 Wyo. L.J. 121 (1961); Gadsby, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financing
of Small Businesses, 14 Bus. LAw. 144, 148 (1958).
89. See Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 2,353 (1974) (purpose
of rule 147 inter alia to provide objective standards to facilitate compliance with §3(a)(ll)
exemption).
90. 1933 Act §3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (1976). The test of residency under the statute
is the same as the constitutional test for domicile. Securities Act Release No. 4386 (July 12,
1961), [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fa. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,774; 1 L. Loss, 4upa note 1,
at 599; Bloomenthal, supra note 35, at 374. But see Emens & Thomas, supra note 84, at 786
(residence does not mean domicile under §3(a)(11)).
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must be incorporated within, 91 the state in which all prospective offerees
reside. All the issuers must be "doing business" in that state.92 It appears
settled that mere business activity within the state is insufficient to meet this
requirement, 93 and the SEC has taken the position that the state of the
transaction must be the issuer's principal place of business. 94 In addition, the
bulk of the financing proceeds must be used in the transaction state.95
Once the issuer's residency, business activities and financing plans conform
to the requirements of the intrastate exemption, the most important prerequisite to eligibility is the plan of distribution. Under the statute, the entire
issue must be offered and sold exclusively to residents of the appropriate
state. 9 A single offer, sale or delivery of a security97 to a nonresident will
destroy the exemption's availability.98 While the residency issue is seldom litigated, 99 refusal of the SEC to recognize the issuer's good faith intent to offer
and sell only to residents as determinative of the intrastate nature of an offering'00 places substantial responsibilities on the issuer to police the distribution.' 0'
These distribution problems are further complicated by the requirement that the securities "come to rest" in the hands of residents of the transaction state.10 2 This requirement prevents circumvention of section 3(a)(11)
through sale to residents acting as proxies for nonresidents.'0 3 The statute
provides no guidance, however, as to when securities sold pursuant to section
3(a)(ll) can lawfully be offered or resold to nonresidents. Recent administrative practice appears to require a one year holding period prior to interstate
91. 1933 Act §3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (1976).
92. Id.
93. Bloomenthal, supra note 35, at 377; McCauley, supra note 86, at 950.
94. Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (requiring substantial operational activities within the appropriate state).
95. See id.; Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Truckee Showboat,
Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
96. 1933 Act §3(a)(ll), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (1976). Offers and sales may be made anywhere and by any means, including use of the mails or of instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, so long as the offerees and purchasers are residents. Securities Act Release No. 4434
(Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961).
97. Cummings, The Intrastate Exemption and the Shallow Harbor of Rule 147, 69 Nw.
U.L. REv. 167 (1974) (discussion of the delivery requirement).
98. See Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942); In re Ned J. Bowman Co., 39
S.E.C. 879 (1960); Bloomenthal, supra note 35, at 373.
99. Cummings, supra note 97, at 174; Emens & Thomas, supra note 84, at 785; Comment,
SEC Rule 147-DistillingSubstance from the Spirit of the Intrastate Exemption, 79 DicK. L.
REv. 18, 26 (1974). See note 90 supra.
100. Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961).
101. See Long, A Lawyer's Guide to the Intrastate Exemption and Rule 147, 24
DRAKE L. REV. 471, 473-75 (1975).
102. Securities Act Release No. 201 (July 20, 1934), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (1946). See SEC v.
HilIsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H. 1958), permanent injunction granted, 176
F. Supp. 789 (D.N.H. 1959), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Hillsborough Inv. Corp. v. SEC,
276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960) (securities resold to nonresidents 30 days after original issue held
not to have come to rest). See Cummings, supra note 97, at 175-78; 1 L. Loss, supra note 1,
at 592.
103. See Securities Act Release No. 201 (July 20, 1934), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (1946).
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offers and resales of such securities.104 Oversight of this aspect of the offering
can be more difficult than ensuring that all persons to whom the issuer offers
and sells securities are residents.105
Intrastate offerings are highly vulnerable to loss of exemption through
integration with another offering not made in reliance on section 3(a)(11). If
integration is applicable, no exemption is available unless the integrated
transaction complies with a single exemption. Deliberate compliance with
the narrow requirements of the intrastate exemption is difficult enough, and
it is unlikely that an offering in reliance on another exemption would satisfy
section 8(a)(l1). For example, if any of the offerees or purchasers in the other
offering were nonresidents, section 3(a)(1l) would not be available for the
integrated transaction. Furthermore, the public nature of an intrastate offering will almost certainly preclude it from qualifying for the exemption pursuant to which the other offering was conducted.0 6
2.

Rule 147

Rule 147107 is the SEC's attempt to impart certainty to the intrastate

exemption by establishing objective standards for application of section
3(a)(11).los Although not entirely successful,l09 and perhaps interpreted too
restrictively," 0 rule 147 has added a substantial degree of certainty to the
operative concepts of the intrastate offering exemption."' For example,
104. See Hicks, supra note 84, at 470. The "one year rule" was originally adopted in
In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935).
105. For discussion of similar types of controls used to prevent improper resales of securities sold pursuant to rule 147 and §4(2), see notes 114 & 162 infra.
106. The rare exception might be the integration of an intrastate and a Regulation A
offering, where the latter is conducted in a manner which complies with §3(a)(11). If, on
the other hand, the offering which is integrated with the intended intrastate offering has been
registered, the combined transaction clearly will not satisfy the registration provisions, nor
will it comply with §3(a)(11) unless the registered offering meets, in every respect, the requirements of that section. In each of these two instances, there is little probability that
either the Regulation A or the registered offering would comply with §3(a)(11). Such compliance would, presumably, have rendered the more expensive and time-consuming requirements of Regulation A and registration unnecessary. Only where the issuer's paramount
concern is to offer securities which have no restrictions on alienation or to have its securities
held by residents of more than one jurisdiction might the issuer register or resort to Regulation A where the offering would have been feasible under §3(a)(11).
107. SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1979).
108. See Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 2,353 (1974) (adopting
rule 147). The rule is nonexclusive; that is, compliance with its requirements is not the only
manner in which a §3(a)(11) exemption may be obtained. Preliminary Note 1 to SEC Rule
147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1979). The rule may be used only by issuers. Preliminary Note 4 to
SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1979).
109. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 84, at 491-99.
110. See, e.g., Kant, supra note 27 (criticizing, inter alia, that an innocent immaterial
failure by the issuer to comply with rule 147 will preclude reliance on the rule). But see
Hicks, supra note 84, at 503-06 (making an excellent argument that rule 147 often permits
intrastate offerings under circumstances in which stricter regulation is needed than is provided by the rule and the applicable state securities law).
111. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 27, at 1168-70; Hicks, supra note 84, at 466-90.
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residency of offerees and purchasers is defined as the location of the principal
office of a business entity and the principal residence of an individual." 2 The
"doing business" requirement under the statute has been reduced to a fourpart analysis which requires that the issuer must have derived at least eighty
percent of its gross revenues from, have eighty percent of its assets located
in, use eighty percent of the proceeds of the proposed offering within, and
have its principal office in the transaction state." 3 Finally, the "coming to
rest" concept has been interpreted to permit interstate resales nine months
after the last sale by the issuer which was part of the intrastate offering
made pursuant to the rule. 114 This is a reasonably discernible standard as
long as the offering pursuant to the rule is not subject to integration with a
subsequent offering. If uncertainty exists as to whether integration is applicable, then interstate resales of securities acquired in the intrastate offering
may have to be postponed until the expiration of nine months after the last
sale in the subsequent offering." 5
An offering which conforms to rule 147 will retain its exempt status, although the offering would be nonexempt as a result of being integrated with
another offering were the rule not available.- 1 To obtain this safe harbor,
strict compliance with the rule is necessary. Such compliance is rarely
assured. 11 Consequently, the probability of integration must always be considered.
112. See generally Hicks, supra note 84, at 483-86. In the case of an individual, "principal
residence" is an objective determination made without reference to domiciliary intent. 1-d.
at 485.
113. SEC Rule 147(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(c)(2) (1979). See generally Hicks, supra note
84, at 479-83, 491-97.
114. SEC Rule 147(e), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(e) (1979). See generally Hicks, supra note 84,
at 487-90. The rules require issuers to take certain precautions against premature interstate
resales by placing a restrictive legend on the certificates or documents evidencing the securities
and issuing stop transfer instructions to the transfer agent. SEC Rule 147(f)(1)(i)-(ii), 17 C.F R.
§230.147(f)(I)(i)-(ii) (1979).
115. The availability of such a precautionary approach assumes that interstate resales have
not occurred before the commencement of the subsequent offering. In that event, the subsequent offering would in all likelihood have to be abandoned altogether to avoid loss of protection under §3(a)(11) for the prior offering.
A hypothetical will: An issuer concludes a rule 147 offering on January 1. More
than nine months later, in October, interstate resales of securities sold in this offering
are made. On November 1, the issuer undertakes another offering of securities pursuant to an
exemption other than §3(a)(l1) which might be integrated with the offering concluded on
January 1. If the two offerings were to be integrated, the other exemption would probably
not apply to the combined transaction for reasons explained in note 106 supra and accompanying text; nor would §3(a)(11) apply since interstate resales had been made before nine months
after the last sale in the case of rule 147 (see SEC Rule 147(e), 17 C.F.R. §250.147(e) (1979))
or before one year after the last sale in the case of §3(a)(11) outside the rule (see note 104
supra and accompanying text).
116. See SEC Rule 147(b), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(b) (1979).
117. The integration shelter of rule 147 is available only if all of the provisions of the rule
have been satisfied. See SEC Rule 147(a), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(a) (1979). Full compliance is determined objectively, without regard for the reasonableness or good faith of the issuer's
conduct. Compare SEC Rule 146(d), (f)-(g), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(d), (f)-(g) (1979), extending a
safe harbor under §4(2) to transactions which the issuer reasonably believes comply with the
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C.

Exchange Transactions

The exemptions provided by sections 3(a)(l1), 3(b) and 4(2) serve primarily
as vehicles for raising new capital for enterprise expansion. In contrast, the
section 3(a)(9) exemption" 5 for exchange transactions,:" 9 or transactions
wherein security holders surrender currently held securities for securities
newly issued by the same issuer, appears to presume that such an exchange
would occur primarily as an element in a plan of financial retrenchment2
Thus, unlike the exemptions previously discussed, where the controlling
theoretical consideration appears to be investor protection, section 3(a)(9)'s
primary focus is on whether registration imposes an excessive burden on a
financially troubled business.' 2 ' Nevertheless, the SEC has restrictively interpreted the scope of the exemption, because information about the issuer may
be as necessary to informed decisionmaking where the offeree is asked to part
with a currently held security as it is where the consideration is of another
form."
The principal interpretative pronouncement on the meaning of section
3(a)(9) states that exchange offers eligible for exemption must be "bona
fide." 2 3 This requirement essentially reflects the same concerns that supported
the "come to rest" doctrine under sections 3(a)(ll) and 4(2) and rule 24012-that the immediate recipients of the newly issued securities not be mere

requirements referred to in note 168 infra. Moreover, as a practical matter, the issuer must
wait at least nine months after the last sale in the offering to ascertain whether all of the
requirements of rule 147 have been met, since a single interstate resale during that period
will eliminate the availability of the rule.
118. 1933 Act §3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C.A. §77c(a)(9) (West Supp. 1978). This section exempts
"any security exchanged by the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively where no
commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting such
exchange." Id.
119. The proscriptions of §5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §77e (1976), apply to "sales," as
defined under §2(3), 15 U.S.C. §77a(3) (1976). Exchanges of securities also constitute sales. See
United States v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1946). Furthermore, an exchange within
the contemplation of the statute may occur without a formal surrender of the original security
and issuance of a new one, as when a modification or amendment of the security holder's
rights occurs. United States v. New York, New Haven 8:Hartford R.R., 276 F.2d 525 (2d Cir.
1960); SEC v. Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 99 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1938).
120. Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities Act of 1933, 4
LAw &- CoNmrirp. PROB. 89, 98 (1937).

121. 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 573. The author indicates that the balancing of the reorganizational needs of the business and the need for investor protection was resolved in favor
of the former because the legislature believed that the preclusion of remuneration would
avoid the danger that the exemption would be used to evade the registration provisions of the
1933 Act. But cf. Throop & Lane, supra note 120, at 97 (indicating that the exemption was
not intended to evidence "a legislative presumption that existing security holders as a class
are in no need of the protection afforded by the registration and prospectus requirements
of the Act...').
122. See Hicks, Recapitalizations Under Section 3(aX9) of the Securities Act of 1933,
61 VA. L. REy. 1057, 1109 (1975).

123. Securities Act Release No. 646 (Feb. 3, 1936), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,956 (1946).
124. See notes 60-61, 102-103 supra & note 162 infra and accompanying text.
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conduits in a public offering of broader scope. 1 25 To prevent such misuse of

the exemption, the SEC announced that it would evaluate several factors to
ascertain the legitimacy of a section 3(a)(9) transaction, including the length
of time that the security holders had held the outstanding securities prior to
the exchange, the number of security holders, and the marketability of the
outstanding securities.126 The SEC also indicated it would consider "whether
the exchange . . .was dictated by financial considerations of the issuer and

not primarily.., to enable one or a few security holders to distribute their
127
holdings to the public."

The section 3(a)(9) exemption has since received little judicial or administrative interpretation.128 A recent study of SEC no-action letters 29 however,
has revealed a substantial adumbration of the "bona fide exchange" doctrine.13O
The threshold question of 3(a)(9) analysis is whether the offered securities and
the securities to be surrendered are issued by the same entity.131 If they are
not, then even if the new issuer represents essentially a reconstitution of the
original issuer, the exemption will be unavailable although no new investment decision is required.13 2 Secondly, section 3(a)(9) has been read to require that the exchange offer be made exclusively to existing security
holders13 and exclusively in consideration of currently outstanding securities34 Finally, extraordinary remuneration or commissions may not be paid
to agents who solicit the exchange. 3 5 Rather, the distribution must be accomplished largely by the issuer's personnel without unusual compensation,
125. See Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,963 (1946); Securities Act Release No. 646 (Feb. 3, 1936), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,956 (1946).
126. Securities Act Release No. 646 (Feb. 3, 1936), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,956 (1946).
127. Id.
128. Hicks, supra note 122, at 1058.
129. For discussion of the legal significance of SEC no-action letters, see notes 351-357
infra and accompanying text.
130. See generally Hicks, supra note 122.
131. In re Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957),
[1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 76,539; Securities Act Release No. 2029
(Aug. 8, 1939), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,963 (1946); Securities Act Release No. 646 (Feb. 3, 1936), 11
Fed. Reg. 10,956 (1946).
132. Recreation Ventures, available May 14, 1973, [1973] SEC No-AcrsON LL=Tr.aS (CCH),
roll 5, frame 08607; Cedar Paint Oil & Gas, available Mar. 29, 1973, [1973] SEC No-AcnON
LETrERS (CCH), roll 3, frame 04131. But cf. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co.,
499 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1974) (voting trust renewal exempt where renewal had been contemplated in original issuance of certificates).
133. Hicks, supra note 122, at 1089. Section 3(a)(9)'s requirement of exclusivity is integrally
related to the issue concept and integration. See generally Securities Act Release No. 2029
(Aug. 8, 1939), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,963 (1946); Hicks, supra note 122, at 1089-92; Throop & Lane,
supra note 120, at 97. See also notes 178-181 infra and accompanying text.
134. Hicks, supra note 122, at 1085. Although under SEC Rules 149 and 150, 17 C.F.R.
§§230.149, .150 (1979), cash adjustments among security holders and cash payments from
issuers to security holders have become permissible, an exchange which requires the investor
to furnish consideration other than securities of the issuer will not meet the requirements of
the exemption. Bank of Cal., available May 18, 1972, [1972] SEC No-AcanoN L'rr.Rs (CCH),
roll 5, frame 07184.
135. Hicks, supra note 122, at 1093.
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except perhaps for incidental expenses. 3 6 The assistance of third party intermediaries, although not prohibited, is risky. 137
Comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of section 3(a)(9) with
the other exemptions would be meaningless. The unique circumstances and
business purposes which attend recapitalization preclude consideration of
section 8(a)(9) as an alternative to any of the other exempted offerings. Moreover, the restrictions which circumscribe section 3(a)(9)'s availability are
specifically designed to prevent its employment for raising new capital."5 In
the same vein, it is virtually inconceivable that an offering under section
3(a)(9) would retain its exempt status under that section if it were integrated
with another offering. The availability of a different transactional exemption for the integrated transaction is also highly unlikely. IA. an unusual
instance, the combined transaction may qualify under section 3(a)(11) outside
of rule 147, if all of the issuer's security holders are residents of the appropriate jurisdiction, or under section 4(2) outside rule 146, if all the issuer's security holders are financially sophisticated and have been given the requisite
access to information as well as restricted securities in the attempted exchange
offering." 9
D.

Private Transactions

Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act exempts from registration "transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering."' 40 The legislative history of
section 4(2) indicates an intent to exempt those transactions "where there is
no practical need for the [1933 Act's] application ...

[or] where the public

benefits are too remote."'-' This language contemplates situations where the
financial sophistication of the offerees and the limited manner of offering
render the protective functions of the 1933 Act unnecessary. 142
The generality of the statutory language, however, left practitioners uncertain of the scope of the private offering exemption. 143 Moreover, judicial
and administrative interpretations144 of the exemption were too fact-oriented
136. See SEC No-Action Letter, Chris-Craft Indus., available Oct. 8, 1972, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 179,052.
137. Hicks, supra note 122, at 1089-92.
138. This proscription is reinforced by treating the newly issued security, for purposes of
resale, as the surrendered security. In other words, restricted securities cannot be "laundered"
in an exchange transaction to circumvent the applicable minimum holding period. See Hicks,
supra note 122, at 1096-1106.
139. See note 151 infra and accompanying text. If precautions are taken to restrict the
transferability of securities exchanged for securities held by existing security holders, rule
240 might also apply, but the narrow limitations of that exemption would probably be
exceeded by the integrated transaction. See notes 60-66 supra and accompanying text.
140. 1933 Act §4(2), 15 U.S.C, §77d(2) (1976).
141 H.R. REI. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
142. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
143. See Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Non-public and Intrastate
Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of Securities, 74 COLUm. L. REv. 622, 632
(1974).
144. Cheek, Exemptions Under the Proposed FederalSecurities Code, 30 VMND. L. REv. 355,
359 n.14 (1977); Heumann, supranote 27, at 3.
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to provide the necessary definitional framework. 14 5 Consequently, the SEC
promulgated rule 146 to provide objective standards for determining whether
an offer or sale of securities by an issuer qualifies for an exemption under
section 4(2).146 Because rule 146 provides a nonexclusive method of qualification, 1 47 issuers may attempt to secure the private offering exemption by
complying with the specific provisions of rule 146 or by following the prevailing administrative and judicial interpretations of section 4(2). 14"
1. Section 4(2) Outside Rule 146
In assessing the availability of the private offering exemption outside rule
146,149 the offerees' need for protection is paramount.150 Whether such protection is adequate will essentially depend upon the nature and number of
offerees, the offerees' access to information about the issuer, the size and
manner of the offering, and the imposition of restrictions on redistribution
of the securities sold pursuant to the exemption.' 51
Although section 4(2) is not framed in terms of a maximum number of
offerees, practitioners had long assumed that the exemption's availability was
predicated on such a numerical limit.' 5 2 Therefore, attention focused pri145. Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (1946) (expressing
the opinion that what constitutes a public offering is a question of fact to be resolved upon
consideration of all surrounding circumstances).
146. Securities Act Release No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974).
147. Id.; Preliminary Note 1 to SEC Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1979). This preliminary note specifies that the exemption will still be available for issuers who do not wish to
comply with the rule or who attempt to comply and fail. See note 52 supra.
148. Id.
149. Because rule 146 offers a guaranteed safe harbor for issuers who meet the requirements specified therein, issuers ordinarily attempt to conduct private placements pursuant to
the rule. In addition, the SEC appears to prefer the more objective language of its rule to
the nebulous language of §4(2), largely because the former is likely to be construed more restrictively than the latter. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 906 (5th Cir.
1977). Consequently, as discussed in note 52 supra, the SEC has shown little inclination to
clarify the statutory exemption, and there still exists confusion as to the requirements of
§4(2) outside rule 146. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 27, at 1158; McDermott, The Private
Offering Exemption, 59 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1974).
150. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953). This decision, in holding that a
corporation's employee stock purchase plan did not qualify as a private offering, emphasized
the necessity that the offerees be able to "fend for themselves."
151. The confusion as to exactly which facts should be examined in order to determine
the availability of the private offering exemption outside rule 146 is apparent from the
numerous variations of the essential elements suggested by authorities in the field. See, e.g.,
Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 143, at 628 (expressing the belief that the §4(2) exemption
should be available if the issuer offers only to financially sophisticated persons, distributes an
offering circular containing information equivalent to that found in a registration statement
to each offeree and provides opportunity to verify the information, and places adequate limitations upon resale); ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Position Paper,
Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAw. 485, 489 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 ABA
Position Paper] (taking the position that the key considerations are offeree qualification,
availability of information, manner of offering and absence of immediate redistribution).
152. The primary reason for this belief was an early release in which General Counsel
John J. Burns indicated that an offering to not more than 25 persons would presumably not
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marily on what constituted this upper limit.'5 3 However, in SEC v. Ralston
Purina,54 the Supreme Court eschewed this numerical approach, emphasizing
instead the existence vel non of a special relationship between the issuer and
the investor which would furnish the protection otherwise provided by registration. Presently, the existence of a limited number of offerees constitutes
some evidence that the requisite relationship between the issuer and each
offeree exists., 5
Whether an offeree needs the protection which registration provides depends upon its financial sophistication, 58 ability to bear the investment
risk, 57 and the closeness of its relationship with the issuer. 58 Any one of
these factors, if satisfied, may vitiate the practical need for full disclosure.
Nevertheless, establishment of only one of these criteria will not assure
availability of the private offering exemption. 5 9 In any case, to qualify for
the private offering exemption outside rule 146, the issuer must bear the
burden of showing that each offeree had access to the information that a
registration statement would provide 60 and the opportunity to verify any
information provided by the issuer.'61
A private offering can readily be transformed into a public distribution
if the purchasers prematurely resell their securities to the public. 62 Although
be a public offering. See Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952
(1946).
153.

Casey, SEC Rules 144 and 146 Revisited, 43 BRoOK. L. REv. 571, 579 (1977).

154. 346 US. 119 (1953). "mhe statute would seem to apply to a 'public offering' whether
to few or many." Id. at 125. The nature of the offerees and purchasers, rather than their
number, would appear to be the more significant consideration after Ralston Purina. Harrison,
Twenty-Eight Years Without Definition- The Private Offering Exemption, 24 ARK. L. REv.

417, 422 (1971).
155. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962).
156. Compare Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.
1971) with Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
157. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 10, at 341; 1975 ABA Position Paper, supra note
151, at 491.
- 158. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1959); R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, supra note 10, at 341; Mulford, Private Placements and Intrastate Offerings of Securi-

ties, 13 Bus. LAw. 297, 300-01 (1958); 1975 ABA Position Paper, supra note 151, at 491.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967)
(purchasers were sophisticated investors but offering nevertheless failed to qualify for §4(2)
exemption because none of the purchasers had access to the information a registration would
provide); SEC v. Tax Serv., Inc., 357 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1966) (mere fact that offerees were
attorneys and persons familiar with issuer's publication did not establish availability of
§4(2) where offerees had neither knowledge of, nor access to, the information registration
would disclose).
160. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir. 1971).
161. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 158 (5th Cir. 1972); Securities Act
Release No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974). In Doran v. Petroleum Mgt.
Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 904-08 (5th Cir. 1977), the court required the issuer to demonstrate
that each offeree was afforded actual disclosure of the information a registration statement
would provide or had effective access to such information. Insider status of the offeree
might be indicative of access, id., but insider status is not required. Woolf v. S.D. Cohn &
Co., 515 F.2d 591, 612 (5th Cir. 1977).
162. Section 4(2) contemplates placement of securities of the issuer with purchasers who
intend to hold for investment. Because the securities are considered restricted in the hands
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section 4(2) contains no size limitation nor any specific restriction on the
number of purchasers, an offering of a very large dollar amount of securities
to other than institutional investors or an offering to a large number of investors may be deemed public unless the purchasers show sufficient financial
standing to indicate that immediate resales are unlikely. 1 3 Similarly, use of
public advertising or offerings accomplished in a manner other than through
direct contact between issuer and offeree may cause the offering to be con6
sidered public.
Because an offering conducted under any transactional exemption other
than section 4(2) will involve a public offering, alternative resort to the
private offering exemption is precluded. For the same reason, section 4(2)
will virtually never be available for an offering pursuant to section 4(2) which
is integrated with an offering made in reliance on any other transactional
exemption. It is more likely that such other exemption will be available for
the combined transaction, particularly when either rule 240 or section
65
3(a)(11) has been relied upon.1
M

2.

Rule 146

Rule 146166 is a more restrictive' 6 7 yet more objective definition of the
private offering exemption than that which is articulated in section 4(2). In
addition to greater certainty, the rule has other significant advantages over
of purchasers, precautions must be taken by the issuer to prevent premature resale. These
precautions typically include placing a legend that describes the restrictions on resale on the
document or certificate evidencing the security, issuing stop transfer instructions to the transfer
agent, and obtaining a letter from the purchaser stating his or her investment intent. Securities
Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962). See also Meer, The Private
Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act, 20 S.W.L.J. 503, 517 (1966). Investment
letters are not conclusive as to actual intent. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962),
27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962); 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 666; Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 143,
at 630; Kennedy, The Case of the Scarlet Letter or the Easy Way Out on "Private Offerings,"
23 Bus. LAw. 23, 28-29 (1967).
SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. §230.144 (1979), governs public resales of restricted securities;
subsection (d) of that rule prescribes a holding period of two years. SEC Rule 144(d), 17
C.F.R. §230.144(d) (1979). See also SEC Rule 237, 17 C.F.R. §230.287 (1979). There is little
judicial authority on when public resales of restricted securities may be made. See United
States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (two years sufficient in the absence of
evidence of lack of purchaser's investment intent at the time of acquisition).
163. See Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962). See
generally Harrison, supra note 154.
164. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962). Offerings
through public media would presumably be inconsistent with a claimed intent to make a
private offering. See, e.g., Robertson v. Business Boosters' Country Club, 212 Ala. 621, 103 So.
576 (1925). Furthermore, a large number of offerees may be evidence of the public nature
of an offering.
165. As a precaution, where integration is a potential threat, it is not uncommon for an
issuer to try to conform with §3(a)(11) as well as §4(2) when attempting to make a private
offering close in time to an intrastate offering.
166. SEC Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1979).
167. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 906 (5th Cir. 1977). For an example,
the statutory language, unlike the rule, imposes no explicit limitation on the number of
purchasers.
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its statutory counterpart. For example, a reasonable belief on the part of the
issuer that certain aspects of the rule have been satisfied will suffice, while
the statutory law may be interpreted to require compliance irrespective of
proper care. 168 In addition, certain persons who lack financial sophistication
may participate as offerees and purchasers in an offering pursuant to the rule
if they are assisted by an offeree representative. 169 Rule 146 does not, however,
stray from the principal foci of the judicial interpretations of the statutory
language. Under the rule, the primary concerns are that the offerees and
purchasers have access to the information that a registration statement would
provide and that they are able to fend for themselves. 70 To decrease the
probability that offers will be made to unqualified. offerees, all forms of
general solicitation and general advertising are proscribed. 171 Unlike the
emphasis on the number of offerees under section 4(2) outside the rule, rule
146 limits only the number of purchasers per transaction 7 The rule also requires that the issuer undertake specific precautionary measures against public
resales by purchasers similar to those precautions typically undertaken in
private offerings outside the rule. 173
The problems wrought by integration of an offering made under rule
146 are similar to those attending integration of an offering made pursuant
to section 4(2) outside the rule.'74 Additionally, the limitation on the number
of purchasers creates a roadblock to application of the rule to a combined
transaction comprised of one or more offerings pursuant to the rule. 7 5 Nothing
1

168. See SEC Rule 146(d) (nature of offerees and purchasers), (g) (number of purchasers),
17 C.F.R. §230.146(d), (g) (1979); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971). But
see 1975 ABA Position Paper, supra note 151, at 493-94 (suggesting that if the circumstances
indicate that the issuer has acted diligently and no one has been harmed, a court "should,
and probably would" ignore a minor failure to make offerings only to qualified offerees).
169. See SEC Rule 146(d)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(d)(2)(ii) (1979). But see 1975 ABA Posi-

tion Paper, supra note 151, at 492 (stating that on three occasions the judiciary, in construing
§4(2), has recognized to some extent the offeree representative principle).
170. Compare Securities Act Release No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974)
(adopting rule 146) and SEC Rule 146(d)-(f), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(d)-(f) (1979) with SEC v.
Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972) ond Hill York Corp. v. American
Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
171. SEC Rule 146(c), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(c) (1979). Rule 146(c) defines "general advertis-

ing" and "general solicitation" to include publications in newspapers or magazines, broadcasts over television or radio, seminars or meetings unless attended by persons who are
financially sophisticated or are represented by persons who qualify as such, and written com-

munications to anyone except financially sophisticated persons. Id.
172. SEC Rule 146(g), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(g) (1979). The issuer need only have a reason-

able belief that there are no more than 35 purchasers. Id. Adoption of a numerical test does
not contravene the Ralston Purina decision, because although the Court refused to prescribe

such a test in that case, the SEC's authority to do so was acknowledged. 346 U.S. at 125;
Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 143, at 641. Certain persons are not counted as purchasers,
either because of the size of their investment or because beneficial ownership exists primarily

in a single family or business unit. SEC Rule 146(g)(2), 17 C.F.R. §230.1 46 (g)(2) (1979).
173. SEC Rule 146(h), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(h) (1979). Securities sold pursuant to the rule

are considered restricted in the hands of purchasers. See note 162 supra.
174. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
175. Thus, two 20-purchaser offerings which are integrated will not, as a single trans-

action, comply with rule 146, if only because the number of purchasers exceeds the limitation
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in the rule, however, diminishes the possibility that an offering pursuant
thereto when combined with a rule 240 or section 3(a)(11) offering would together satisfy the latter exemption. 1 76 Furthermore, rule 146 prescribes a

means of assuring that offerings made under it will not lose their exemption
through integration with certain other types of offerings. 1 7" The rule does not,
however, provide a safe harbor from integration with every type of offering,
and its protection is, in part, dependent on future conduct. In addition, the
guidelines for compliance with the rule are indefinite, particularly as to the
nature of the solicitation employed and the sufficiency of access to information afforded offerees and purchasers - areas in which the issuer's due care is
irrelevant. Consequently, the likelihood of integration remains a significant
consideration in offerings made pursuant to rule 146.
II.

ORIGINS AND EARLY APPLICATIONS OF INTEGRATION

(1933-1961)

Underlying the scheme of transactional exemptions in sections 3 and 4
of the 1933 Act is a theoretical assumption that a firm's past financial transactions can be separated into distinct and identifiable issues. The premise is
explicit in several provisions. For instance, section 3(a)(11) exempts only those
securities which are "part of an issue" offered and sold intrastate.17 Section
3(b) similarly is restricted in its application to an "issue" of securities with
an offering price not in excess of $2,000,000.1 9 Despite the obvious significance
of the issue concept, the vast array of variables that attend financial transactions has generated difficulty in its practical application.
Implementation of the issue concept entails a determination whether a
series of securities offerings constitutes one or more transactions. The concept
itself had been interpreted at an early date to require that the transaction be
registered or that all activities conducted in furtherance of a transaction or
issue of securities strictly conform to the requirements of a single exemption.,,o
Integration is the logical extension of the notion that an issuer should not
be allowed to circumvent an exemption's requirements by resorting to a combination of transactional exemptions to insulate what would otherwise be a
nonexempt public offering from the 1933 Act's registration provisions. Likewise, an issuer should not be permitted to effect an otherwise nonexempt
public offering by making a partially registered and partially exempt issue.
Integration was first applied in 1933 by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), the SEC's predecessor in administering the 1933 Act, 8 ' in response
of rule 146(g). See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8, §4.15[5][b][ii] at 4-160. This assumes that
the total number of different purchasers in the combined transaction exceeds 35. See Henry
Exploration Co., available Nov. 24, 1978, SEC No-Ac'noN LETTERS (CCH), fiche 55, frame E15.
176. See note 165 supra and accompanying text.
177. SEC Rule 146(b), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(b) (1979). See text accompanying note 116 supra.
178. 1933 Act §3(a)(l1), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (1976).
179. 15 U.S.C.A. §77c(b) (West Supp. 1978).
180. 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 577-78, 591-96, 615-19, 687-89.
181. The FTC was initially responsible for administration of the 1933 Act. The functions,
powers and duties of the FTC under the 1933 Act were transferred to the SEC by the 1934
Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §210, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (amending 1933 Act §2(5)) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §77b(5) (1976)).
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to an inquiry regarding an intrastate offering.11 The letter of inquiry had
questioned whether intrastate sales of securities could be perfected during
the post-filing, pre-effective period of a registration statement,8 3 and had
indicated that the proposed intrastate sales would be from the issue covered
by the registration statement28 4 The FTC's response launched the application
of integration in conclusory, ambiguous terms:
The Securities Act will not permit you to use the mails inside the
state of X for the sale of securities until a registration statement is
effective unless, in accordance with the provisions of section [3(a)(11)]
the entire issue is to be sold to residents of that state. It is understood
that you plan to sell part of the issue to non-residents of X as soon as
the registration statement becomes effective. If this is done, the conditions of section [3(a)(11)] will not be met, and any use of the mails for
sales within the state pending an effective registration will be a violation of the Act. 8 5
Shortly thereafter, the SEC adopted its predecessor's treatment of the issue
concept in a decision regarding a similar offering for which the issuer sought
section 3(a)(11) protection.8 8
182. Section 3(a)(11), which originally appeared in the 1983 Act as §5(c), provided in
part as follows: "The provisions of this section relating to the use of the mails shall not apply
to the sale of any security where the issue of which it is a part is sold only to persons resident
within a single State or Territory ....
" 1933 Act, Pub. L. No. 73-22, §5(c), 48 Stat. 77 (1938).
In 1934, this language was deleted and §8(a)(11) was added in its present form. 1934 Act, Pub.
L. No. 73-291, §204, 48 Stat. 906 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (1976)).
183. Securities Act Release No. 97 (Dec. 28, 1933), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,949 (1946).
184. Id. at 10,950.
185. Id. (emphasis added). Cf. notes 79-85 supra and accompanying text (purposes of
intrastate exemption). See also In re Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 88 S.E.C. 680 (1958).
186. See In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (1985), in which the SEC
informally required a registration statement to be filed under the 1933 Act with respect to
$8,000,000 principal amount of 15-year bonds as a prerequisite to their registration under
§12(e) of the 1984 Act and continued listing on the New York Stock Exchange. All of the
bonds had been sold to four New York investment banking houses acting as underwriters in
reliance on §8(a)(11). Approximately 15% of such bonds, however, were resold by the underwriters or their transferees to nonresidents of New York prior to the completion of the
distribution. Interestingly, the issuer's counsel had believed that §3(a)(1l) was available despite
Securities Act Release No. 97 (Dec. 28, 1933), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,951 (1946). The issuer's counsel
also relied on §3(a)(11) despite a prior public statement by the FTC that, while referring
specifically to the proposed bond offering without mentioning the issuer's name, advised that
"in order that the exemption of §3(a)(11) might be available . . .it is clearly required that
the securities at the time of completion of ultimate distribution shall be found only in the
hands of investors resident within the State." Securities Act Release No. 201 (July 20, 1934),
11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (1946). In addition, the Chief of the Securities Division of the FTC had
previously orally rendered a similar opinion to the underwriters' counsel, who, in turn, had
reported it to the issuer prior to the commencement of the offering. 1 S.E.C. at 159.
Almost two years later, the SEC, citing with approval the Brooklyn Manhattan Transit
Corp. proceeding, reaffirmed the basic tenets of integration as applied to offerings made in
reliance on §3(a)(l1): "[S]ince . . . the exemption is applicable only if the entire issue is

distributed under the circumstances specified [in §3(a)(11)], any ... sales to a non-resident in
connection with the distribution of the new issue would destroy the exemption as to all securities which are a part of that issue. This is true regardless of whether such sales are made
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The term "issue" as used in section 3(b) of the 1933 Act initially received
treatment similar to that accorded the term in section 3(a)(l1). In re Unity
Gold Corp.18 7 involved a stop order proceeding"' brought to test certain

statements which the registrant proposed to add to its registration statement.
The amendments would have declared that all shares previously sold by the
registrant had been sold in conformity with rule 202, an administrative exemption adopted pursuant to section 3(b).1 89 The SEC found that the attempted
rule 202 offering, involving 75,000 shares of unregistered common stock sold
to one individual on March 19, 1937, was "part of the same 'issue' as the
[600,000] shares covered by the registration statement"' 90 filed on May 25, 1937.
Accordingly, the SEC held the 75,000 shares not exempt under section 3(b),
because the aggregate value of the combined offerings exceeded the $100,000
single issue limitation then contained in section 3(b).191
The SEC explained:
The manifest purpose of the $100,000 proviso contained in section
3(b) of the Act is to limit the exercises of the Commission's exempting
power to cases of small financing. It follows that the proviso cannot
of large financing
be construed to permit the exemption of small portions
92
operations. This would defeat its very purpose.1
Unlike prior applications of integration,' 9 3 however, the SEC's opinion expressed more than a mere conclusion that the two transactions should be
integrated. Rather, the Commission made its first attempt to formulate guidelines for implementing the single issue concept through integration:
directly to non-residents or indirectly through residents who purchased with a view to resale
and thereafter sold to a non-resident; and it would furthermore be immaterial that the sales
might be made without use of the mails or instruments of interstate commerce, or by persons
themselves exempt from the registration and prospectus requirements, and might therefore,
as isolated transactions, involve no violation of the Securities Act. Any such sales to nonresidents, however few, and even though legal in themselves, would preclude compliance with
the conditions of section 3(a)(11), and would render the exemption unavailable for the portion
of the issue sold to residents through use of the mails." Securities Act Release No. 1459 (May
20, 1937), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,958 (1946) (emphasis added).
187. 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938).
188. 1933 Act §8(d), 15 U.S.C. §77h(d) (1976). Under this section the SEC may, after
it appears
giving the issuer due notice and an opportunity for hearing, issue a stop order "[i]f
to the Commission at any time that the registration statement includes any untrue statement
of 4 material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading." The order suspends effectiveness of the
registration statement. Cessation of the stop order is mandatory if the registration statement
is amended in accordance with the order. Id.
189. Regulation A, SEC Rules 251-264, 17 C.F.R. §§230.251-.264 (1979), is the current
equivalent to former rule 202. The latter established procedures whereby $100,000 of securities
could be sold to the public without registration pursuant to §3(b). See Securities Act Release
No. 182, Part III (Mar. 15, 1936) (available from the SEC); 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 60910.
190. 3 S.E.C. at 625.
191. Id. at 625-26.
192. Id. at 625.
193. See notes 185-186 supra and accompanying text.
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The determination whether securities are being offered as part of a
single "issue" will depend upon a consideration of various factors
concerning the methods of sale and distribution employed to effect
the offerings and the disposition of the proceeds. If the offerings may be
segregated into separate blocks, as evidenced by material differences
in the use of the proceeds, in the manner and terms of distribution,
and in similar related details, each offering will be a separate "issue."
In the main, of course, each case must be determined upon the basis
of its own facts.""
In addition, the SEC stated:
[S]ecurities of the same class, offered on the same general terms to
the public in an uninterrupted program of distribution, cannot be
segregated into separate "issues" merely by claiming an exemption for
a limited portion of such shares under Rule 202, or under any otheil
rules of the Commission adopted in accordance with section 3(b) of
the Act, and registering the remainder. 95
Six considerations emerged after Unity Gold as relevant factors for evaluating the impact of integration on a series of securities offerings:
(1) the plan of distribution, i.e., whether the plan to distribute the
securities includes as well the distribution of other securities;
(2) the means of distribution, i.e., the methods of sale and distribution;
(3) the classes of securities offered;
(4) the general terms on which the securities were offered;
(5) the timing of the offerings; and
(6) the use of the proceeds from the offerings. 96
The relative weights to be accorded these factors were not specified by the
SEC. Nevertheless, these factors have since provided the framework for integration analysis not only under sections 3(b) and 3(a)(11), but also under
197
the other transactional exemptions.
Integration of offerings made pursuant to section 3(a)(11) or 3(b) was
premised in part on the explicit incorporation of the issue concept in those
sections. Unity Gold, however, revealed that the issue concept reflected a
general legislative concern that exemptions could be misused to avoid regis194. 3 S.E.C. at 625.
195. Id.
196. The SEC observed in Unity Gold that the filing of successive prospectuses pursuant
to the §3(b) rules, presumably with a period of time transpiring between each filing, would
not make the securities covered by each filing a separate issue "if in fact the [securities]
thereby offered otherwise constitute a single 'issue' within the meaning of Section 3(b)." 1,d.
This application of integration was expressly reversed as to successive offerings made under
Regulation A pursuant to a single plan of distribution so long as the aggregate amount
offered in any twelve-month period did not exceed the per issue dollar limitation in §3(b).
Securities Act Release No. 2410 (Dec. 3, 1940), [1941-1944 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP.
(CCH) 175,111. This exception to traditional integration practice has been continued to the
present, although it is not expressly articulated in the current version of the rules promulgated pursuant to §3(b). See 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 616; Weiss, supra note 70, at 238.
197. See text accompanying notes 369-411 infra.
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tration when there was a need for investor protection.1 98 This conclusion
suggested that integration might be applied to section 3(a)(9) transactions
despite any specific mention of "issue" within that provision. 99
Even prior to Unity Gold, the SEC had informally laid the groundwork
for integrating nonexempt public offerings made partially in reliance on
section 3(a)(9). 20 0 Shortly after Unity Gold, the SEC's General Counsel, in
express reliance on that proceeding, upheld simultaneous section 3(a)(9) and
4(2) offers by the same issuer. 20 1 That issuer desired to exchange under
section 3(a)(9) one series of bonds for another with its security holders, while
a third series of bonds would be sold to twelve insurance companies under
section 4(2) for cash. Although the cash was to be used to redeem the outstanding securities not tendered for exchange, the difference between the
series of bonds to be transferred to security holders and the series of bonds to be
sold to the insurance companies was held "sufficiently substantial to warrant
[treating] them as separate classes. ' ' 20 2 Significantly, though, the opinion included an extensive discussion of issue and integration concepts2 03 and asserted
198. 3 S.E.C. at 625.
199. Although §3(a)(9) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §77c(a)(9) (West Supp. 1978), does not
include the word "issue," the provision's legislative history supports a constructive application
of the issue concept. As originally proposed, §3(a)(9) referred to "any security issued by a
person where the issue of which it is a part is exchanged by it with its own security holders
exclusively." H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (emphasis added). A conference amendment resulting in the present language does not appear to have contemplated a substantive
alteration in the meaning of the original proposal. See H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
40 (1934); 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 577 n.61. The issue concept has since been read into
§3(a)(9) via its use of the word "exclusively." See Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8,
1939), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,963 (J946); 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 577.
200. See Securities Act Release No. 646 (Feb. 3, 1936), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,956 (1946), which
expressed the opinion of the General Counsel of the SEC as follows: "I believe section 3(a)(9)
is applicable only to exchanges which are bona fide, in the sense that they are not effected
merely as a step in a plan to evade the registration requirements of the Act. For example,
Corporation A, as part of such a plan, might issue a large block of its securities to Corporation B, and might then issue new securities to Corporation B in exchange for the first issued
securities, with the understanding that such new securities are to be offered to the public by
Corporation B. In my opinion, the mere fact that the exchange in such case might comply
with the literal conditions of section 3(a)(9) would not avail to defeat the necessity for registration of the securities issued in such exchange. Cf. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935)." Id. at 10,956.
201. Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,963 (1946).
202. Id. at 10,964.
203. Id. The General Counsel had, prior to reaching this conclusion, indicated that
"[w]hatever may be the precise limits of the concept of 'issue' when all securities involved
are of the same class, I do not believe that securities of different classes can fairly be deemed
parts of a single 'issue.'" Id. He then qualified this statement by noting that any difference
"in the incidents of two blocks of securities, however trivial, [would not render them] separate
classes and consequently separate 'issues' for the purposes of the Act." Id. The series to be
issued under §3(a)(9) and the series to be sold under §4(2) were different in respect to
maturity dates, interest rates, redemption prices and default provisions. But cf. Ellerin v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959), aif'g 167 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (holding under the 1934 Act that two series of preferred stock were part of the same
class of security, although they differed with respect to: annual dividend rates; redemption
prices; sinking fund accumulation rates; dates of issuance, registration, listing and com-
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that the protection of investors required a narrow interpretation of the scope
of the exemptions. This indicated that policies underlying integration of
offerings made under sections 3(a) (9), 3(a)(11) or 3(b) were equally appropriate for section 4(2) private offerings. As in section 3(a)(9), section 4(2)
transactions were subjected to integration analysis despite the absence of
the word "issue" within the provisions of section 4(2).204 Unlike section
3(a)(9),. 0 5 however, section 4(2) had no legislative history to support such
an interpretation. Nor did the SEC reconcile application of integration
with the overall purpose of the section 4(2) exemption, as it had reconciled
integration with the purpose of section 3(b) in Unity Gold. In fact, the exemptions are very different in their relation to the purposes of the registration re2
quirements of the statute. 20 The SEC has continued to adhere to its ruling, 07
mencement of the payment of dividends; and voting rights upon impairment of the rights
or preference of either series). This opinion has properly been interpreted to mean that
integration is not mandatory simply because the same class of securities is involved in two
transactions made or proposed otherwise than in reliance on a single exemption. 1 L. Loss,
supra note 1, at 577-78.
204. In Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,963 (1946), the
General Counsel of the SEC concluded that §4(2) "does not exempt every transaction which
is not itself a public offering, but only transactions 'not involving any public offering.' Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the exemption is not available to securities privately
offered if any other securities comprised within the same issue are made the subject of a
public offering." Id. at 10,964. Through this interpretation of the word "involving," the SEC
incorporated the issue concept into §4(2) in much the same way that the concept ,was introduced into §3(a)(9) via the word "exclusively." I L. Loss, supra note 1, at 687. See note 199
supra.
205. See 1 L. Loss, supra note I, at 687. See also note 199 supra and accompanying text.
206. The SEC had recognized this fact when it indicated earlier that it would not apply
integration as restrictively to private offerings as it would to public offerings made in reliance
upon a transactional exemption lacking federal disclosure requirements. See SEC Rule 152,
adopted by Securities Act Release No. 305 (Mar. 2, 1935) (available from the SEC), rescinded,
readopted and consolidated in the General Rules and Regulations under the 1933 Act by

Securities Act Release No. 627 (Mar. 15, 1936) (available from the SEC) (current version at
17 C.F.R. §230.152 C1979)).
Rule 152, substantially unchanged in form since its adoption, provides as follows:
"The phrase 'transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering' in section 4(2)
shall be deemed to apply to transactions not involving any public offering at the time of
said transactions although subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make a public offering
and/or files a registration statement." SEC Rule 152, 17 C.F.R. §230.152 (1979). The purpose
of the rule is ostensibly to allow "those who have contemplated or begun to undertake a
private offering to register the securities without incurring any risk of liability as a consequence of having first contemplated or begun to undertake a private offering." Securities Act
Release No. 305 (Mar. 2, 1935) (available from the SEC).
The language of the rule is nevertheless unclear and subject to several interpretations. For
example, may a registered offering conceived after a private offering never be integrated with
that offering even if integration would be otherwise appropriate? If integration is never proper
in such a case, will all private offerings be integrated with subsequent registered offerings
which had been planned at the same time? See generally 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8,
§4.14[5][a] at 4-156.1; Shapiro & Sachs, supra note 32, at 17-19. These authorities differ on the
proper response to the first question above. Further, despite the unqualified use of the words
"public offering" in the rule, it is settled that only Regulation A and registered offerings will
qualify. 3 H. BLooMENTAL, supra note 8, §4.14[5][a] at 4-156.1; 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at
689 n.139.
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but these conceptual differences have ultimately prompted adjustments in
the agency's position.208
With few exceptions, integration problems remained quiescent in the
official proceedings of the SEC for almost two decades. 20 9 Finally, the SEC
formally embraced, in two instances, certain interpretations of integration
which had been applied only informally by the staff in processing filings
under Regulation A and registration statements.
One such interpretation affected so-called "bonus securities," which are
securities issued to underwriters as consideration for their underwriting
service. The SEC took the position that a "bonus stock" arrangement was
part of the principal transaction, which ordinarily would be registered or
made pursuant to Regulation A,210 and that subsequent resales of such stock
Rule 152 has been generally ignored by the SEC, and it is unlikely that issuers who desire
to follow a private offering with a registered offering will find much comfort in the rule.
From 1971 to 1978 there was not one written request of the SEC staff for interpretative advice
concerning rule 152. Reasons for the relative disuse and SEC antipathy toward this rule presumably include the following: the vagueness of its language; the probative difficulties in
ascertaining and substantiating intention, a nemesis to the SEC in other aspects of its administration of §4(2), as seen in United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
and the apparent bonanza which the rule bestows upon the good faith but shortsighted issuer.
207. See In re Edsco Mfg. Co., 40 S.E.C. 865, 869 (1961); In re Cameron Indus., 39 S.E.C.
540, 546 (1959); In re Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436, 448 (1958).
208. The SEC has, on several occasions, permitted offerings by the same issuer to be made
in reliance on §4(2) concurrently with offerings made pursuant to a registration statement.
See, e.g., DeLorean Motor Co., available Sept. 15, 1977, [1977] SEC No-ACrIoN LETrs (CCH),
fiche 59, frame A4; Wellington Fund, Inc., available Sept. 22, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcTION
LrTrERs (CCH), roll 9, frame 12220; SEC No-Action Letter, Kaiser Resources, Ltd., available
Aug. 1, 1973, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 579,493.
209. Research has revealed only one SEC proceeding and one court case involving integration between 1939 and 1958. See In re Herbert R. May, 27 S.E.C. 814 (1948) (relying on the
Unity Gold criteria to integrate §§3(b) and 4(2) offerings); Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d
476 (9th Cir. 1942).
210. In re Peoples Sec. Co., 39 S.E.C. 641 (1960), aff'd sub nom., Peoples Sec. Co. v. SEC,
289 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1961). The same treatment was given securities transferred by a
controlling person to an underwriter in In re Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436, 448 (1958).
An exception to this rule governing integration of the transfer to an underwriter of
so-called bonus securities was originally made for securities issuable upon the exercise
of bonus warrants, if the warrants were nontransferrable and nonexercisable for a period of
one year from the commencement of the offering on behalf of the issuer. This rule was
later extended to all securities which were placed in escrow pursuant to an arrangement precluding any transfer by the underwriter of its interest in the bonus securities for a period
of thirteen months. I L. Loss, supra note 1, at 618 n.43; SEC REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF
SECURITIES MARKETS,

H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 542 (1963) [hereinafter cited as

1963 SECUlTIS MARKETS REPORT]. See also Weiss, supra note 70, at 245-46, for an examination
of integration as applied to underwriters' bonus securities in the context of Regulation A
offerings.
The current practice with respect to bonus securities is to require all transferrable options,
warrants, or rights, as well as the security to be issued upon the exercise thereof, to be
registered along with the securities to be offered to the public, even if the recipients of
these bonus securities represent that they do not intend to resell them in the foreseeable
future. Securities Act Release No. 4936, Guide No. 10 (Dec. 9, 1968), 33 Fed. Reg. 18,617
(1968). Only the underlying security need be registered if the options, warrants, or rights
are not transferrable. Id.
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by the underwriter must conform to the rules affecting that transaction. Another interpretation created an exception to integration practice for securities
sold to promoters 21' for non-cash consideration, or "promotional securities,"
where the securities were issued in conformity with section 4(2) but were
distributed either concurrently with or dose in time to a registered or
2
Regulation A offering. 1
These interpretations, besides supplementing the relatively sparse literature on integration, cast some light on the relative importance of some of
the factors deemed in Unity Gold to be material to an integration decision.
By not treating underwriters' bonus securities as part of the same transaction
as the related offering, the SEC rendered two factors controlling on that
particular integration question--the timing of the two offerings and the
211. A "promoter" is defined by the SEC as:
(a) Any person who, acting alone or in the conjunction with one or more other persons,
directly or indirectly takes initiative in founding and organizing the business or enterprise
of an issuer;
(b) Any person who, in connection with founding and organizing of the business or
enterprise of an issuer, directly or indirectly receives in consideration of services or property,
or both services and property, 10 percent or more of any class of securities of the issue or 10
percent or more of the proceeds from the sale of any class of securities. However, a person
who receives such securities or proceeds either solely as underwriting commissions or solely
in consideration of property shall not be deemed a promoter within the meaning of this
paragraph if such person does not otherwise take part in founding and organizing the enterprise. SEC Rules 251, 405(q), 17 C.F.R. §§230.251, .405(q) (1979).
212. Ultimately, sales made to promoters for cash were given the same dispensation from
integration as sales for property or services. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 594, 618-19 (no
integration of cash offerings to promoters in reliance on §§3(b) or 4(2)). Nevertheless, in an
alternative holding in In re Cameron Indus., 39 S.E.C. 540 (1959), the SEC integrated a
registered public offering with a prior cash offering to promoters in reliance on §4(2), where
the purpose of the latter transaction was to raise the funds necessary to accomplish the
public offering. See also In re Hamilton Oil & Gas Corp., 40 S.E.C. 796, 805 Q1961) (same
position taken by SEC staff but the question was not reached by the Commission).
In tandem with the prevailing treatment of underwriters' bonus securities, current practice
under Regulation A requires an issuer with an unprofitable operating history to place all
promotional securities in escrow, irrespective of the consideration for which they were issued.
Additionally, the issuer must make arrangement assuring that these securities will not be
reoffered to the public within one year subsequent to the commencement of the Regulation A
offering and that any reoffer of the securities will conform to the 1933 Act. SEC Rule 253(c),
17 C.F.R. §230.253(c) (1979). It has been suggested that this escrow requirement is primarily
intended to preserve an exemption for the offering of the promotional securities and is not
mandated by integration considerations. 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 619 n.246.
Failure to comply will result in loss of the Regulation A exemption for offers and sales
made in reliance thereon only if the inclusion of such securities in the computation of the
permissible maximum aggregate offering price under Regulation A causes such maximum to
be exceeded. In re Mutual Employees Trademart, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 1092, 1093 (1962); In re
Edsco Mfg. Co., 40 S.E.C. 865, 867 (1961). Even when the maximum is not surpassed, noncompliance with the escrow requirements will result in a constructive integration of the promotional offering with the Regulation A offering by reducing, dollar for dollar, the amount
of securities which may be sold under Regulation A, regardless of whether, as a matter of
law, the two offerings satisfy the prerequisites for integration. SEC Rule 253(c), 17 C.F.R.
§230.253(c) (1979). Constructive integration for limited purposes is also found elsewhere in
the regulatory framework of the 1933 Act. See SEC Rules 144(e)(3), 240(e), 17 C.F.R. §§230.144
(e)(3), .240(e) (1979).
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terms upon which the securities were offered. The SEC will not integrate
the offerings if a sufficient differential exists between the times when the
securities in each offering ultimately reach the public, regardless of the fact
that they involve the same securities sold for the same purpose as part of
the same plan of distribution. Moreover, where the consideration received by
the issuer is applied essentially to the same purpose, 213 the nature of the terms
on which the offerings were made is given less weight in the integration equation by the SEC than the time lapse between the offerings. This is a reasonable
inference from the SEC's restraint in not integrating offerings of promotional
securities with concurrent public offerings on the condition that the promo214
tional securities are escrowed for a period of time.
During the incipient development of integration practice, the courts offered
little refinement to the pronouncements of the SEC on the subject. The relative unfamiliarity of some courts with the securities laws 215 and with integration in particular 2 16 may help explain this lack of contribution. Further, the
courts encountered the question infrequently, and none of the controversies
adjudicated posed particularly difficult conceptual roadblocks to applying
integration. 217 Only one court in wrestling with the integration dilemma ex213. See In re Cameron Indus., 39 S.E.C. 540, 546 (1959).
214. See notes 210 & 212 supra.
215. See, e.g., Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F. Supp. 104, 105 (D. Minn. 1958) (wherein
the court twice referred to the 1933 Act as the "Securities and Exchange Act").
216. In Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1942), it was determined that
whether two transactions should be integrated for 1933 Act purposes is a question of federal
law. This conclusion, reached in the context of an action testing the sufficiency of a criminal
indictment for violations of §5(a)(1) and (2), where one of the defenses offered was that
the sales of securities in question were a separate intrastate "issue" unrelated to any interstate transactions, has never been questioned. On the other hand, an alternative holding in
Shaw that "[t]he 'issue' of [§3(a)(11)] includes all the shares of common character originally
though successively issued by the corporation" has been repudiated as a patent confusion of
the terms "issue" and "class." Id. at 480. See I L. Loss, supra note I, at 578 nn.64 & 65.
In SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H. 1958), the court entered a
preliminary injunction restraining the corporate defendant, and apparently its controlling
person, from making further sales of the corporation's securities without registration, where
prior sales had been made in violation of §5(a) due to failure to comply with the intrastate
exemption under §3(a)(l1). The court extended the erroneous reasoning of Shaw by concluding that "even future sales of securities already issued are not exempt if other securities of
the same issue are not exempt." 173 F. Supp. at 88. See In re Bankers Union Life Co., 2
S.E.C. 63, 72-73 (1937); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 10, at 839. The court was
correct, nevertheless, that future sales of the corporation's securities of the same issue, whether
or not previously issued, could not be made by the corporation without registration, because
any such sales would be integrated with the prior offerings made in violation of §5(a). This
position was properly taken in Hillsborough Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960),
afJ'g SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 176 F. Supp. 789 (D.N.H. 1959). The appellate court
affirmed the entry of a permanent injunction by the district court which had been issued
after the defendants had attempted to use subterfuge to circumvent a preliminary injunction
granted in a prior district court proceeding. See SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp.
86 (D.N.H. 1958). The appellate court observed that "an entire issue must be sold only to
residents or the exemption is lost, and once the exemption is lost, the use of interstate facilities
in any sale [by or on behalf of the corporation] to resident or non-resident without registering
the security is a violation of the [1933] Act." 276 F.2d at 668.
217. See, e.g., SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830, 870-72
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pressly relied upon prior interpretations of the SEC.218 Nor were the Unity
Gold integration criteria expressly applied, although at least one opinion
219
recognized their importance.
III.

RECENT FoRi.AL APPLICATIONS OF INTEGRATION (1961-1979)

A.

SEC Releases

Cognizant of the burgeoning popularity of the intrastate exemption,220
aware of its potential for abuse, 2 - and motivated by fresh courtroom successes
in controversies involving that exemption,2 2 2 the SEC published two releases
in 1961 governing the exemption's use. The latter, Securities Act Release No.
4434,23 was issued in part to ease certain restrictions created by the earlier
release, 224 and sought "to provide in convenient and up-to-date form a re(S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960). In that case, integration of concurrent offerings
of the same type of securities, pursuant to the same plan of distribution and for the same
purpose, was a foregone conclusion. The only potential difficulty in applying integration was
that multiple issuers were involved, several of whom were incorporated in different states
and each of whom claimed a §3(a)(1l) exemption based upon sales allegedly made solely
within their respective jurisdictions of incorporation. The issuers were all owned or controlled
by the same person and each was selling securities pursuant to "an identical plan." 186 F.
Supp. at 871. The court, without mentioning integration, had no difficulty in denying the
availability of §3(a)(ll) to what it characterized as "a mere subterfuge intended . . . to
create an artificial basis for the assertion of the defendants that the 'intrastate exemption' is
applicable." Id.
218. SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 88 (D.N.H. 1958).
219. See SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830, 870-72 (S.D.
Cal. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
220. See 1963 SECURITIES MARKETS REPORT, supra note 210, at 573.
221. See Sosin, The IntrastateExemption: Public Offerings and the Issue Concept, 16 W.
REs. L. REv. 110, 113-14 (1964). In the late 1950's, a wave of intrastate offerings in Minnesota
followed in the wake of an incredibly successful intrastate offering by Control Data Corporation in that state. The prices of the securities sold in these offerings apparently escalated very
rapidly in the local over-the-counter market. Nonresidents of Minnesota quickly entered
the market, and the issues thereby lost their intrastate character "almost before the ink was
dry on the prospectus." Id. at 114. The author refused to vouch for the accuracy of this story.
Id. at 114 n.15.
222. See SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal.
1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960); SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86
(D.N.H. 1958), permanent injunction granted, 176 F. Supp. 789 (D.N.H. 1959), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. Hillsborough v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960).
223. (Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961).
224. Securities Act Release No. 4386 (July 12, 1961), [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FMa.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH 176,774. By 1961, it had already been well established that a sale to even
a single nonresident would disqualify the entire transaction of which such sale was a part
from §3(a)(ll) treatment. See SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. 186 F. Supp.
830, 871 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960); SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp.,
173 F. Supp. 86, 87-88 (D.N.H. 1958); In re Edsco Mfg. Co., 40 S.E.C. 865, 869 (1961); Securities Act Release No. 1459 (May 29, 1937), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,958 (1946). Securities Act Release
No. 4386 extended this concept by denying §3(a)(l1) treatment to any transaction in which a
resident purchased with a view to resale to anyone and did in fact resell to a nonresident
prior to completion of the "process of distribution." This position was revised five months
later in Securities Act Release No. 4434, in which the forbidden animus was described less
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statement of the principles underlying section 3(a)(l1) as so expressed over
the years and to facilitate an understanding of the meaning and application
of the exemption. ' 225 In part, the release treated the application of integration to offerings made in reliance on section 3(a)(ll):
Any one or more of the following factors may be determinative of the
question of integration: (1) Are the offerings part of a single plan of
financing; (2) do the offerings involve issuance of the same class of
security; (3) are the offerings made at or about the same time; (4) is
the same type of consideration to be received;
and (5) are the offer22 6
ings made for the same general purpose.

Excluding only the criterion of similarities in sale and distribution methods,
these factors essentially tracked the determinants of integration established by
the SEC in Unity Gold.227 Beyond this recitation the SEC did not provide any
insight into the definition or interrelationship of the factors denominated as
determinative, nor did it offer any reason for its exclusion of the method of
distribution as a factor. 228 Even more significant was the unprecedented pronouncement that any one of the factors could be controlling. Such a general
restrictively in terms of an intent to resell to nonresidents, and resale to nonresidents was
permitted "in due course." See generally, Sosin, supra note 221, at 116-18.
225. Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961).
226. Id.
227. See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
228. The exclusion of the Unity Gold factor, requiring a comparison of the methods of
sale and distribution employed to effect two potentially integrated offerings, may have been
motivated either by the conclusion that this factor was not relevant, or that it was subsumed into one of the remaining components of the integration formula. Neither conclusion
is significantly furthered by the conspicuous absence of consideration of the excluded factor
in the several "integration" opinions of the SEC rendered shortly before its adoption of
Securities Act Release No. 4434. See, e.g., In re Edsco Mfg. Co., 40 S.E.C. 865, 869 (1960);
In re Cameron Indus., 39 S.E.C. 540, 546 (1959). But see, In re Herbert R. May, 27 S.E.C.
814, 819 (1948).
Prior to issuance of the release, no administrative or judicial case had posed a definition
of the excluded factor. The criterion into which that factor logically would be incorporated
is whether the offerings are of a single plan of financing. Perhaps its absence is more indicative
of its irrelevance than of inclusion through incorporation. The factors in Securities Act Release No. 4484 are intended to assist in the process of differentiation. Offerings are more
likely to be similar in respect to the type of consideration paid the issuer, a factor included
in the release, than in respect to the methods of sale and distribution employed by the
issuer in each of the offerings. Thus, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the excluded
factor was intended to be present as a silent ingredient in the SEC's formula for integrating
securities offerings. See Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969), in
which the court denied recovery under §12(1) of the 1983 Act, 15 U.S.C. §771(l) (1976), to a
Wisconsin resident who purchased common stock from the defendant-issuer. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the stock which he purchased was part of an offering made
by the issuer to residents of Mississippi in reliance on §3(a)(11). The court concluded that the
offering to the plaintiff was exempt under §4(2) and should not be integrated with the intrastate offering, in part because "[tlhis exchange differed from . . . the [intrastate] public
offering . . . in that purchasers in the public offering paid a fifty cent per share commission
or broker's fee and entered into stock subscription agreements with defendant corporation,
while [plaintiff] did neither." 419 F.2d at 158.
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guideline, without further refinement, engendered maximum theoretical un29
certainty.
Less than one year later, the SEC repeated almost verbatim the formula
for applying integration enunciated in Securities Act Release No. 4434. The
occasion was Securities Act Release No. 4552,230 which was prompted by "an
increasing tendency [among issuers] to rely upon the [private offering] exemption for offering of speculative issues to unrelated and uninformed persons."' 23
Securities Act Release No. 4552 described the limitations on the availability
of the private offering exemption.232 Significantly, the SEC introduced in
Securities Act Release No. 4552 the five factors adopted in Securities Act Release No. 4434 with markedly different language: "The following factors are
relevant to [the] question of integration . . . ."3 This suggested that the
standard for integrating securities offerings might vary depending upon
whether the offering whose independence was in question was made in reliance upon section 4(2) or section 3(a)(11).234 In contrast to Securities Act
Release No. 4434, which explicitly states that satisfaction of a single component of the prescribed list of determinants may result in integration, Securities Act Release No. 4552 can be read to preclude integration of two
23 5
offerings whenever only one of the five factors has been affirmatively met.
This raises the possibility of an interesting conundrum involving two offerings,
one made in reliance on section 4(2) and the other on section 3(a)(11). Assuming that only one of the factors enumerated in Securities Act Release
Nos. 4434 and 4552 was present in both offerings, the private offering might
be integrated into the intrastate offering so as to eliminate the availability of
section 3(a)(ll). However, the intrastate offering could not be integrated into
the private offering, which would remain exempt under section 4(2).236
229.

For further development of this conceptual problem, see notes 292-307 infra and

accompanying text.
230. (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962).
231. Id.at 11,316.
232. At the time Securities Act Release No. 4552 was published, the private offering
exemption was embodied in the second clause of §4(1). It was moved to its current location,
§4(2), in 1964. Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, §12, 78 Stat. 565 (1964) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §77d(2) (1976)).
233. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317 (1962)
(emphasis added).
234. Integrating securities offerings by a standard which varies depending upon which
exemption the issuer has relied is not unprecedented in SEC lore. See SEC Rule 152, 17 C.F.R.
§230.152 (1979). See note 206 supra.

235. A consistent reading of Securities Act Release No. 4552 would require that an
issuer show dissimilarity in more than one factor to avoid integration. This proposition seems
too restrictive. See Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SFc.
L. REP. (CCH)

95,438 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The court, finding no integration of two offerings

made three months apart where the later offering was necessitated by unforeseen expenses
incurred in applying the proceeds of the prior offering, stated that "[i]t does not appear
that this second sale was part of the original plan of financing of the corporation." Id. at
99,212. The court did not state that all other factors were present, but rested its decision on
the plan of financing factor to sustain the availability of §4(2) for the second offering. However, all other factors apparently were satisfied.
236. The concept of a "one-way" application of integration, with the violation of §5 by
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one of two offerings while the other remains in compliance, has precedent. In fact, one-way
integration is the rule whenever an attempted exempt offering and a registered offering are
integrated, the former losing the exemption while the registered offering remains intact. An
exception would occur only if by extraordinary coincidence the combined offerings satisfy a
single exemption; e.g., if the exempt offering were made pursuant to §3(a)(ll) and the
registered offering also complied in every respect with that exemption. For a discussion of
why such an exception is unlikely to occur, see note 106 supra and accompanying text. Note,
however, that when the registration statement precedes the exempt offering, the registration
statement would probably be misleading if the §5 violation resulting from the integration
of the two offerings was not disclosed therein. See In re Cameron Indus., 39 S.E.C. 540, 546
(1959).
One-way integration of a modified sort also results whenever a purportedly exempt offering is integrated with an offering made under Regulation A within twelve months thereafter.
In such a case, the aggregate offering price of securities which may be offered under Regulation A is reduced by that of the securities sold in the prior offering. SEC Rule 254(a)(1), 17
C.F.R. §230.254(a)(1) (1979). If the aggregate offering price of the combined transaction exceeds
the permissible limit under Regulation A, both offerings lose their respective exemptions,
barring a fluke of compliance of the nature just described in the discussion on integration
involving a registered offering. Cf. In re Herbert R. May, 27 S.E.C. 814, 817-20 (1948) (prior
Regulation A offering, within permissible maximum, lost exemption when integrated with
subsequent offering when aggregate offering price of the combined transaction exceeded
Regulation A ceiling); In re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 623-26 (1939) (stop order issued
under §8(d) suspending effectiveness of registration statement for misleading statement that
prior offering under former rule 202, promulgated pursuant to §3(b), conformed with that
rule where registered offering and rule 202 offering were part of the same transaction).
See also In re Justin Steppler, 37 S.E.C. 252, 255-56 (1956).
If the Regulation A maximum aggregate offering price is not exceeded by combination of
the two offerings, the Regulation A offering will be exempt under §3(b) while the prior
offering will be in contravention of the registration requirements, unless the combined offerings
together satisfy some other exemption. Should the possibility of integration be discerned
prior to the commencement of the Regulation A offering, or at any time prior to the point
when the aggregate offering price of the combined offerings exceeds the Regulation A ceiling,
the size of the Regulation A offering might be adjusted downward to avoid losing the Regulation A exemption. Thus, for example, if the offering price of the securities sold in the prior
offering were $1,000,000 and the offering price of the proposed Regulation A offering were
also $1,000,000, the Regulation A offering could be commenced if the amount offered thereunder were first reduced to $500,000. Otherwise, if the Regulation A offering commenced,
the ceiling might be deemed to have been exceeded. See SEC Rule 254(a)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§230.254(a)(1) (1979) (limiting the monetary amount offered or sold pursuant to the regulation). Under proper circumstances, however, the SEC might permit reduction of the amount
offered while permitting the issuer to retain the §3(b) exemption.
As in the case of a registration statement relating to an offering which has been integrated with a prior offering, the issuer's notification on SEC Form I-A, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP.
7,325-27, will likely be misleading if the fact and effect of integration have not
(CCH)
been disclosed. In addition, the notification may be found to be misleading as to the amount
offered under the regulation if the offering has commenced and thereafter has been reduced
in size in an attempt to preserve the exemption. Finally, the limited nature of the disclosure
of prior offerings of unregistered securities required by Item 9 of SEC Form 1-A - that is, all
such securities issued within one year prior to the filing of the notification allows for some
likelihood that an integration problem will not be discovered by the SEC staff before a
Regulation A offering is commenced. For example, an offering of unregistered securities may
be made more than one year prior to the filing of the notification, yet be subject to integration with an offering made within that period. Compare SEC Form I-A, Item 9, 2 FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 7,325 at 6,442 with SEC Form S-1, Item 25, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7,124
at 6,209-3 (requiring disclosure in the registration statement of all sales of unregistered
securities by the registrant within three years prior to the filing of the registration statement).
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As in Securities Act Release No. 4434, the SEC in Securities Act Release
No. 4552 refused to elaborate on the substantive nature of each of the five
factors; nor did it indicate the degrees of "relevance" which should be
accorded them. The SEC did, nevertheless, take the opportunity to speak to
a specific segment of the investment community whose excessive reliance on
the private offering exemption had apparently triggered issuance of the
237
release:
What may appear to be a separate offering to a properly limited
group will not be so considered if it is one of a related series of
offerings. A person may not separate parts of a series of related transactions, the sum total of which is really one offering, and claim that a
particular part is a nonpublic transaction. Thus, in the case of offerings of fractional undivided interests in separate oil or gas properties
where the promoters must constantly find new participants for each
new venture, it would appear to be appropriate to consider the
entire
238
series of offerings to determine the scope of this solicitation.
B.

Case Law

The SEC releases, which represent the current formal administrative
position on integration, provide little substantive guidance for the issuer
and counsel. 239 Similarly, the releases have proved of little aid to the courts
in their analyses of the integration problem.m Nonetheless, an examination
"One-way" integration is also possible under recent regulatory refinements of integration.
See notes 321-346 infra and accompanying text.
237 'See text accompanying note 231 supra.
238. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,310, 11,310 (1962).
239. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 4877 (Aug. 8, 1967), 32 Fed. Reg. 11,705 (1967) (in
which the SEC explained the statutory requirements under the 1933 Act applicable to offers
and sales of interests in real estate syndications primarily in the form of interests in limited
partnerships or interests in joint or profit-sharing ventures). In this release, the SEC raised
the spectre of integration and referred the reader to Securities Act Release Nos. 4434 and
4552. See also Securities Act Release No. 5306 (Oct. 31, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 23,180 (1972), excluding from the computation of the quantity of restricted securities which may be sold in
reliance on SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. §230.144 (1979), any restricted securities sold pursuant
to a registration statement. SEC Rule 144(e)(3)(G), 17 C.F.R. §230.144(e)(3)(G) (1979). It is
not clear whether this interpretation creates an exclusion from integration. Cf. SEC No-Action
Letter, Morrison & Foerster, available July 30, 1975, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
Rr. (CCH) 180,265 (stating that sales to insiders pursuant to §4(2) or 3(a)(11) may be
integrated with an offering exempt under rule 240, even though SEC Rule 240(e)(2)(ii), 17
C.F.R. §230.240(e)(2)(ii) (1979) excludes from the computation of the dollar amount of securities sold pursuant to that rule securities sold in reliance on another exemption to "any
promoter, director, executive officer, or full-time employee"). If, in fact, an exclusion from
integration was being created, no explanation was offered, and the validity of any logical
extension of the exclusion was left uncertain.
240. Occasionally, the question of integration will first arise on appeal. In this situation,
one circuit has uniformly refused to consider the issue. See Henderson v. Hayden Stone, Inc.,
461 F.2d 1069, 1071 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. American Intl Franchises, Inc., 448
F.2d 680, 689-90 (5th Cir. 1971). In the latter case the court granted rescission of purchases
of stock which had been sold in reliance on §4(2), because the defendants presented no
evidence negating "the existence of plans for offering additional securities." 448 F.2d at 691.
The court pointed out that the size of the transaction of which the offering to the plaintiffs
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of the cases treating integration is potentially instructive for the issuer in
several respects. First, through comparison of the various factual contexts in
which the integration question has previously been resolved, one may better
assess the potential for integration of a proposed offering. This objective
can be considerably advanced if similar factual circumstances can be accumulated and correlated with results. Second, analysis of the case law may
provide additional insight into the meanings of the components of the integration formula and into their interrelationships, thereby furthering a clear
understanding of integration itself. Third, scrutinizing the relevant cases may
reveal whether the relative inclinations of the courts to integrate particular
offerings are a function of the type of exemption relied upon by issuer.
Finally, the courts' technical competence and uniformity in integrating securities offerings will be observed in order to determine whether counsel can
realistically assess the probability of compliance. In this subjective analysis,
close attention will be paid to the independence of thought exhibited by
the courts. This factor affects the predictability of the law and provides a
basis for assessing the relative importance of the prevailing administrative
24 1
applications of integration.
The courts have dealt with questions of integration in fourteen post-1961
cases. 242 Eight of them 243 were suits brought for rescission of sales of unwas a part would be affected if the defendants entertained a "program" of "additional offerings in subsequent years." Id. It appears that not only did the court consider the question
of integration sub silentio but held that the defendants had lost their exemption for the
offerings in question because they had failed to present evidence that these offerings should
not be integrated with offerings which had not yet occurred. The only evidence 'which the
court acknowledged as suggesting the possibility that the offering in question was part of a
series of proposed offerings was that "the number of [Florida] purchasers was deliberately kept
below fifteen the first year in order to comply with the Florida Blue Sky Law." 1d. As surprising as this seems, Securities Act Release No. 4552 is susceptible to this interpretation: "A
determination whether an offer is public or private would also include a consideration of
the question whether it should be regarded as a part of a larger offering made or to be
made." 27 Fed. Reg. at 11,317 (emphasis added). See also text accompanying note 238 supra.
Similar language appears in Securities Act Release No. 4434: "[W]hether an offering is . . .
an integrated part of an offering previously made or proposed to be Made is a question
of fact .... 26 Fed. Reg. at 11,896 (emphasis added). Cf. SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F.
Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), afJ'd, 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977) (oral affirmation not subject
to citation as precedent under local rule) (sales of multilevel distributorships to nonresidents
held integrated with similar sales to residents in reliance on §3(a)(l1): "The entire Galaxy
wholesale operation was part of a single plan of financing which continuously offered the
same type of investment and thus constituted but one offering." 417 F. Supp. at 1243).
Some courts have ignored integration in opting for a less esoteric ground for decision.
E.g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978).
241. The approach suggested in this paragraph has also been applied in another authority
on the propriety of integration -the SEC staff's replies to requests for "no-action" letters.
In response to inquiries regarding integration the staff has from time to time interpreted
the integration process and/or stated its position with respect to the taking of enforcement
action in the proposed circumstances. For an analysis of these administrative letters, see
notes 351-411 infra and accompanying text.
242. Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); General Life of Mo.
Inv. Co. v. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419
F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Cal-Am Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1978); SEC v.
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registered securities under section 12(1) of the 1933 Act 2 " Four 245 were suits
pursuant to section 20(b) of the 1933 Act,2" brought by the SEC for injunctions against future violations of the securities laws and based upon alleged
prior violations of the registration provisions of the 1933 Act. One247 was a
private damage action predicated upon a violation of section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, and one2 - was a suit to enforce a subscription agreement to
purchase unregistered securities. Except in two cases, 249 the plaintiff in each
Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FE. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %95,779 (S.D. Ga. 1976); Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp.,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 195,438 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Bayoud v.
Ballard, 404 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Mason v. Marshall, 412 F. Supp. 294 (N.D.
Tex. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1976); Livens v. William D.
Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104 .(D. Mass. 1974); Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp.
609 (D. Del. 1971); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 326 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Dunfee, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 191,970 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
In the most recent case, SEC v. Cal-Am Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1978), the
district court decided the question of integration by what can only be described as an unconscious sleight of hand. The SEC sought an injunction based upon violations of the
registration provisions of the 1933 Act and of the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts. With respect to all counts the SEC posited the existence of "three separate schemes
which, taken in conjunction, amount to one massive, nationwide, complex scheme undertaken by the defendants." 445 F. Supp. at 1331 n.1. See also id. at 1334 n.12 and accompanying
text. As to the claim that the registration provisions had been violated, the defendants argued
that "the transactions in question were 'private offerings."' Id. at 1333 (emphasis added). The
court concluded that "the transactions involved in this case [could not] qualify as private
offerings .... Given the size and scope of the offering and the number of investors [4,000]
alleged in the complaint, the defendants could scarcely contend that the Court should find
a private offering exemption available in this case." Id. at 1334 (emphasis added). The result
appears so self-evident that the error in resolving the integration question sub silentio is
manifestly harmless. See SEC v. Universal Major Indus., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fan. SEC.
L. RaP. (CCH) 195,229 at 98,212 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976). Although
the oversight was harmless, the Cal-Am case illustrates that even in 1978 an integration
problem may avoid scrutiny in an important matter before a federal court located in a
circuit with a high incidence of securities law litigation.
243. Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Jackson Tool
& Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969); Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., [1975-1976
95,438 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Bayoud v. Ballard, 404
Transfer Binder] Fan. SEC. L. REP. (CCI)
F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Mason v. Marshall, 412 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd
on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1976); Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F.
Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1974); Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609 (D. Del. 1971);
Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fan. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
%91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
244. 1933 Act §12(1), 15 U.S.C. §771(1) (1976).
245. SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Continental
Tobacco Co., 326 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 463 F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1972); SEC v. Dunfee, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 191,970 (W.D.
Mo. 1966).
246. 1933 Act §20(b), 15 U.S.C. §77t(b) (1976).
247. Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FE. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) g95,779
(S.D. Ga. 1976).
248. General Life of Mo. Inv. Co. v. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1976).
249. Id.; Mason v. Marshall, 412 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1974), affd on other grounds,
531 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1976).
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case was the party who argued for integration. The courts found integration appropriate in five of the fourteen cases. 2 50 Significantly, however, the
first such holding 251 occurred in 1976, and since then every court confronting
the integration issue has decided it in the affirmative.2 5 2 No particular type of
action or plaintiff has been particularly prevalent in those cases mandating
integration.253Nor has one transactional exemption proved more vulnerable
to integration than another. 254 The only factual similarity which might be
of value to the practitioner is that six of the cases involved enterprises engaged in mineral exploration.2 55 Specially mentioned in Securities Act Releases Nos. 4434256 and 4554,257 these types of enterprises are clearly a distinct
concern of the SEC 258
250. Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); General Life of Mo.
Inv. Co. v. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Cal-Am Corp., 445 F. Supp.
1329 (C.D. Cal. 1978); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Kennedy
v. Tallant, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,779 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
251. SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
252. The number of integration cases presently on the books is not large enough statistically to provide sufficient data to make confident predictions; however, the recent success
of the integration argument clearly enhances that concept's credibility. Except for Shaw v.
United States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942), in which the significance of the court's recognition of the issue concept under §3(a)(ll) was substantially diminished by its questionable
analysis, see Shapiro & Sachs, supra note 32, at 19-20, the courts prior to SEC v. Galaxy
Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) had indicated only theoretical approval of
integration. See, e.g., Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (D. Mass.

1974).
253. The SEC won two of the five cases. SEC v. Cal-Am Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1329 (C.D.
Cal. 1978); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Of the other three
cases, two, Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977) and General Life of
Mo. Inv. Co. v. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1976) involved violations of the registration provisions of the 1933 Act. The third, Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %95,779 (S.D. Ga. 1976) involved a fraud claim under the 1934 Act.
Shamburger and Kennedy were won on the integration issue by the defendants.
254. Of the fourteen cases cited in note 242 supra, all but Kennedy raised integration in
the context of the availability of a transactional exemption. Of these, nine involved §4(2)
(Doran, Shamburger, Cal-Am, Barrett, Bayoud, Mason, Livens, Bowers and Continental
Tobacco); three of the nine resulted in integration (Doran, Shamburger, Cal-Ain). Three
of the fourteen involved §3(a)(ll) (Jackson Tool, Galaxy Foods, Dunfee); one resulted in
integration (Galaxy Foods). One of the fourteen in which the integration argument was
unsuccessful involved §4(1) (Marcus).
255. Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Cal-Am Corp.,
445 F. Supp. 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,438 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Bayoud v. Ballard, 404 F. Supp.
417 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Mason v. Marshall, 412 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1974), affd on other
grounds, 531 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1976). See also SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d
1044 (2d Cir. 1976) (integration issue not reached).
256. Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896, 11,896 (1961).
257. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317 (1962).
258. In the latter release, the SEC specifically addressed the application of integration
to the financing of this type of enterprise. See text accompanying note 238 supra. The
financing of mineral exploration ventures, especially through the sale of interests in limited
partnerships or undivided fractional interests in mineral leases, frequently raises integration
questions, and the advice of the SEC with respect thereto has often been sought. See, e.g.,
Henry Exploration Co., available Nov. 24, 1978, [1978] SEC No-AcrioN Lmas (CCH), fiche
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Both courts and parties have misunderstood the circumstances appropriate for integrating securities offerings,25 9 although misapplication has not
occurred frequently. Nevertheless, it is surprising in this age of deference
to administrative expertise 260 that a relatively large proportion of the integration cases make no mention of the work of the SEC in the area, nor of cases
or authorities which have drawn on that work. Rather, the courts and parties
appear to have dealt with the integration issue purely on instinct 261 In doing
so, a few have happened upon most of the five enunciated factors the SEC
2 2
has deemed relevant or even determinative of 6 the integration question,26s
although these courts may not have recognized that they were using generic
criteria.28 ' A number of courts, including a few which expressly recognized
the SEC's pronouncements regarding integration, resolved the integration
question in conclusory terms with little or no elaboration.2 65 One court
added a sixth factor of whether the offerings in question were made by the
55, frame E15; Oklahoma Oil & Gas Co., available Nov. 16, 1978, [1978] SEC No-AcrioN
LErmEs (CCH), fiche 52, frame L15; SEC No-Action Letter, JIC Drilling Companies, available
Sept. 23, 1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH) 80,765.
259. See, e.g., SEC v. Cal-Am Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (see note 242
supra); SEC v. Universal Major Indus., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,229 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976). In Universal Major Indus.,
the district court found that the integration issue need not be reached, and stated that
"[t]he question of whether securities are part of the same 'issue' . . . arises in the context
of Section 3(a)(11) . . . and not . . . when determining whether an exemption ,pursuant
to Section 4(2) is available." [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fm. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 195,229 at
98,210 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see note 204 supra and accompanying text. See also Bayoud
v. Ballard, 404 F. Supp. 417, 424 (N.D. Tex. 1975). After finding that two different securities
were involved in one registered and one unregistered offering which plaintiff sought to integrate, and commenting that the plaintiff's integration argument "rests upon either a misunderstanding of its normal application ... or... of the legal ramifications resulting from
its application," the Bayoud court concluded that even if the offerings were integrated, the
issuer's "registration statement would still cover the integrated issuance." Id. This conclusion
was reached because the aggregate public offering price of the securities sold in both offerings
did not exceed the maximum aggregate offering price established in the registration statement for the sale of registered securities.
260. See Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973).
261. See General Life of Mo. Inv. Co. v. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1976);
Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969); Bayoud v. Ballard, 404 F.
Supp. 417 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Mason v. Marshall, 412 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd on
other grounds, 531 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 32& F. Supp.
588 (S.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Dunfee,
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,970 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
262. See text accompanying notes 230-236 supra.
263. See General Life of Mo. Inv. Co. v. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774, 783 n.13 (8th Cir.
1976) (same plan of financing for same purpose determinative of integration); Smith v.
Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152, 153 (5th Cir. 1969) (different timing, plan and
methods of distribution determinative of nonintegration).
264. Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152, 153 (5th Cir. 1969).
265. See, e.g., SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (court
adopted SEC guidelines); Bayou v. Ballard, 404 F. Supp. 417, 424 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (court
reticent as to SEC guidelines, stating that "[in light of the private offering aspects of the...
transaction, the Court feels that the two issuances differed in significant and conclusive
ways, such that integration would be improper.')
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same person.2 66 Conversely, a handful of courts have not only adopted the
SEC's integration formula as a guideline, but have also provided insight into
the reasoning behind their conclusions. For these courts, perhaps the least
defined of the SEC's five factors is the first: whether the offerings are part of a
26 7
single plan of financing.
In Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 26s a rescission action brought under
section 12(1), the plaintiff had purchased securities from the defendants in
four offerings during the period from October 4, 1967 to December 19, 1968.
Defendants contended that the action was barred by the applicable one year
statute of limitations.269 Plaintiff, relying on Securities Act Release No. 4552,270
argued that additional offers which he had declined had been made to him
by the defendants within one year of the commencement of the action. The
plaintiff asserted that these later offerings and the four prior offerings were
1
part of the same transaction; thus, the statute of limitations had not run.Y7
The court, applying the factors cited in the release, concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the existence of a single plan of financing
because "each successive financing was expected by the defendants to be the
last which would be required to make [the issuer] self supporting."272 More266. Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965): "We do not think . . . 'integration' is warranted on the
facts of this case because (1) the offerings sought to be integrated were by two different
persons . . . [the issuer and the individual defendant]; (2) they were not a part of a single
plan of financing; (3) they involved different classes of securities; (4) they were not made at
the same time; (5) they were not for the same kind of consideration (cash rather than stock
in a subsidiary); and (6) they were not for the same general purpose. See Sec. Act Rel. No.
33-4552 (1962) ...." Id. at 94,971 (emphasis added). This additional factor has since been
widely recognized as a significant consideration in resolving an integration question. See
note 388 infra and accompanying text.
267. The only commentator who has attempted to develop a workable definition of this
factor concluded that all of the other factors in the SEC formula "are in reality detailed
statements of item (1) [single plan of financing]." Sosin, supra note 221, at 124. See also
Shapiro, supra note 32, at 17-19.
268. 374 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1974).
269. 1933 Act §13, 15 U.S.C. §77m (1976): "No action shall be maintained to enforce
any liability created under section . . . 771(1) [section 12(1)] of this title, unless brought
within one year after the violation upon which it is based."
270. 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962).
271. 374 F. Supp. at 1106-07. The reverse of the plaintiff's argument in Livens was made
by the defendants in Mason v. Marshall, 412 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1974), which was also
a rescission action. Defendants in that case argued that the court should apply integration to
treat sales made within the period of the statute of limitations as part of the same transaction
with sales as to which the statute had expired so as to bar claims with respect to all sales.
Id. at 300. But see Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FFD. SEc. L. RP. (CCH)
95,779 at 90,824 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (holding that the statute of limitations had not expired
as to claim under §10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1976), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1979), when the most recent offer by defendants was within the applicable
statutory period and was part of an "integrated offering" which had been transacted over a
period of five years).
272. 374 F. Supp. at 1107 (emphasis added). In its discussion of the importance of when
the offerings were conceived or planned, the court acknowledged that "the parties recognized
that the first financing in October, 1967, inight be inadequate and additional financing might
be required." Id. (emphasis added). The court, however, dismissed this possibility by noting
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over, the court emphasized that certain events which precipitated the necessity
for additional financing were beyond the control of the defendants, and some
"were not contemplated at the time of the first financing .... .'.3 This unplanned nature of the multiple offerings, coupled with the fact that "different
classes of securities were issued and the prices of the securities varied," led
the court to conclude that integration was inapplicable despite a similarity
in the purposes of the offerings and the type of consideration received 7 4
While the court did not specify which factor weighed most heavily in its
analysis, the attention devoted to planning and intent indicate that the plan
of financing was the critical inquiry.275 The fact that the decision to make
the public offering came after completion of the private offering minimized
the need for careful examination of the other factors. These two offerings
simply could not have been conducted as parts of the same transaction.
Utilizing a criterion which requires ascertaining the time a mental determination is made, however, raises serious practical problems which will
persist regardless of the identification of other more objective aspects of the
single plan of financing factor. 276
Understandably, courts often treat the single plan of financing factor in
that "[o]n the other hand, everyone hoped and expected that the initial [financing] would
be sufficient ...." Id. (emphasis added). Accord, Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d

893, 901 n.9 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that "two kinds of limited partnership interests were...
offered as part of a single scheme of financing contemplated by the limited partnership agreement. . ." (emphasis added)); Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,438 at 99,211 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (citing Livens). See generally
Bayoud v. Ballard, 404 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (finding no integration of accepted
private offering and concurrent public offering which plaintiffs had declined). This approach
seems sensitive to a venerable tenet of commercial law which protects the entrepreneur's
reasonable expectations when based upon the usual or probable. See Hadley v. Baxendale,
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
273. 374 F. Supp. at 1107 (emphasis added).
274. Id. In mentioning the price of the securities, the court may have created an additional factor of its own or itcould have been using this fact to emphasize the differences
in the classes of securities sold. For further discussion see note 392 infra and accompanying
text.
275. This emphasis upon a single plan of financing treated that factor as an independent component of the integration formula, and not simply as a product of the other
factors, as has been suggested by Sosin, supra note 221, at 124. Such reasoning is consistent
with the language of SEC Rule 152, 17 C.F.R. §230.152 (1979), which was intended to create
an "exception" to the normal application of integration. See note 206 supra. The administrative explanation of the rule states that an attempted private offering does not become suspect
merely because it is followed by a subsequently conceived public offering. The rule thus increases the weight against integration allocated to any of the SEC's five integration factors
which are affected by the question of when the offerings were conceived. The only such
factor to which this question is always relevant is that of whether a single plan of financing
exists. Securities Act Release No. 305 (Mar. 2, 1935) (available from the SEC) (adopting rule
152). See note 379 infra and accompanying text.
276, Perhaps the best illustration of this point is the highly imprecise methodology which
developed for determining whether a person who had purchased restricted securities from
an issuer and thereafter resold them was an "underwriter" as defined in §2(11) of the 1933
Act, i.e., whether the person purchased the securities "with a view to ... distribution." 1933
Act §2(11), 15 U.S.C. §77b(l1) (1976). See Wheat Report, supra note 27, at 167.
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conclusory terms,2 7 if at all.271 One court, expressly using the SEC's factors
in its integration inquiry, concluded that the issuer's series of similar offerings
involved a single plan of financing, although the last of the seven offerings
apparently had been conceived approximately thirty months after development of the plan to make the other six.279 It may have been determinative that
all other integration factors were similar.2s0 Nonetheless, in each of the four
cases in which the courts expressly deemed integration appropriate, they relied on the single plan of financing factor.sl Moreover, this factor was an
explicit basis for decision in five of the six cases in which integration was
2 2
rejected where any explanation at all was given for the court's conclusion.
Further definition of the single plan of financing factor seems desirable and
likely on this basis alone.
None of the other integration criteria has been cited as frequently by
the courts as a basis for decision. 22 It also appears that each of the factors
does not carry relatively equal weight on both sides of the integration question.
For example, the courts in Bowers v. Columbia General Corp.2 8 4 found that
all factors except the type of security offered militated against integration
277. SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1243 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
278. See, e.g., Mason v. Marshall, 412 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1974), afJ'd on other grounds,
531 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1976).
279. Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,779
at 90,824 (S.D. Ga. 1976). There is support for the approach of integrating a series of similar
offerings without careful consideration of whether they were conceived at the same time.
See Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971). See also
Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962).
280. See generally Sosin, supra note 221.
281. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 901 n.9 (5th Cir. 1977); General
Life of Mo. Inv. Co. v. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Galaxy Foods,
Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1243 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,779 at 90,819, 90,824 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
282. See Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969); Barrett v.
Triangle Mining Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,438 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1974); Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609 (D. Del. 1971); Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [19641966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In the sixth case,
SEC v. Dunfee, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,970 (W.D. Mo.
1966), the plan of financing factor was not mentioned. See text accompanying notes 285-286
infra.
283. Ten of the integration opinions cited in note 242 supra explained their results to
some extent. Plan of financing was discussed in nine cases (Doran, Shamburger,Jackson Tool,
Galaxy Foods, Kennedy, Barrett, Livens, Bowers, Marcus). The other factors, in order of
mention in support of a court's stance on the integration question, were: time, discussed in
seven cases (Doran, Jackson Tool, Galaxy Foods, Kennedy, Livens, Bowers, Marcus); class of
security, discussed in seven cases (Jackson Tool, Galaxy Foods, Kennedy, Livens, Bowers,
Dunfee, Marcus); type of consideration, discussed in six cases (Doran, Jackson Tool, Kennedy,
Livens, Bowers, Marcus); and purpose, discussed in six cases (Doran, Shamburger, Kennedy,
Livens, Bowers, Marcus). Except for the conclusion that the single plan of financing factor
carries the most relative weight, no reliable inferences as to the relative importance of the
various factors can be drawn from the above statistics, especially since, in two of the 10
cases (Barrett, Dunfee) four of the five factors received no mention, and in another case
(Shamburger) three of the five factors were ignored.
284. 336 F. Supp. 609 (D. Del. 1971).
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of a purported private offering and refused to integrate. On the other hand, in
SEC v. Dunfee,2 5 all of the factors except the type of security favored integration, yet the court declined to integrate the defendant's section 3(a)(11)
offering with prior offerings made in violation of section 5. 2 6 This would
suggest that offering the same class of security may not of itself be sufficient
grounds to require integration; however, a court may be persuaded not to
integrate solely on the basis that dissimilar securities have been offered.-s
This result might, but probably should not, be explained in terms of
which exemptions were relied upon by the issuer. The SEC has taken the
position that any one of the five factors may be determinative when the
intrastate exemption is involved, 2ss but that these factors are only relevant
considerations in integrating a private offering.2s9 Theoretically, this posture
presents a rather open-ended standard for assessing the propriety of integration of an intrastate offering, because a single factor by its presence or
absence may prevent or implement integration. Founding integration on a
single criterion in this circumstance, but not in others, is difficult to justify.
Dunfee illustrates from the regulator's perspective the dangers posed by this
apparent two-way street. Rather, each factor's relationship with the others
should hinge upon the legal consequences attendant their juxtaposition. Thus,
akin to Bowers, if two offerings are not part of the same plan of financing but
are similar in all other respects, integration nonetheless may be inappropriate.290 On the other hand, like Dunfee, if two offerings are part of the same
plan of financing but none of the other factors are coincidental, the satisfaction
of this single criterion may not be sufficient to sway the balance in favor of
29 1
integration.
285. [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH) 91,970 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
286. The court stated: "In August of 1965 this defendant was selling six per cent
notes, payable in twenty monthly installments. From August of 1965 until April of 1966
he sold no notes of any kind. In April he commenced the issuance and sale of seven per cent
notes payable in thirty-six months. This Court believes that as a matter of law this is a
'new issue' of securities." [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 91,970 at
96,302. Lest it appear that the offerings referred to by the court were not made at or
about the same time, it should be noted that during the greater part of the eight-month
hiatus, when the defendant sold no notes, he had attempted unsuccessfully to qualify an
offering of notes under Regulation A. These notes were similar to the notes which were
sold in reliance on §3(a)(11) at the expiration of this period. The differences between the

two types of notes do not appear significant enough to warrant the result. See Securities Act
Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,963 (1946), discussed in notes 201-203 supra
and accompanying text.
287. At least one court has integrated two offerings without resolving the factor relating
to the class of security where all other factors were similar. Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp.,
545 F.2d 893, 901 (5th Cir. 1977).
288. Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961).
289. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962).
290. See DeLorean Motor Co., available Sept. 15, 1977, [1977] SEC No-ACTION LEurraS
(CCII), fiche 59, frame A4. Cf. Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,438 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court treated only the plan of financing
factor in not integrating where the other four factors might reasonably have been found
to have been coincidental).
291. Cf. Polk County Indus. Dev. Auth., available Dec. 26, 1975, [1975] SEC No-AatoN
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C. Administrative Safe Harbors
1. Rules 146 and 147
As demonstrated above, analysis of integration cases yields only a few
generalizations, several largely untested hypotheses and a clear recognition
of the need for greater explication of when integration is applicable. Toward
the end of 1972, the SEC embarked on a program to develop rules providing
more definitive standards for satisfying the exemption prescribed in section
4(2) than was currently provided by administrative and judicial interpretations of the statutory language. 292 This endeavor, which was expanded to
include redefinition of section 3(a)(ll), 293 extended into 1974.2 4 In the first
proposals of rules 146 and 147 the SEC continued, for integration purposes,
the more restrictive treatment of offerings made in reliance on section 3(a)(1 1)
than those made in reliance on section 4(2).s5 The SEC initially proposed
integration of all offerings of securities made within any consecutive sixmonth period of an intended section 3(a)(ll) offering.2 6 Ultimately, the SEC
LETrERs (CCH), roll 12, frame 16277 (no integration where at least three, and likely four,
of five factors, including plan of financing, were the same).
292. Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 179,108.
293. Securities Act Release No. 5349 (Jan. 8, 1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,168.
294. Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 2,353 (1974) (adopting
SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1979) and defining §3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§77c(a)(11) (1976)); Securities Act Release No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974)
(adopting SEC Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1979) and defining §4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. §77d(2) (1976)).
295. See, e.g., SEC Rule 152, 17 C.F.R. §230.152 (1979) (granting preferential treatment
to private offerings followed by subsequently conceived registered offerings). Rule 152 is reproduced and discussed at note 206 supra.
296. Proposed SEC Rule 147(b), Proposed Reg. §230.147(b), Securities Act Release No.
5349 (Jan. 8, 1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,168. The initial
proposal of rule 146, which antedated publication of proposed rule 147, would have limited
to 35 the number of persons in any consecutive twelve-month period who could purchase
securities of the issuer in offerings pursuant to the rule or otherwise in reliance on §4(2).
Proposed SEC Rule 146(f), Proposed Reg. §230.146(f), Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov.
28, 1972), [1972] 179 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-i, F-5. This proposal was subsequently
amended to integrate only offerings of the same or similar class of securities made pursuant
to the rule or otherwise in reliance on §4(2). Proposed Rule 146(g)(2), Proposed Reg.
§230.146(g)(2), Securities Act Release No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] RED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 79,529. The amended proposal excluded from integration sales to the
following persons: (1) directors and executive officers; (2) wholly owned subsidiaries or the
100% parent of the issuer; (3) banks lending money to the issuer when the loans were
evidenced only by the issuance of debt securities; (4) employees of the issuer, to the extent
of 35 in any consecutive twelve-month period, who purchase securities pursuant to a pension,
profit-sharing, stock bonus, stock option, stock purchase or similar plan approved by shareholders of the issuer; and (5) persons acquiring securities in connection with a business
combination, to the extent of 35 in any consecutive twelve-month period. Id. When traditional
integration concepts were applied in the final version of rule 146, as discussed in text accompanying notes 302-307 infra, these exclusions were discarded, and it is unclear whether
these types of offerings enjoy any degree of immunity from integration. See generally 3 H.
BLOOMENTIHAL, supra note 8, §4.15[5][b][i] at 4-157 to -159.
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adopted a somewhat more equally applied format to govern integration of

offerings made pursuant to these rules. This format, as set forth in rule
146(b)(1),297 and, except where otherwise indicated, repeated verbatim in
rule 147(b)(2), 2s provides:
For purposes of this rule only, an offering- 9 shall be deemed not to
include offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the
issuer pursuant to the exemptions provided by section 3 or section 4(2)

of the Act or pursuant to a registration statement filed under the
[1933] Act, that take place prior to the six month period immediately
preceding or after the six month period immediately following any
offers, offers for sale or sales pursuant to this rule, Provided, That there
are during neither of said six month periods any offers, offers for sale
or sales of securities by or for the issuer of the same or similar class as

those offered, offered for sale or sold pursuant to the rule.300

Full compliance with those terms guarantees an issuer a safe harbor from
undesired integration of any lawful offering of its securities with an offering
made in compliance with the rule. 30° A preliminary note to both rules describes when offerings otherwise in compliance with the rule but not entitled
to a safe harbor are subject to integration. 302 These notes affirm that whether
297. SEC Rule 146(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(b)(1) (1979).
298. SEC Rule 147(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(b)(2) (1979). This subsection is the §3(a)(11)
counterpart to rule 146(b)(1).
299. Rule 147(b)(2) uses the word "issue" instead of "offering," consistent with the
language of §3(a)(11).
300. SEC Rule 146(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(b)(1) (1979). The rule 147(b)(2) version of

the proviso language of the paragraph quoted in the text is slightly different, viz.: "Provided,
That there are during either of said six month periods no offers for sale or sales of securities
by or for the issuer of the same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or sold
pursuant to the rule." SEC Rule 147(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(b)(2) (1979) (partial emphasis
added). A literal reading of the word "either" would create a considerable relaxation in rule
147(b)(2) from the format used in rule 146(b)(1), since not engaging in any offerings of the
same or similar securities in only one of the two six-month periods would assure that the
offering made in reliance on the rule would be immune from integration. Such a reading
is expressly refuted in Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 2,353 (1974),
which adopts rule 147, and describes rule 147(b)(2) as creating a safe harbor from integration
for offerings in conformity with the rule "provided that there are no offers, offers to sell or
sales of securities of the same or similar class by or for the issuer during either of these sixmonth periods." Id. at 2,354 (emphasis added). Further, the note appearing immediately after
rule 147(b)(2) supports inferentially the interpretation stated in the release. See Note to SEC
Rule 147(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(b)(2) (1979). It therefore seems unlikely that only literal
compliance with rule 147(b)(2) will suffice. Furthermore, it appears questionable whether
such compliance would entitle an issuer to the protection afforded in the last sentence of
§19(a) of the 1933 Act, which states in part that "[n]o provision of this subchapter imposing
any liability shall apply to an act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any
rule or regulation of the Commission." 1933 Act §19(a), 15 U.S.C. §77s(a) (1976). Neither
conformity with the rule nor the requisite good faith would likely be found. 'See generally 3
L. Loss, supranote 1,at 1842-49.
301. See Hicks, supra note 84, at 472-77 for a detailed description of the operation of
the integration safe harbor of rule 147(b)(2). Professor Hicks concludes that this provision
adds very little certainty to the interpretative dilemma posed by traditional integration
concepts. Id. at 477.
302. Preliminary Note 3 to SEC Rules 146 and 147, 17 C.F.R. §§230.146 and .147 (1979).
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offerings will be integrated is a question of fact. 3 3 In the case of rule 146,
after referring to Securities Act Release No. 4552,304 the note lists the SEC's
five integration factors and indicates that these factors should be considered
in making a determination as to the applicability of integration. 30 5 The
preliminary note to rule 147, on the other hand, cites Securities Act Release
No. 4434,30 6 refers to the same five integration factors, but prefaces the
reference with the statement that "any one or more of the following
factors may be determinative."307 The rules thus maintain the same linguistic
inconsistency of treatment of the five integration factors in offerings made
in reliance on sections 3(a)(l1) and 4(2) which first appeared in Securities Act
Release Nos. 4434 and 4552.
There appears to be a rational basis for not integrating two offerings,
one made pursuant to one of these rules and another which relies exclusively
on the statute, when the offerings are separated by more than six months. The
likelihood that integration would be appropriate decreases as the time
between the offerings increases. After a six-month hiatus between offerings,
the frequency with which they ought to be integrated is presumably quite
low. Consequently, relative to the quantum of inconvenience which will be
experienced by issuers who are required to plan and execute their offerings
under the vague threat of integration, little protection for investors is
generated by subjecting all such offerings to an integration scrutiny.30 8 Additionally, because the rules have more stringent requirements than the prevailing judicial and administrative interpretations of sections 3(a)(l1) and
4(2),309 they presumably provide greater investor protection than the statutory
language. Use of the rules might be deterred and the potential protection for
investors diminished if offerings pursuant to the rules, whenever made, faced
the possibility of integration. Thus, integration safe harbors may encourage
utilization of the rules and thereby promote investor interests.
Unfortunately, the availability of ostensibly objective rules retards clarification of the statutory language. Unsure of safety from integration when
making offerings in reliance on that language, issuers readily turn to the
security of a rule offering. As the size of the safe harbor carrot grows, refinement of the principles governing integration will correspondingly diminish.
Moreover, little incentive will exist for further definition of when integration
is applicable as long as the SEC desires to encourage use of the rules. This
These preliminary notes govern integration of an offering made in reliance on either rule with:
(1)an offering, whenever made, in violation of §5, and (2) any offering, whenever made, if an
offer, offer for sale or sale of the same or similar class of security as that offered, offered
for sale or sold pursuant to the rule was made during the six months immediately preceding
or subsequent to the offer, offer for sale or sale pursuant to the rule.
303. Id.
304. (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962).
305. Preliminary Note 3 to SEC Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1979).
306. (Dec. 6, 1901), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961).
307. Preliminary Note 3 to SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1979).
308. See notes 17-30 supra and accompanying text (discussing cost and inconvenience of
adjusting the formal of a securities offering).
309. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 906 (5th Cir. 1977).
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works to the detriment of those who, for various reasons, are either unable
to structure their securities offerings to comply with one of the rules or to
wait the requisite six months between offerings of the same or similar securities.
Whatever the merits to a policy promoting compliance with rules 146
and 147, a case can be made for shortening the present six-month measure
of freedom from integration. In the first place, the length of time chosen
is largely arbitrary. In addition, reduction of the six-month "windows" might
entice smaller issuers, whose securities ordinarily pose greater risks than their
well-established competitors, to use the rules. Small issuers tend to have
difficulty accurately predicting capital needs and are often financially unable
to delay for any appreciable period the additional financing necessary to
meet unanticipated expenses.310 Finally, the six-month limit is much longer
than the period during which the public receives the protection of the
prospectus delivery requirements of section 5 in a registered offering.3 Under
this section, if the issuer has not previously sold securities pursuant to an
effective registration statement, a prospectus must be delivered during the
first ninety days subsequent to the commencement of the offering,sla which
is arbitrarily established as the period during which a distribution is in
process. 313 Arguably, a ninety-day hiatus both before the first and after the
last offer, offer for sale, or sale in an offering which conforms to one of the
rules ought to provide insulation from its integration with other offerings
otherwise in compliance with the statute.3 4 Specifying this shorter time restraint would still provide a period of protection equivalent to that afforded
the public in a registered offering.31 5 Such an approach would probably meet
310. See, e.g., DeLorean Motor Co., available Sept. 15, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcION L.TERS
(CCH), fiche 59, frame A4; Sargent, The Federal Securities Laws and Small Business, 33 Bus.
LAw. 901, 913 (1978).
311. 1933 Act §5(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §77e(a)-(b) (1976). The protection of these sections is
extended beyond the prescribed period as to any transactions in "securities constituting the
whole or a part of an unsold allotment to or subscriptions by [a] dealer as a participant in
the distribution of such securities by the issuer or by or through an underwriter." 1933 Act
§4(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. §77d(3)(C) (1976).
312. 1933 Act §4(3), 15 U.S.C. §77d(3) (1976). The distribution period is 40 days for all
registered offerings subsequent to the first. Id.
313. Until 1954, the statute had fixed this period at one year. In that year the period of
distribution was reduced to 40 days, and in 1964 increased to 90 days for first-time registrants.
See 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 257.
314. Cf. Securities Act Release No. 5979 (Sept. 19, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 43,709 (1978)
(reducing the measuring period of sales of restricted securities prescribed in SEC Rule
144(e)(1)-(2), 17 C.F.R. §230.144(e)(1)-(2) (1979), from six to three months); Securities Act
Release No. 5995 (Nov. 8, 1978), [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CC)
81,759
(amending in part SEC Rule 144(e)(3)(ii)-(vi), 17 C.F.R. §230.144(e)(3)(ii)-(vi) (1979), to reduce
from six to three months the period during which sales of securities by persons other than
the person seeking to utilize the rule are integrated to reduce the amount of securities which
the latter can sell pursuant thereto). Rule 144 limits the quantity of securities which may be
sold in each of a series of offerings made three months apart. It may be inappropriate to
apply the rationale of the above releases to permit a rapid series of offerings to be
made pursuant to rules 146 and 147 as long as these rules impose no restriction on the
quantity of securities sold.
315. All current restrictions on resales of securities acquired in rule 146 and 147 transactions could be maintained so as to preclude these transactions from being converted into
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resistance from the SEC. 31 Finally, even if the inadequacy of state regulation 317 or the potential for abuse of the registration requirements in view of
318
necessitates
the public nature of offerings made pursuant to the exemption
no
offerings,
other
and
offerings
intrastate
a substantial time barrier between
3
1'146.
rule
with
in
conformity
similar rationale applies to offerings made
to
justify
In fact, as long as an offering conforms with rule 146, it is difficult
denying it the availability of section 4(2), even if another offering otherwise in
conformity with the statute has been made concurrently. 320 Certainly, a ninetyday "window" on both sides of a rule 146 offering should be more than
adequate to guarantee an exemption for that offering and to prevent it from
components of an unregistered interstate public offering. See SEC Rules 144, 146(h), 147(e)(f), 17 C.F.R. §§230.144, .146(h), .147(e)-(f) (1979).
316. Cf. I L. Loss, supra note 1, at 597 (noting that the reduction of the period of distribution of registered offerings from one year to 40 days through amendment of §4(3), discussed in notes 312-313 supra and accompanying text, is not likely to prompt the SEC to
reduce from one year to 40 days the rebuttable presumption as to the period of distribution
of offerings made pursuant to §3(a)(l1), discussed in note 104 supra and accompanying text,
which had been patterned after §4(3)).
317. Acceptance of the idea that state regulation is inadequate questions the wisdom
of congressional preservation of state jurisdiction over securities transactions in §18 of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §77r (1976). Generally, if an offering is exempt pursuant to §3(a)(1l),
the remedial provisions of the 1933 Act, §§12(2) and 17, are still applicable, as is §10(b) of
the 1934 Act and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1979), promulgated thereunder.
318. For an example of such abuse, see SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86,
88-89 (D.N.H. 1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960).
319. Under current regulations, the SEC is in a considerably more advantageous position
to oversee rule 146 offerings than intrastate offerings. For example, SEC Rule 146(i), 17 C.F.R.
§230.146(i) (1979), requires the issuer to file a report with the SEC concerning offerings made
within any twelve-month period in reliance on rule 146 with aggregate proceeds to the issuer
of at least $50,000.
320. See note 208 supra. Of course, the rule 146 offering might be integrated "one way"
with the concurrent offering; that is, integrated solely for the purpose of determining whether
the concurrent offering, when combined with the rule 146 offering, conforms to the statute.
If the concurrent offering is a registered offering, all investors in both offerings have been
given full protection of the statute to the extent necessary in light of their circumstances
and the nature of the offerings. Both offerings should therefore be deemed in compliance
with the statute.
If the offering concurrent with the rule 146 offering is made pursuant to §3(a)(9), (11)
or Regulation A, tile narrow contexts in which these exemptions were intended to be used
would clearly not exist, and integration would technically appear appropriate. However, at
least in the instance of concurrent rule 146 and Regulation A offerings, as in the instance of
concurrent rule 146 and registered offerings, it is arguable that imposing the registration requirement on both offerings is unnecessary to protect investors.
In either of the above cases in which integration is suggested as inappropriate, it is
recognized that substantial practical difficulties exist in attempting to conduct concurrent
private and public offerings. It would seem that to comply with rule 146, the security offered
in the private offering would have to possess at a minimum very different jinvestment
characteristics from that offered in the public offering to the extent that the public investors
would likely have no interest in purchasing the privately offered security. If so, the offerings probably would not be integrated using traditional integration concepts. See also Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,963 (1946) (concurrent offerings
of securities pursuant to §§3(a)(9) and 4(2) permitted where each of the offerings involved a
substantially different security).
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being used as a catalyst to promote spontaneous ill-considered purchases as
part of a related exempt or registered offering.
The above discussion has focused on the manner in which integration
will apply to an offering made in reliance on rule 146 or 147 when no other
offering of securities of the issuer has occurred within six months prior or
subsequent to the offering made in reliance on the rule. In that situation, the
offering made in reliance upon the rule cannot lose its exemption through
integration with any other offering made inconformity with an exemption or
pursuant to a registration statement occurring outside the six-month buffer.
Nothing in either of the rules, however, grants a safe harbor to that other
"exempt" offering. The introductory language of the safe harbor provision in
the rules321 supports this concept of "one-way" integration3 22 Thus, if an

issuer were to make two offerings more than six months apart, one in conformity with rule 146 and the other pursuant to section 3(a)(9), 3(a)(11)
or 4(2), the latter offering could lose its exemption if the circumstances
warranted integration.= 3Rule 146(b)(1) indicates, however, that the section
4(2) exemption for the offering made in reliance on the rule would remain
intact.m4 Of course, if the other offering fulfilled the requirements of an inte321. SEC Rules 146(b)(1), 147(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§230.146(b)(1), .147(b)(2) (1979): (Tor
purposes of this rule only"). See text accompanying notes 299-300 supra for further wording.
Rules 146 is intended inter alia to establish "feasible objective standards upon which responsible business[persons] may rely in raising capital under claim of section 4(2) exemption."
Preliminary Note 3 to SEC Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1979). A similarly worded clause
with respect to §3(a)(ll) appears in Preliminary Note 3 to SEC rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147
(1979). Nothing in either rule purports to affect offerings other than the offering made in
reliance on the rule.
322. A one-way application of integration, in which two offerings are treated as a single
transaction only for the purpose of determining whether one of the offerings complies with
the registration requirements, is not uncommon. See note 236 supra. Such an application
typically occurs when one of the offerings is registered. See, e.g., In re Cameron Indus., 49
S.E.C. 540, 546 (1959). A similar treatment has not been consistently accorded a combination
of an otherwise exempt offering and a Regulation A offering. See, e.g., In re Herbert R. May,
27 S.E.C. 814, 816-20 (1948); 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 616 nn.237 & 238 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, one-way integration appears to be proper where an exempt offering can
be combined with an offering pursuant to §3(b) under rule 240. See Preliminary Note 6 to
SEC Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1979); SEC No-Action Letter, Morrison & Foerster, available July 30, 1975, [19 75 -1976 Transfer Binder] FaD. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 180,265.
323. The same result would follow if one of the offerings had been accomplished in
conformity with rule 147 and the other pursuant to a transactional exemption incompatible
with the statute when combined with the rule 147 offering, such as §3(a)(9) or 4(2).
324. Again, the result under rule 147(b)(2) would be similar. The safe harbor provisions
of rules 146 and 147 provide no protection from integration with a prior or subsequent offering in violation of §5. Hence, once an offering loses its exemption upon being integrated with
an offering made in reliance on one of the rules, the latter is theoretically vulnerable to
being integrated with the newly-created §5 violation. Such a result would circumvent the
purpose of the safe harbor provisions and should be dismissed. See Hicks, supra note 84, at
472. Professor Hicks concludes that reading rules 146(b)(1) and 147(b)(2) to permit one-way
integration "would defeat the whole purpose of the rule[s]," because the above result would
necessarily follow. Id. at 473. In the context of rule 147, he suggests that "the objective test
contained in the rule covers those non-intrastate offerings of securities that take place immediately prior to or immediately subsequent to an intrastate offering made in re-
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gration safe harbor under rule 146 or 147, then that offering would not lose
its exemption through integration.
While in the situations described, the offering made pursuant to rule
146 or 147 remains exempt despite its "one-way" integration with another
offering, at least one other problem may remain. If the offering pursuant to
either rule did not disclose the possibility of integration with a prior offering,
and therefore the existence of a contingent liability to the purchasers therein
325
purchasers in the safe harbor offering
under section 12(1) of the 1933 Act,
32 6
Even
might have a valid rescission action under section 12(2) of the statute.

if the safe harbor offering preceded the offering with which it was integrated,
27
a similar problem of nondisclosure may exist3

If, on the other hand, there is an offering of the same or similar class
of security as that offered pursuant to one of the rules within six months of
the latter offering, integration of the two offerings will be determined by
reference to the applicable SEC release on integration. 328 Even if the two
liance upon the rule." Id. In support of Professor Hicks' interpretation, one might note that
the SEC knows how to describe one-way integration in very explicit terms when this concept
is intended to be applied. See Preliminary Note 6 to SEC Rule 240, Note 2 to SEC Rule
240(e), 17 C.F.R. §230.240, .240(e) (1979). On the other hand, there is no reason why the
SEC would want to protect non-rule offerings from integration, except perhaps those made
under Regulation A which are readily likened to registered offerings for integration
purposes. It seems more likely that the SEC would want to encourage use of the rules
under §§3(a)(ll) and 4(2) and not extend such special protection from integration to more
public §3(a)(9) offerings simply because investors in another offering, which might be part
of the same integrated transaction, received the benefit of the protection of one of the
rules. In any case, the door is open to the one-way integration interpretation suggested.
Moreover, it appears that the "backlash" effect, whereby the rule offering loses its exemption after being integrated with another offering which lost its exemption by having been
integrated with the rule offering, can be more readily discarded as contrary to the
purposes of the rules than can the concept of one-way integration. See also note 345 and text
accompanying notes 337-345 infra.
325. 1933 Act §12(1), 15 U.S.C. §771(1) (1976).
326. 1933 Act §12(2), 15 U.S.C. §771(2) (1976). In addition, the SEC might bring an injunctive proceeding pursuant to §20(b) of the 1933 Act, alleging a violation by the issuer of
§17(a). Cf. In re Cameron Indus., 39 S.E.C. 540, 546 (1959) (stop order issued under §8(d) of
the 1933 Act, suspending effectiveness of registration statement which in part failed to disclose contingent liability under §12(1) arising out of issuer's failure to register prior offerings
which the court held were integrated with offerings to which registration statement related).
327. It is almost inconceivable that offerings more than six months apart would be
integrated unless they were part of the same plan of financing. Compare In re CrowellCollier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957), [1957-1961 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,539 (offerings one year apart of convertible debentures
pursuant to same trust identure held integrated) with Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374
F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1974) (offerings to plaintiff on six occasions between September, 1967
and April, 1970 held not part of a single plan of financing and therefore integration
not appropriate). If the offerings were part of the same plan of financing, nondisclosure of
the plan and of the possibility of integration would likely be actionable.
328. The note to rules 146(b)(1) and 147(b)(2) provides: "In the event that securities of
the same or similar class as those offered pursuant to the rule are offered, offered for sale or
sold less than six months prior to or subsequent to any offer, offer for sale or sale pursuant
to the rule, see Preliminary Note 3 hereof as to which offers, offers to sell, offers for sale
or sales may be deemed to be part of the offering." Note to SEC Rules 146(b)(1), 147(b)(2),
17 C.F.R. §§230.146(b)(1), .147(b)(2) (1979). See notes 302-307 supra and accompanying text.
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offerings are not integrated, the safe harbor from integration will have been
lost.3 2 9 If, instead, dissimilar classes of securities330 are offered, the safe harbor
will be preserved. The literal language of the rules is unclear, however, as
to whether the two offerings of dissimilar classes may be integrated.31 The
practice of not integrating two offerings solely because they involve dissimilar
classes of securities is supported by precedent3 2 which suggests that integration
But see Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 2,353 (1974) (adopting
rule 147 and stating that in applying integration in the context of that rule, "the Commission generally has deemed intrastate offerings to be 'integrated' with those registered or
private offerings of the same class of securities made by the issuer at or about the same
time." Id. at 2,345 (emphasis added)). No similar language appears in Securities Act Release
No. 5487 (Apr. 26, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974) (adopting rule 146). Presumably, offerings of similar classes of securities under rule 147 will be treated as described in the text.
Rule 146 does not address the applicability of SEC Rule 152, 17 C.F.R. §230.152 (1979), to a
rule 146-registered offering sequence. See note 206 supra. Presumably, rule 152 will continue
to be factored into the integration formula. See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8,
§4.14[5][b][ii] at 4-162.
329. It is difficult to justify denial of a safe harbor to an offering made in reliance on
rule 146 or 147 simply because an offering which is not integrated with the offering made
in reliance on the rule involves the same or similar class of security and is made within six
months of that offering. This is particularly so when the offering which destroys the safe
harbor is conceived and initiated subsequent to the rule 146 or 147 offering.
For example, an issuer undertakes and completes a rule 147 offering of common stock
in January in order to raise $1,500,000 for research and development. Thereafter, in March,
the issuer has a unique opportunity to acquire assets in exchange for common stock issued
in conformity with rule 146. This opportunity was unforeseen in January and would not be
available in July, when the integration safe harbor would accrue. It may be assumed that
the proper integration determination would be to leave the offerings uncombined. Nevertheless, no safe harbor exists for either offering under the rules. If in October the issuer were
to desire to raise an additional $1,500,000 for research and development by offering its
common stock pursuant to Regulation A, the issuer would be faced with the prospect that
the Regulation A offering would be integrated with the rule 147 offering made the preceding January, thereby precluding entirely the making of the Regulation A offering. See note
236 supra. While it may be true that integration is not mandatory or perhaps even probable,
the vagaries of applying integration may well encourage the issuer to postpone the
October offering. This delay could have been avoided by the issuer if the January and March
offerings had been of different classes of securities. Depending upon the circumstances, this
solution may have been impractical. The issuer conceivably might proceed safely with its
offering in October by conforming it to §3(a)(11), but even this alternative may already have
been foreclosed. See note 115 supra.
330. A "class" of a security is much broader than an "issue." See 1 L. Loss, supra note 1,
at 577-78. Likewise a "class" is broader than a "series." See Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1959). Nevertheless, because there are numerous
potential variables in the characteristics of a given "class" of security, the task of differentiation may be quite complex. See Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 71,
75-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), afJ'd, 270 F.2d 259, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1959). It follows that distinguishing
between "similar" classes of securities as required by the provisions of rules 146(b)(1) and
147(b)(2) is likely to be even more troublesome.
331. Compliance with rule 146 or 147 will only immunize an offering from integration
with offerings made more than six months prior or subsequent to that offering. See text
accompanying notes 299-300 supra. The note to the rules, however, creates a negative inference as to the propriety of integrating a nile offering and another offering of a dissimilar class of security made within either of the six-month periods. See note 328 supra.
332. See Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,963 (1946). See
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is appropriate for offerings which could readily have been combined by the
issuer because, inter alia, the securities in each offering would attract the
same type of investors. 3-3 Nevertheless, in the absence of clear language to
the contrary, there is ample flexibility to integrate offerings of dissimilar
classes of securities made within six months even if one or both offerings
are made in conformity with the rules.33 4
2. Rule 240
Rule 240,33 5 consistent with its purpose of facilitating small offerings of a
limited character, 336 approaches integration in a considerably more objective
fashion than do rules 146 and 147. All unregistered offerings within the preceding twelve months are integrated solely for the purpose of determining
the aggregate amount which can be sold in reliance on the rule 337 With this
exception, rule 240 offerings retain their integrity as exempt offerings even
if they are integrated with other offerings. 338 These non-rule 240 offerings,
however, if made in reliance upon an exemption, may lose their exempt
status.33 9 This one-way integration can also have significant repercussions on
also SEC v. Dunfee, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE_'. (CCH) 91,970 (W.D. Mo.
1966).
333. See notes 391-394 infra and accompanying text.
334. See note 394 infra. See Hicks, supra note 84, at 474-75, where the author states that
even an illegal offering of a dissimilar security within six months of a rule 147 offering will
not be integrated under the language of rule 147(b)(2), but questioning whether this was
intended by the SEC. If, in fact, this is what is intended, it is surprising that the SEC has
not given more prominence to this factor in its integration formula.
335. SEC Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1979).
336. See 193 Act §3(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §77c(b) (West Supp. 1978); Securities Act Release
No. 5560 (Jan. 25, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 180,066
(adopting rule 240).
337. SEC Rule 240(e), 17 C.F.R. §230.240(e) (1979). See also SEC Rule 254(a)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§230.254(a)(1) (1979), which, for purposes of determining the aggregate dollar amount of
securities which can be sold pursuant to Regulation A, integrates all sales in violation of
§5(a) and pursuant to §3(b) within one year prior to the commencement of the proposed
Regulation A offering.
338. Preliminary Note 6 to SEC Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1979), provides: "While a
transaction may be exempt pursuant to Rule 240, the same transaction may be part of a
larger issue of securities and may affect the availability of a different exemption for other
transactions which are a part of such larger issue. See Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov.
6, 1962), [27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962)] concerning the integration of transactions." Id. See
generally 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8, §4.14[5][c]. See also Note I to SEC Rule 240(b), 17
C.F.R. §230.240(b) (1979); Bloom & Denberg, available Dec. 16, 1976, [1976] SEC No-ACTION
LETTERs

(CCH), roll 12, frame 15975.

The citation to Securities Act Release No. 4552 in preliminary note 6 to rule 240 apparently refers to the rules governing integration of a rule 240 offering and another purportedly exempt offering solely for the purpose of determining whether the latter is exempt.
This reference is only helpful where the offering subject to integration has been made in
reliance on §4(2). Certainly, for example, the SEC did not intend the integration standards
of that release to apply in the context of offerings made in reliance on §3(a)(11). See Preliminary Note 3 to SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1979); Securities Act Release No. 4434
(Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961).
339. Preliminary Note 6 to SEC Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1979).
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the rule 240 offering. For example, if an offering of securities for $50,000 is
made to directors by an issuer in reliance on section 4(2), the amount of
that offering will not reduce the permissible maximum amount of securities
which may be sold within the following twelve months under rule 240.340

But, if a $100,000 rule 240 offering of common stock is made within that
period, that offering may be integrated with the offering to directors, thereby
transforming the 4(2) offering into a section 5 violation.3 41 The consequence
of such a scenario may be that the directors, who probably had authorized
both offerings, would have an action against the issuer for rescission.3 4 2 The
purchasers in the rule 240 offering would have no right of rescission 343 and
would remain owners and share in the burden of any recovery by the directors.3- In addition, because the offering to directors was made in violation of section 5, the aggregate sales price of securities sold may be deemed
to have exceeded by $50,000 its limitation under rule 240. 45 Rule 240 poses
340. SEC Rule 240(e)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. §230.240(e)(2)(ii) (1979), excludes from the computation of the dollar amount permitted to be sold pursuant to the rule, securities sold "in
reliance on an exemption from registration other than this rule . . . to any .

.

. direc-

tor...."
341. Preliminary Note 6 to SEC Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1979); SEC No-Action
Letter, Morrison & Foerster, available July 30, 1975, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
RaP. (CCH) g80,265.
342. See 1933 Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. §771(i) (1976).
343. If there was no disclosure in the rule 240 offering of the potential liability of the
issuer to the directors, the purchasers in the rule 240 offering might be able to rescind their
purchases under §12(2) of the 1933 Act.
344. See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8, §4.14[5][c] at 4-162.1. Significantly, however,
in a suit by directors, the defenses of estoppel or in pari delicto may be available to preclude
recovery. See Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Natl Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
965 (1977) (in pari delicto); Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th
Cir. 1961) (estoppel); Bell, How to Bar an Uninnocent Investor-The Validity of Common
Law Defenses to PrivateActions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. FLA. L. REv.

1 (1970) (both); Ruder, supra note 23, at 659-65 (in pari delicto). In addition, any director
who controlled the issuer would be subject to being made a defendant in a suit pursuant
to §15 of the 1933 Act.
345. This result is achieved through inclusion of the $50,000 proceeds from the offering
to directors in the computation of the maximum aggregate sales price pursuant to rule
240(e). See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8, §4.14[5][c] at 4-162.1. In such case, the last
$50,000 of sales under rule 240 would not qualify for that exemption. See Note 2 to SEC
Rule 240(e), 17 C.F.R. §230.240(e) (1979). See also note 67 supra. The one-way integration
concept incorporated in preliminary note 6 to rule 240 would be seriously undermined if the
offering which was integrated with the rule 240 offering could affect the availability of rule
240. The threatening result suggested in the text could be avoided, perhaps at the cost of
creating other interpretational problems, by reading rule 240(e)(2)(ii) literally. Thus, inasmuch as the offering to directors was made "in reliance" on §4(2), although not in conformity
therewith, the proceeds from such offering would not reduce the extent to which rule 240
is available to the issuer. SEC Rule 240(e)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. §230.240(e)(2)(ii) (1979) (emphasis
added). See note 340 supra. The language of rule 240 distinguishes between "reliance" and
"compliance" in several places. See, e.g., Note 1 to SEC Rule 240(b), 17 C.F.R. §230.240(b)
(1979). This result could simply be rejected as inconsistent with the purpose of rule 240. See
note 324 supra. In any case, "[s]urely the Commission did not intend to create such traps
for the unwary in a Mom and Pop type exemption." 3 H. BLOOMNTHAL, supra note 8,
§4.14[5][c] at 4-162.1.
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similar integration problems vis-a-vis subsequent offerings, but unlike the
above situation involving a prior offering, the rule's retrospective focus pre3
cludes those problems from affecting its availability. 46
To date, there has been no judicial clarification of the conceptual difficulties which attend integration of offerings made in reliance on rules 146, 147
and 240. Certainly the safe harbor aspects of these rules make them attractive
havens, yet an issuer who intends to rely on one of the rules may not ignore
the possibility of integration. If in any respect the issuer has failed to comply
with the rule, the absolute protection against integration available through
full compliance disappears. 34 7 Because complete certainty of compliance is
rare,3 48 an issuer should always be wary of possible integration problems,
particularly when engaging in a series of related offerings the nonintegration
of which is dependent upon the operation of the safe harbor provisions of
the rules.
Such vigilance is useless, however, when the issuer and its counsel do not
know what to look for. This problem is particularly serious because no
mistake is minor in this area. Hence, greater definition of both when integration applies and the ramifications of its application is desirable and even
essential. The courts, and particularly the SEC, undoubtedly cherish the
flexibility that ambiguity insures. Uncertainty breeds caution, and the prospect
of integration is a potent threat. Nonetheless, the public benefits lost by
maintaining such uncertainty far outweigh any harm prevented.
Until recently, this situation was ameliorated to some extent by the
willingness of the SEC staff to render informal advice concerning integration.
This practice was suspended in April, 1979 when the staff took the position
that integration questions are factually too complex for staff determination
and that any such determinations are too susceptible of being "misconstrued
349
It is too early to appraise the effect
and misapplied in other situations."
346. See Note 1 to SEC Rule 240(b), 240(e), 17 C.F.R. §§230.240(b), .240(e)
(1979); Bloom & Denberg, available Dec. 16, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcrioN LETrErs (CCH), roll
12, frame 15975.
347. The nature of the noncompliance may be minor, e.g., failure to file form 146
pursuant to rule 146(i), Securities Act Release No. 5912 (May 3, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 10,550
(1978). In such case, the offering likely would maintain its exempt status under §4(2), but all
benefits of rule 146 theoretically would be lost.
348. See generally Long, supra note 101. Under rule 147, the issuer must wait at least
nine months subsequent to the last sale in the offering to be certain of compliance. See
SEC Rule 147(e), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(e) (1979). See note 115 supra.
349. See Indian Wells Oil Co., available Apr. 16, 1979, [1979] SEC No-AcrIoN LETrS
(CCH), fiche 20, frame A25; SEC No-Action Letter, Kearney Plaza Co., available Apr. 9, 1979,
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,132. But see Capital Energy Corp., available July 23, 1979, [1979] SEC No-ACrION LErmEs (CCH), fiche 33, frame F22. The Indian
Wells Oil Co. and Kearney Plaza Co. letters each involved factual situations similar to those
to which the SEC staff had recently rendered informal advice in the past. See, respectively,
Churchill & Hoskins, available Oct. 25, 1978, [1978] SEC No-Ac'rON LETTERS (CCH), fiche 49,
frame Hl, and Canon Club Co., available June 26, 1978, [1978] SEC No-AcrION L=Er s (CCH),
fiche 31, frame I1. In fact, the individual on whose behalf the Kearney Plaza Co. letter was
requested was one of the general partners of the Canon Club Co. limited partnership. During
one other period, the SEC staff refused to deal substantively with inquiries about integration.
See note 359 infra. The SEC will, however, advise when one of its rules immunizes an offer-
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of this turnabout. Nevertheless, it seems likely that there will be greater
pressure on issuers to use the integration safe harbors of rules 146 and 147.
Most practitioners undoubtedly will mourn the loss of access to the staff on
this issue. Some, on the other hand, may view the closure of this avenue of
clarification as an opportunity to sidestep integration problems which the
staff might have raised if asked but which do not exist in the practitioner's
judgment.350 In any event, issuers and their counsel must now decide integration questions without direct assistance. Nevertheless, they will have available recent integration interpretations by the SEC staff which were made
public prior to the staffs decision to cease responding to integration inquiries
on the subject. The following section examines these interpretations with
the goal of clarifying the formal law on integration.
IV.

CURRENT INFORMAL APPLICATIONS OF INTEGRATION:

SEC No-AcTION LETT Rs (1971-1979)

By written request in prescribed form, the SEC staff will provide interpretative legal advice with respect to statutes administered by the SEC or any SEC
rules and regulations. 35' Such inquiries may, and typically do, include an additional request that the SEC staff not recommend enforcement action on the
basis of facts stated in the inquiry. The responses of the SEC staff, generally
referred to as "no-action letters," 35 2 together with the inquiries which prompted
them, have been made publicly available since February, 1971.353 This policy
ing from integration. See Weatherford & Co., available June 25, 1979, [1979] SEC No-ACTION

(CCH), fiche 29, frame F3.
350. See, e.g., Golf Host West, Inc., available Feb. 13, 1978, [1978] SEC No-ACrioN Lm-rs
(CCH), fiche 7, frame A19; Photographic Artists, Ltd., available Nov. 7, 1977, [1977] SEC NoACTION LErms (CCH), fiche 68, frame BO.
351. 17 C.F.R. §§200.81, 202.2 (1979).
352. See Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts with Existing Statutes, Cases and
Commission Releases, 59 VA. L. REV. 303, 304 (1973). As noted in the text, there are two
types of responses which may be solicited: interpretative and no-action. See Hicks, supra
note 122, at 1059 nn.12 & 13. The general practice of referring to both types of letters as
"no-action" letters will be used herein.
353. See Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 27 Bus. LAw. 957, 962
(1972). Prior to February, 1971, the SEC had treated as confidential all inquiries and responses of its staff, primarily on the belief that publication might constitute an invasion of
privacy, be prejudicial to the business interests of individuals, or influence the market. It
was also feared that these informal decisions might be misunderstood or overestimated in
importance. Securities Act Release No. 4924 (Sept. 20, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 177,606 at 83,294. However, in 1970, the SEC adopted a regulation
which treated as public records all requests for no-action letters submitted on or after December 1, 1970, and the responses of the staff thereto. Securities Act Release No. 5098 (Oct.
29, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCI) 177,921 (adopting 17 C.F.R.
§200.81). This regulation was promulgated in response to long-held and widespread interest
regarding these letters. See Posner, supra, at 962, and the recommendations contained in the
LETTERS

REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]

FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 178,187.

These no-action letters, as well as all publicly available documents in the SEC's files,
including releases, may be obtained for a fee upon written request directed to the SEC,
Public Reference Section, Washington, D.C., 20549, or by making a request in person at
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of making no-action letters available for public scrutiny has considerably enhanced their stature35 4 and impact on the formal body of law to which they
relate,3 5 5 despite the boilerplate declarations to the contrary which are
routinely included in the staff's responses.3 56 However, it is clear that the
staff's position will not control the rights and actions of private parties involved in the described transactions to which these responses relate.3 7
the Public Reference Section, 1100 L Street, N.W., Room 6101, Washington, D.C., stating the
name of the person on whose behalf the inquiry was made, the applicable statute and
section to which the inquiry relates, and the date on which the inquiry and no-action letter
became publicly available. A complete library of these letters has been compiled on 42X
microfiche and 16 mm. microfilm by Commerce Clearing House, which has indexed the
letters by topic, case name, statute, section-under-the-statute and rule-under-the-section
designations. These letters are also contained in a computer file in the Federal Securities
library of the LEXIS computer research service offered by Mead Data Control, Inc. Except
for practitioners who can economically justify subscribing to one of these special research
services, most practitioners ordinarily rely on research services which carry only a limited
selection of no-action letters. See FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH); SEC. REc. & L. REP. (BNA). The
availability of these letters raises some interesting questions with respect to a lawyer's legal
responsibility to examine no-action letters not readily available. The SEC has partially
alleviated the problem of identifying important or unusual no-action letters by publishing
monthly lists of letters the staff deems significant. This practice was begun in 1976. See Securities Act Release No. 5691 (Mar. 17, 1976), 9 SEC DocxrTr 180 (1976). A sample of one
such list appears at [1978] 445 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) C-3 to C-4. In any event, the
magnitude of no-action literature available has been of concern to the bar since no-action
inquiries and letters became public records. See Posner, supra, at 962.
354. Prior to 1971, opinions differed on the legal significance of these letters. Compare
Panel Discussion, Public Information Act and Interpretative and Advisory Rulings, 20 AD. L.
REV. 1, 29 (1967) (quoting Professor Kenneth Culp Davis' characterization of the contents
of SEC no-action letters as "some of the most important law of the SEC") with Securities Act
Release No. 4924 (Sept. 20, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP'. (CCH)
77,606 at 83,294 (disagreeing with Professor Davis' evaluation, but admitting that "practitioners might find these letters helpful"). See also Riviana Foods, Inc., available Apr. 16, 1973,
[1973] SEC No-AcTiON LETTERS (CCH), roll 4, frame 07401, 07405 (reference by counsel to
instance where broker-dealer establishes acquisition of no-action letter as prerequisite to acting
as underwriter); Lowenfels, supra note 352, at 304 ("One might expect that the publication
of no-action requests and letters would serve to clarify relevant statutes, court decisions and
formal SEC administrative decisions and releases, but unfortunately this new source of substantive law has frequently had the opposite effect. No-action letters have often represented
positions inconsistent with established substantive law.")
355. See Lowenfels, supra note 352, at 319. In a highly critical evaluation of SEC noaction letter practice, the author concludes that "[by] bureaucratic fiat, the staff of the SEC
Id.
I..."
is creating substantive law .
356. E.g., Scottish Inns of America, Inc., available Jan. 8, 1979, [1979] SEC No-ACaON
LmrrEas (CCH), fiche 1, frame F16: "Further, this letter only expresses the Division's position
on enforcement action and does not purport to express any legal conclusion on the questions
presented." Id. at frame F18.
The staff of the SEC has expressed strong concern that a no-action stance may be misunderstood, since "in some instances no interpretation is involved but merely the expression
of a judgment with respect to enforcement policy." Securities Act Release No. 4924 (Sept.
20, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 177,606 at 83,294. Hence, the
enforcement decision may at times reflect more a consideration of priorities and resources
than a view on the application of the law. Id.
357. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Dec. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962), stating:
"[P]ersons receiving advice from the staff . . . that no action will be recommended if they
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For purposes of this study, 193 no-action letters responding to inquiries
relating to integration have been examined. This undertaking encompassed
relevant no-action letters available as of October 1, 1979.358 In view of the
presumably vast number of exempt offerings made daily, it is surprising that
more inquiries have not been submitted. While the reasons behind the lack
of inquiry obviously cannot be fully determined, 59 it can safely be hypothesized that this phenomenon is not attributable to the clarity of recent integration practices of the SEC.360 If anything, the boundaries of current integration principles appear so ambiguous that practitioners have steered far
from situations in which integration might be applicable.3 6
proceed without registration in reliance upon the exemption [§4(2)] should do so only with
full realization that the test so applied may not be proof against claims by purchasers of
the security that registration should have been effected." Id.
358. The letters examined in this article were obtained from the Federal Securities
library, No-Action Letter file, of the LEXIS computer research service, using the program:
"integratt"; an overinclusive program was preferred to an underinclusive one. Hence, additional refinement of the program was deemed inadvisable in the interest of maximum
coverage. The last LEXIS search using the program was made on September 30, 1979. See
note 353 supra.
359. One possible explanation is that in the first few years after making no-action letters
publicly available, the SEC frequently expressly refused to respond to integration questions,
typically parrying them instead with a statement that the attorney making the inquiry was
in a better position than the SEC staff to determine the applicability of integration. See, e.g.,
Lamco &Assocs., available Apr. 26, 1973, [1973] SEC No-AcrTON LETTrs (CCI), roll 4, frame
07294: "Since the staff is not in a position to make the investigation necessary to ascertain
the requisite factual information, and since this information is more readily available to
the issuer and its counsel, we are unable to express any opinion as to whether the proposed
transactions may be completed without compliance with the registration provisions of the
Act .... ." Id. In 55 of the 193 inquiries examined, the SEC ignored or expressly refused to
express an opinion on an integration question. See, e.g., Hawkeye Bancorporation, available
May 3, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AersoN LETTERS (CCH), roll 5, frame 06294. Sometimes, however,
persistence pays. See, e.g., Daseke & Co., available June 16, 1975, [1975] SEC No-ActoN LErrms
(CCH), roll 6, frame 07202 (office conference after staff refusal to respond to initial inquiry
procures response to second request).
360. Many of the no-action letters surveyed were written in response to inquiries from
nationally recognized securities practitioners concerned about relatively common integration
applications. See, e.g., Kassuba Dev. Corp., available May 28, 1973, [1973] SEC No-ACTION
LrERas (CCH), roll 5, frame 09480. This phenomenon may perhaps be explained by the
statement of one knowledgeable securities lawyer: "The sad truth seems to be that you
get 'no-action' letters in the clear cases but have an awful time getting them -or don't even
ask - in the cases where you really need them." R. JENNINGS & H. MArSH, supra note 10, at
397 n.29 (quoting SEC PBOBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOI.DRs AND IN UNDERWRITING 19 (C.
Israels ed. 1962)). Some practitioners have all but admitted their bafflement at the complexities of an integration problem. See, e.g., Charles E. Watters, available May 24, 1978, [1978]
SEC No-AcrioN LETrERs (CCH), fiche 26, frame 121 ("I regret the rambling nature of this
inquiry ..... Id. at frame J1.).
361. According to 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 594, the application of integration in the
context of §3(a)(11) "has oscillated so much-perhaps the Commission would just as soon
leave the answer vague . .. ." Id. Some practitioners have taken a different approach, assuming
that two or more proposed offerings will be integrated and structuring them on a combined
basis to satisfy a single exemption. See, e.g., Henry Exploration Co., available Nov. 24, 1978,
[1978] SEC No-ACTIoN LE-rms (CCH), fiche 55, frame E15. Nevertheless, accommodating
the potential for integration in this fashion may entail considerable tangible and intangible
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Staff No-Action Practice:ProceduralRules of Thumb

Until its very recent determination not to issue no-action letters concerning integration, the SEC staff appeared to adhere to certain practices in
responding to inquiries relating to integration. The staff has not given advice
on integration of offerings which have been completed prior to the request.362 Nor has it responded to inquiries of "a general nature," such as requests which do not relate to specific proposed offerings but rather seek
advice on the propriety of a general strategy of raising capital363 This has
put the burden on the issuer to commence one offering and specifically propose another before being entitled to the guidance of the staff.3 64 Such a procedure, while unreasonable on its face, may perhaps be justified on the
grounds that administrative resources are limited and must be allocated to
solve existing, rather than speculative, problems. This policy also minimizes
the likelihood of creating unduly broad precedent.3 65 Nevertheless, on occasion
the staff has responded to inquiries of a hypothetical nature for reasons attributable to convenience 3 6 6 public policy,3 67 or the persistence of the in368
quirer.
costs. Compare Intermedco, Inc., available Dec. 16, 1974, [1974] SEC No-AcTION LErrEas (CCH),
roll 12, frame 16100 (shell registration statement filed for securities to be issued in
future) with Bowers v. Columbia Gen'l Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609 (D. Del. 1971) (series of acquisitions in reliance on §4(2) not integrated). See also A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG
ARCHIPELAGO (1973) (vagueness of substantive law and unchecked legal system discourage individuals from approaching the unclear line between what is legal and what is not). See also
F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1937).
362. See C & S Inv. Funds, available July 13, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcrION LLTrES (CCH),
fiche 48, frame K2; Amarex Private Drilling Program, available May 14, 1977, [1977] SEC
No-AcTION LEirERs (CCH), fiche 32, frame H6.
363. See Safeguard Mini Storage, Inc., available Aug. 28, 1974, [1974] SEC No-AcTioN
LwrrERs (CCH), roll 8, frame 11256: "The staff will respond to interpretative requests of a
specific nature in this area, but we cannot respond to inquiries of a general nature because
of the substantial possibility that any position we might take would be misconstrued." Id.
364. See American Leisure Assocs., available Aug. 1, 1974, [1973] SEC No-AcTION LE-rEs
(CCH), roll 8, frame 14737: "American proposes to acquire real estate and construct thereon
recreational facilities. . . . Upon completion of a particular facility, American proposes to
sell the improved real estate to limited partnerships which it will form and in which it
will act as general partner. Following the formation of the limited partnership, it will sell
limited partnership interests in reliance on either the Section 3(a)(ll) or 4(2) exemptions....
The question of integration is one that depends on the unique circumstances surrounding
each transaction or group of transactions. Accordingly, and in light of the fact that American
has not as yet entered any transaction, the Division is unable to express any opinion respecting American's proposed operation." Id.
365. See notes 356 & 363 supra.
366. See Kassuba Dev. Corp., available May 28, 1973, [1973] SEC No-AcTION LErrms
(CCH), roll 5, frame 9480 (inquiry involved well-settled issue). In such case, the inquiry is
susceptible to a ready, narrow response.
367. See National Ass'n of Home Builders, available Mar. 23, 1972, [1972] SEC No-AcTION
LESrERs (CCH), roll 4, frame 06631 (narrow inquiry by national trade association of the
residential construction industry).
368. Compare Daseke & Co., available June 16, 1975, [1975] SEC No-ACTIoN Lt-rERs (CCH),
roll 6, frame 07202 (response on second try after office conference; initial inquiry declined) and
Daseke & Co., available May 2, 1975, [1975] SEC No-AcTION LErrERs (CCH), roll 5, frame
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On those occasions when the opinion of inquiring counsel has not been
relied upon,3 6 9 the staff has generally utilized as its analytical framework the
five integration factors370 which had their genesis in the Unity Gold stop order
proceeding.Y31 As might be expected with any process implemented by a
number of different individuals over a period of years, the treatment of
these five factors from the standpoint of both definition and relative importance has varied.
1. Single Plan of Financing
This component of the integration formula has emerged in many administrative and judicial proceedings dealing with integration as one of the
most influential of the traditional integration factors. The staff of the SEC
has also given considerable weight to this factor, but its definition has lacked
consistency. Moreover, the staff's position remains ambiguous as to the extent
that the single plan of financing inquiry is colored by the other purportedly
distinct factors. For example, the staff declined to take a no-action stance
with respect to proposed offerings of different securities where the offerings
would have been proximate in the time and the proceeds and purposes of
the offerings were similar.372 The correlation of these three factors led the
staff to conclude that there was "one integrated scheme [plan] of financing."37 3
This approach suggests that the plan of financing factor is simply defined by
the remaining four factors.3 74
In some inquiries, the single plan of financing factor appears to have
been equated with the purpose of the offerings factor. Thus, -inquiring
counsel have indicated in several instances that because the purposes of
their clients' offerings were dissimilar, single plans of financing were not
involved.3 75 Although that approach would seem to create analytical problems
05411 with First Union, Inc., available June 16, 1975, [1975] SEC No-AcTioN LErrEas (CCH),
roll 6, frame 6528 (initial request on same issue declined; second inquiry apparently not
made).
369. See, e.g., Charles E. Watters, available May 24, 1978, [1978] SEC No-AcTIoN LraEs
(CCH), fiche 26, frame 121; Golf Host West, Inc., available Feb. 13, 1978, [1978] SEC NoActION LrrEsS (CCI), fiche 8, frame A21.
370. See Securities Act Release No. 4484 (Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961); Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962); text accompanying
note 226 supra.
371. In re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938). See notes 187-196 supra and accompanying text.
372. SEC No-Action Letter, Property Invs., Inc., available Nov. 17, 1972, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fm. Sac. L. REP'. (CCII)

79,201.

373. Id. at 82,640.
374. See note 267 supra.
375. See, e.g., RCA Credit Corp., available Dec. 6., 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcnoN Lxrrms
(CCH), roll 12, frame 16227; SEC No-Action Letter, Stratford Employees' Cattle Program, Ltd.,
available Apr. 8, 1974, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FmD. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 79,761. Cf. SEC

No-Action Letter, Metropolitan Capital Corp., available Apr. 1, 1976, [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,485 (single plan of financing factor deemed by counsel
to require consideration both of the purposes of the offerings and when they were conceived).
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the SEC staff has nevertheless

recommended no-action on the basis of these facts, 377 implying that the ap-

proach taken in the inquiries may have some validity.
It has already been noted that some courts have interpreted "single plan
of financing" to require a determination as to when the relevant offerings
were conceived. 378 This approach has also won staff acceptance on several
occasions.3 79 On the other hand, one no-action letter treats the timing of the
3
respective conceptions as a separate factor .

0°

Suggestions have also been advanced that "single plan of financing" encompasses consideration of the methods of sale and distribution. 38 1 This seems
consistent with the formal treatment of sale and distribution methods as a
separate factor prior to the adoption of the current five-factor formula.38 2 In
one letter, the SEC staff approved inquiring counsel's argument that although
the purposes of the offerings were the same, the plans of financing, and
therefore the offerings, were not because the methods used to offer the securities were different s83 Presumably, however, even given that the method
376. Any definition of the integration factors which creates an overlap between two
or more of them may result in giving undue weight to those factors. The impropriety of
such an approach becomes evident when certain of the factors appear to be entitled to
more weight than others. See, e.g., Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104 (D.
Mass. 1974). Currently, however, a large percentage of counsel who request no-action letters
equate the single plan of financing factor with the purpose factor. See, e.g., SEC No-Action
Letter, Westminster Co., available Oct. 21, 1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,791 at 87,066; SEC No-Action Letter, Martin Exploration Co., available Oct. 7,
1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,794 at 87,076; Liberty Nat'l
Corp., available May 21, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcrIoN LmrERs (CCH), roll 5, frame 06231,
06236; A.G. Becker & Co., available Feb. 18, 1975, [1975] SEC No-AcTiON LErrERs (CCH), roll
2, frame 01169, 01174; no-action letters cited note 375 supra.
377. RCA Credit Corp., available Dec. 6, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcrON LETrERS (CCH),
roll 12, frame 16227; SEC No-Action Letter, Stratford Employees' Cattle Program, Ltd.,
available Apr. 8, 1974, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,761.
378. See text accompanying notes 268-275 supra.
379. DeLorean Motor Co., available Sept. 15, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcTION LMtTRS (CCH),
fiche 59, frame A4; SEC No-Action Letter, Eastern Ill. Tel. Corp., available Apr. 14, 1975,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,238.
380. Lexicon Corp., available Sept. 22, 1978, [1978] SEC No-AcTION LETrER (CCH), fiche
44, frame E12: "On the basis of the factors presented, and particularly considering that
the . . . funds are part of a single plan of financing to be used in a further part of the
product development phase [and] that the proposed offering was contemplated at the time
of the Regulation A offering ... this Division is unable to concur in your opinion that the
proposed sale of convertible ... debentures should not be integrated with the earlier Regulation A offering." Id. at frame E13.
381. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., available Aug. 15, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcTION
L-TrERs (CCH), fiche 51, frame G19: "ifihe methods of offering the two types of securities
are sufficiently different to constitute separate plans of financing." Id. at frames G20, G24;
Four-Phase Sys., Inc., available Dec. 10, 1973, [1973] SEC No-AcTioN LErrERs (CCH), roll 12,
frame 20368 (citing In re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938): "The manner and terms
of the respective distributions are materially different." Id. at frame 20374).
382. See text accompanying notes 196 & 227-228 supra.
383. Wellington Fund, Inc., available Sept. 22, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcTION LETERs (CCH),
roll 9, frame 12220 (open market sales through dealers who receive commissions versus
negotiated sales on net basis).
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of distribution is an appropriate consideration under the single plan of

financing factor, it should not be treated as controlling against a persuasive
showing that the offerings were originated at the same time. The method of
distribution is too readily manipulated to warrant significance as a determinative factor.
Perhaps the one consideration that has surfaced under single plan of
financing which does not overlap with the other Unity Gold factors is whether
the relevant offerings are financially interdependent. Thus, inquiring counsel
in one instance proposed section 3(a)(9) and 3(a)(ll) offerings but contended
that no single plan of financing existed because the success or failure of
each offering would be unaffected by the outcome of the other.:s Without
38 5
elaborating, the staff recommended no action.
If integration is intended to combine offerings which ought to be treated
integrally in order to fulfill the purposes of the statute, it would seem that
offerings should be integrated only when they could have been made as a
single transaction. Each of the above considerations bears directly on this
question, and therefore each should play a role in any evaluation of whether
a single plan of financing exists.
2.

Same Class of Security

The staff's no-action letters have been instructive on the complex task

of determining which attributes of a security are significant when comparing
it with another security.386 Although few broad rules can be developed given
the multitude of variables, two considerations have emerged as key definitional
predicates for "same class of security."
The first consideration is the identity of the issuer. 38 7 If the issuers are
separate, their securities are irrebuttably dissimilar and nonintegration would
384. UST Corp., available Apr. 8, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcrioN
frame L14.
385. Id.

LtwrRs

(CCH) fiche 24,

386. Not surprisingly, convertible securities are less likely to be treated as similar to
the securities into which they are convertible if the convertible feature does not become
operative for a significant period of time after the sale. Compare Betz Laboratories,
available July 25, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AarIoN La'rras (CCH), fiche 43, frame C22 (no

integration: debentures convertible seven years after sale) with Lexicon Corp., available Sept.
22, 1978, [1978] SEC No-AarIoN LErs (CCH), fiche 44, frame E12 (integration: debentures
convertible within one year from date of sale).
Similarly, other attributes of securities, for example their tax aspects, will vary in significance depending upon the factual context. Compare Rohr Indus., available Feb. 2, 1975,
[1975] SEC No-ACrION LErm's (CCH), roll 2, frame 01340 (different tax attributes of re-

stricted and qualified stock options to purchase common stock not sufficient to cause them
to be classified as different securities) with Huntsville-Madison County Airport Auth., available
Apr. 3, 1974, [1974] SEC No-AcroN Lxrrmts (CCI), roll 4, frame 04984 (different tax attributes of two series of industrial revenue bonds sustains their characterization as different
securities).
387. Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SC. L. Rm,.
(CCH) 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) first expressed the importance of this factor, identifying it
as a sixth factor, in addition to those contained in the integration formula devised by the
SEC.
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appear to be mandatory. 38 In determining whether two entities are in fact
389
separate, their financial independence appears to be most important.
The fact that the entities have one or more controlling persons in common will
not automatically result in their being treated as a single issuer.3 90
The second consideration which has influenced the SEC staff on the
same class of security factor has been the identity of the offerees. If the
offerings are not directed to the same pool of potential investors, this will be
supportive of a position that the classes of securities are different.3 91 It is, of
course, not uncommon for securities which are clearly of the same class to
fact that the investors
be offered to different investors. Even in that case, the
392
are different will weigh heavily against integration.
See, e.g., Equity Programs Inv. Corp., available Nov. 27, 1978, [1978] SEC No-AcTiON
(CCH), fiche 55, frame C21; Michael J. Hayes, available Aug. 24, 1978, [1978] SEC
No-AcTION LETrERS (CCH), fiche 40, frame D24.
389. See, e.g., Churchill & Hoskins, available Oct. 25, 1978, [1978] SEC No-ACTION LE-rras
(CCH), fiche 49, frame HI; SEC No-Action Letter, Westminster Co., available Oct. 21, 1976,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 80,791. Financial independence will
not prevent integration, however, where the entities had previously been financially interrelated, at all times were under common ownership, and conducted the same type of business
in the same manner. See SEC No-Action Letter, Union Home Loans/Union Fin'l Corp., available July 3, 1978, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,726, which suggests
that some economic justification for doing business through multiple entities is necessary.
There is no discernible trend in this direction, however. See, e.g., DeLorean Motor Co.,
available Dec. 30, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcTION LETTERs (CCH), fiche 77, frame F13.
390. Numerous inquiries have been submitted on this issue. The responses have been
overwhelmingly supportive of nonintegration in such a situation. See, e.g., Grubb & Ellis
Dev. Co. (Devco), available July 23, 1973, [1973] SEC No-AcTION L-rEmS (CCH), roll 7,
frame 12640; Pronghorn Petroleum Corp., available July 19, 1972, [1972] SEC No-ACTION
LETrERS (CCH), roll 7, frame 12537; National Ass'n of Home Builders, available March 23,
1972, [1972] SEC No-ACTiON LETrERs (CCH), roll 4, frame 06631.
(CCH),
391. Liberty Nat'l Corp., available May 21, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcTION IrrEas
roll 5, frame 06231, 06231 (requiring the issuer to separate the "sources and applications
of the money" generated in two concurrent offerings (emphasis added)). Compare SEC NoAction Letter, Tele-Tower, Inc., available Feb. 27, 1978, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,540 at 80,188 (established as a condition to the granting of a no-action
letter with respect to concurrent offerings of interests in affiliated limited partnerships
that "there is no general pool of offerees from which participants in the various limited
partnerships are drawn") with Equity Programs Inv. Corp., available Nov. 27, 1978, [1978]
SEC No-ACTION LETrERS (CCH), fiche 55, frame C21, C22, C25 (staff in a similar situation
in which it recommended that no action be taken, relied on inquiring counsel's representation that it was "anticipated" that the limited partners in the partnerships making concurrent offerings would be different, although the basis for this representation appeared to be
only that one type of limited partnership interest would be sold to "a limited number of
sophisticated investors with certain minimum net worth requirements," while the other
type of limited partnership interest "[would] be offered to a broader range of limited
partners" (emphasis added)).
On one occasion, counsel voluntarily integrated offerings of two investment companies
because the purposes of the companies were essentially the same and presumably would
attract the same type of investor. C & S Inv. Funds, available July 13, 1977, [1977] SEC NoACTION LETTERS (CCH), fiche 48, frame K2. However, no such "largesse" was evinced under
similar circumstances in Navigator Group Funds, available Aug. 18, 1977, [1977] SEC NoAc--ON LETTERS (CCH), fiche 53, frame C4, wherein each investment group was composed
of different individuals and was treated as independent by the staff.
392. In SEC No-Action Letter, Stratford Employees' Cattle Program, Ltd., available Mar.
388.
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Because the same class of security factor is traditionally significant,393 the
identity of the issuers and of the offeree pool is apt to be of substantial importance in the final integration decision. This focus is appropriate if integration should apply only to those offerings which might readily have been
functionally combined. Separate issuers, even if commonly controlled, rarely
coordinate securities offerings if their underlying businesses are unrelated. If
the group of offerees are different, a bona fide reason probably exists for using
different means of compliance and the offerings should be treated as separate
transactions.3 94
8.

Made At or About the Same Time

Unlike the inquiry under the single plan of financing factor, the deter8, 1974, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH) 79,761, the staff enumerated
several "substantial differences" among the offerings, one of which was the considerable
disparity in the prices per unit of the various similar limited partnership interests offered
-$100 for the interests offered to employees, $5,000 for the interests offered to others.
Thereby the staff implied that most employees could not have met the minimum investment
required in the other offerings and hence that it would have been impractical for the issuer
to have combined the offering to employees with the other offerings. The staff did not
articulate the relationship of this observation to the five-factor formula, but the securities
offered were not identical, and it appears that the "same class of security" factor likely was
involved. See note 274 supra and accompanying text.
393. See, e.g., SEC v. Dunfee, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
91,970 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
394. The no-action letters treating the "same class of security" factor shed some light on
the operation of the safe harbor provisions of rules 146 and 147. In one opinion, SEC NoAction Letter, Midstate Tel. Co., available Oct. 7, 1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FE
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,800, the staff confronted the question of whether an offering of a
different security within six months of a prior rule 147 offering was immune per se to
integration. Although there is room in the language of the rule for making such an inference, inquiring counsel refused to do so. Instead, counsel requested the staff's concurrence
that "the subordinated debentures in this case are not part of the 'same or similar class' of
securities as, or 'part of an issue of: the senior debentures of [the issuer]." Id. at 87,089
(emphasis added). In effect, counsel conceded that integration would be possible under the
facts presented. The staff opinion, "that the proposed issue of subordinated 'debentures
would not be part of the senior debt issue for purposes of rule 147," also implicitly
recognized this possibility. Id. at 87,088. See also SEC No-Action Letter, Martin Exploration
Co., available Oct. 7, 1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,794
(counsel requested opinion in a situation similar to that in Midstate Tel. Co., but staff re-

sponse simply indicated that it would not question the distinctness of the two offerings).
Prior to adoption of rules 146 and 147, the staff found at least one situation in which
integration of dissimilar securities offered within a six-month period was deemed appropriate.
SEC No-Action Letter, Property Inv. Inc., available Nov. 17, 1972, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 79,201. No purpose would be served by creating a manda-

tory exclusion from integration for a similar case arising now. The notes to rules 146(b)(1)
and 147(b)(2) should be read to provide guidance on the application of integration only in
the contexts described therein. Note to SEC Rules 146(b)(1), 147(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§230

.146(b)(1), .147(b)(2) (1979). See notes 328-334 supra and accompanying text. Integration of
offerings of dissimilar securities presumably will be governed by traditional considerations
unless otherwise required in order to facilitate the purposes of rules 146 and 147. See Delta
Natural Gas Co., available Sept. 12, 1977, [1977] SEC No-ACTION LErrms (CCII), fiche 57,
frame C21 (offerings of different securities in reliance on §4(2) and rule 147 submitted to

staff for traditional evaluation of applicability of integration; no-action request granted).
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mination whether offerings occurred "at or about the same time" focuses on
when the offerings in question were made and not when they were planned.
When offerings are made at or about the same time, their potential impact
on investor behavior warrants greater scrutiny than when they are not proximate in time. In the case of exempt offerings of bonus securities to underwriters or of other securities to insiders concurrent with a public offering,
exceptions to integration principles were developed to counterbalance the
attributes of a single transaction in such cases. s95 As is the case with most of
the SEC's integration factors when they are not satisfied, the absence of
simultaneity can weigh in the balance against integration.3 96 Proximity in
time, on the other hand, has seldom been determinative; even if simultaneous, one or more of the other integration factors often will be viewed as
more important. 3 9 7 Furthermore, this factor may be ignored if investors will
derive only insignificant benefits from registration 398 or the shared timing of
395. See notes 210-212 supra and accompanying text. The SEC has promulgated several
rules to facilitate access to the capital markets without registration while preserving the
interests of investors in an orderly market. The timing of the offering is an express determinant
of the availability of the exemptions defined by these rules. See, e.g., SEC Rules 144(d)(1), (e),
253(c), 254(a), (d)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§230.144(d)(1), (e), .253(c), .254(a), (d)(2) (1979). The safe
harbor provisions of rules 146 and 147 are included among the rules which attempt to strike

this difficult balance. SEC Rules 146(b)(1), 147(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§230.146(b)(1), .147(b)(2) (1979).
In this respect, based upon its appearance in these rules only one of the other four integration factors, "same class of security," has been recognized as susceptible of providing an
effective objective standard of control.
396. See, e.g., SEC No-Action Letter, Shockey Cos., available Dec. 13, 1976, [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,924 (annual offerings of common stock to employees pursuant to rule 146 need not be integrated); Hospital Corp. of America, available
May 13, 1974, [1974] SEC No-AcTION LETTERS (CCH), roll 5, frame 07009 (no integration of
registered offerings of common stock pursuant to shelf registration statement to acquire
hospitals and offering in reliance on §4(2) of convertible notes for same general purpose,
when 18 months transpired between note offering and last sales pursuant to registration
statement). The Shockey Cos. letter illustrates that a series of offerings pursuant to a single

plan of financing may not be integrated as long as a significant amount of time transpires
between the offerings. This has been the SEC's well-established approach to a planned series
of offerings made pursuant to Regulation A. See Securities Act Release No. 2410, (Dec. 3,

1940) (available from the SEC) (adopting former rule 220(d)); I L. Loss, supra note 1, at 616;
Hawaiian Enterprises, available Nov. 29, 1972, [1972] SEC No-AcTION

LErrERS

(CCH), roll 11,

frame 17568. See also SEC Rules 146(b)(1), 147(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§230.146(b)(1), .147(b)(2) (1979),
which permit a series of semiannual private or intrastate offerings so long as they are not a
part of a plan or scheme to evade the registration provisions of the 1933 Act. See Preliminary
Note 7 to SEC Rule 146, Preliminary Note 3 to SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §§230.146, .147
(1979). The principal suggested by the Shockey Cos. letter offers substantially less protection
from integration than the formal administrative exceptions described. See note 240 supra.
397. See, e.g., Delta Natural Gas Co., available Sept. 12, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcTON
LETTERS (CCH), fiche 57, frame C21 (simultaneous offerings of dissimilar securities permitted
under rule 147 and §4(2)); Wellington Fund, available Sept. 22, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcIoN
LETTERS (CCH), roll 9, frame 12220 (simultaneous offerings of same security for different
purposes not integrated).
398. See SEC No-Action Letter, Kaiser Resources, Ltd., available Aug. 1, 1973, [1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,493 (concurrent registered and private offerings permitted where private placees were 10 large Japanese companies who were unlikely
to be under any compulsion to resell the securities so acquired, and who had agreed to
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the offerings is coincidental.3 99
4.

Same Type of Consideration To Be Received

Cash is the consideration ordinarily furnished in exchange for securities.
It has been argued to the staff that similarity of consideration therefore ought
not to be determinative where the offerings in question are made for cash.400
This argument is too simplistic.40 1 Nevertheless, this factor, like the factors

relating to the type of security and timing of the offerings, can ordinarily be
objectively determined, and therefore serves to identify which offerings
should be considered for integration.
One inquiry observed that this factor had relevance only "where the
consideration received in two purportedly separate offerings involves integral
parts of the same asset, such as stock of the same corporation or assets which
are useful only in combination with one another." 40 2 This observation attempts
hold them for at least two years and then to make any resales only in conformity with the
Canadian and United States securities laws); Hawaiian Enterprises, Ltd., available Nov. 29,
1972, [1972] SEC No-Ac-boN LLrrans (CCH), roll 11, frame 17568 (consecutive Regulation A
and registered offerings not integrated). Cf. Environmental Research & Dev. Corp., available
Oct. 18, 1972, [1972] SEC No-A-noN LTrErs (CCH), roll 10, frame 17030 (§3(a)(ll) offering
will be integrated with registered offering but suggestion made that concurrent Regulation
A and registered offerings would not be integrated). But see May Petroleum, Inc., available
Aug. 28, 1974, [1974] SEC No-ACTIoN LrrERs (CCH), roll 8, frame 11187 (staff opposition
to issuer's plan to rely on §4(2) for offering of undivided fractional interests in oil and gas
leases offered to a privately held limited partnership approximately six months after registered
sale of preformation interests in publicly held limited partnerships exploiting same leaseholds, despite fact that idea for private sale was initiated by unaffiliated private partnership
after registration statement became effective).
399. See SEC No-Action Letter, Stratford Employees' Cattle Program, Ltd., available Apr.
8, 1974 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

79,761 at 84,052 (according to

counsel: "Miming of the offering . . . is dependent on factors totally unrelated to the
timing of the other two offerings'). A similar approach has been taken in distinguishing plans
of financing. See Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (D. Mass. 1974);
SEC No-Action Letter, Remote Computing Corp., available Dec. 28, 1972, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 79,182 at 82,598 (opinion by inquiring counsel that a
period of nine months between a Regulation A offering and a proposed offering in. reliance
on §4(2) was "significant in relation to the Company's operations in the interim"). These
letters demonstrate that the primary value of the factor relating to the timing of the offerings
is as a rebuttable presumption designed to identify those situations in which integration
might be appropriate.
400. See, e.g., A.G. Becker & Co., available Feb. 18, 1975, [1975] SEC No-AcrioN LETrEas
(CCH), roll 2, frame 01169. While this approach was unavailing, the staff took a no-action
stance.
401. Of course, when cash is received by separate issuers, the consideration factor should
carry little weight in the integration determination. See SEC No-Action Letter, Pacific Resources, Inc., available Aug. 13, 1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]

FED. SEC.

L. RnP. (CCI)

80,714.
402. Hawkeye Bancorporation, available May 3, 1976, [1976] SEC No-ACTION LrTrms
(CCH), roll 5, frame 06294. In A. G. Becker & Co., available Feb. 18, 1975, [1975] SEC NoACMON Lzrras (CCH), roll 2, frame 01169, the staff agreed not to integrate a bank holding
company's unregistered offerings for cash of commercial paper pursuant to §3(a)(3) and an
offering pursuant to §4(2) by a subsidiary of the holding company for cash of unsecured
promissory notes guaranteed by the holding company, provided that the proceeds from the
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to isolate the circumstances under which receipt of the same type of consideration would be significant in resolving the integration question. It recognizes
that mere coincidence of correlation between the proceeds of two or more
offerings is no reason to require them to be treated as a single transaction.
The probative value of this factor is properly limited to distinguishing instances in which the offerings might have been structured as a single transaction directed at an identifiable group of investors who may need the protection of the registration provisions of the statute. In this respect, this
criterion overlaps significantly with the factor relating to the general purposes
of the offerings and to a lesser degree with the aspect of the same class of
security factor, which also considers whether the offerings are made to the
same type of investors.403
5.

Made for the Same General Purpose

It is common for this factor to be significant in the staff's determination
not to integrate. 40 4 Even more common may be situations where offerings
commercial paper offerings would not be used "to honor the parent's [holding company's]
guarantee of the . . . subsidiary's paper issued in reliance on section 4(2)." Id. at frame 01170.
403. Clearly, the nature of the proceeds is directly related to their ultimate use. The relationship becomes more apparent where the consideration is unique. Thus, in SEC NoAction Letter, Stratford Employees' Cattle Program, Ltd., available Mar. 8, 1974, [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,761, counsel recognized that the consideration
to be received in a proposed exempt offering to employees was likely to be equated by the
staff with the consideration received by the corporation in concurrent registered offerings.
Because the latter was unique, i.e., management fees and proceeds from the sale of goods
and services, and pointed toward a common offering purpose, counsel undertook to distinguish
the types of consideration by stating: "The actual consideration to be received by the
[corporation] . . . is the continued morale and well-being of their employees which will
result from providing them with cattle feeding investments in which the possibility of loss
is minimized .
I..."
Id. at 84,052-53. The staff concluded that the offerings were made for
different purposes and recommended that no action be taken with respect to the proposed
offering. Id. See also Affiliated Bankshares, Inc., available Aug. 9, 1973, [1973] SEC No-ACrIoN
LErras (CCH), roll 8, frame 14902, 14909 inquiring counsel concluded that significant
warranties given by directors of bank in addition to their transfer of bank stock made consideration received from them a different type than that received from shareholders of
bank who transferred only stock).
404. See, e.g., NCNB Corp., available Apr. 28, 1978, [1978] SEC No-AcTION LETrEzEs (CCH),
fiche 22, frame D19 (no integration of offerings of commercial paper pursuant to §3(a)(3) and
short term notes in reliance on §4(2) where proceeds of former would be used to finance
current transactions and proceeds of latter would be applied only to long-term transactions);
Employee Benefits, Inc., available Sept. 9, 1976, [1976] SEC No-ACTION LETrERs (CCH), roll
9, frame 12200, 12201 (no integration of proposed sale of common stock to employee stock
ownership trust in reliance on §4(2) and proposed rule 146 offering within six months to
increase issuer's capital surplus, because "the offerings are not being made for the same
general purpose").
Counsel frequently equate this factor with the factor which requires a determination
whether the offerings are part of a single plan of financing. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Corp.,
available May 12, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcTION LEarras (CCH) roll 5, frame 06231; SEC NoAction Letter, Stratford Employees' Cattle Program, Ltd., available Apr. 8, 1974, [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 79,761 at 84,051-52. Also see no-action letters cited
at note 376 supra. The staff has neither expressly joined in nor repudiated this confusion of
factors. See text accompanying notes 375-377 supra.
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are made for the same general purpose, but integration is not required because other features of the subject offerings provide overriding distinctions.4 05
In these respects, this factor repeats a pattern generally consistent with the
staff's treatment of the other factors.
The staff has not, however, offered any guidance on how broadly the
same general purpose factor is to be interpreted. Theoretically, an expansive
interpretation would be adopted, since the registration requirements are
seldom applied unless a majority of the articulated factors are present and
relief from integration is readily granted when a single factor is not met.
This theory is not substantiated in practice. For example, in one request
for a no-action letter,40 6 an issuer was in the midst of publicly offering common
stock pursuant to a registration statement for the purpose of establishing a
network of automobile dealerships to market an automobile which the issuer
proposed to design and manufacture. The proceeds of this offering were in
escrow pending the sale of stock to a specified minimum number of purchasers. In addition, the issuer proposed to sell common stock concurrently
with the public offering to "a prominent entertainment personality" in reliance on section 4(2). The purpose of that offering, according to the SEC,
was "to obtain short-term working capital" and "to establish a meaningful
relationship with the purchaser, whom [the issuer] believes can be of substantial assistance in connection with the sale of automobiles in the future."407
Counsel attempted to distinguish the offerings on several grounds, most of
which ultimately rested, on whether in fact the general purposes of the offerings differed.408 Although the staff readily could have found a common
405. See, e.g., Buxton's Country Shops, available June 25, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcrIoN
LL-rr~as (CCH), roll 6, frame 08199; SEC No-Action Letter, Eastern Ill. Tel. Corp., available
Apr. 14, 1975, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,238; Industrial Dev.
Bd. of the County of Anderson, Tenn., available Nov. 15, 1973, [1973] SEC No-ActioN LE-rEs
(CCH), roll 11, frame 19539; Affiliated Bankshares, Inc., available Aug. 9, 1973, [1973] SEC
No-AcroN LEaras (CCH), roll 8, frame 14902.
406. DeLorean Motor Co., available Sept. 15, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcrIoN L=EaRts (CCH),
fiche 59, frame A4.
407. Id.

408. Id. The inquiry also indicated that the registered offering was limited solely to
new car dealers, who at the time of purchase executed dealership agreements with the issuer.
The staff referred to this fact, but the predominant portion of their letter focused on the
general purpose factor. It is not clear what kinds of problems would have been involved in
qualifying the private placee as a purchaser in the public offering. Even if this could have
been readily accomplished by a post-effective amendment, the proceeds would have had to
have been placed in escrow until the required number of purchasers had been secured. Apparently, immediate access to the proceeds was an important consideration to the issuer.
Here, as usual, the staff was silent as to the relative significance of these facts.
It is doubtful that much flexibility is gained by eschewing specifics in such instances. If
the staff has a more limited view than counsel but does not wish to take enforcement action,
the staff could make a general statement as to the specific aspects of counsel's opinion with
which it disagrees and then take no action. Furthermore, if the staff is concerned that, by
dealing in specifics, the appearance will be created that the law is being interpreted when
such is not the case, its position is not well considered. It seems more sensible to presume
that most practitioners are viewing their clients' situations practically, with an accurate
assessment of the no-action letter's significance. The treatment of the practice exemplified in
this letter effectively gives the practitioner considerably more leeway than if the staff con-
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general purpose among the offerings, it chose to concur with the issuer's
09
counsel that integration was not required.4
Lest the practitioner become too relaxed in regard to the general purpose
factor, it should be noted that the staff has, in some instances, expressly conditioned a no-action stance on the assumption that the proceeds of the offerings will not be used for a specified purpose. These instances have primarily
involved situations where affiliated enterprises have sought to conduct concurrent offerings for similar purposes.4 10 It would appear that the staff's requirement that the proceeds from the offerings be applied solely to the respective businesses of the issuers is intended to assure that the offerings are
not financially interdependent. This is supported by several letters which
permitted concurrent or nearly concurrent offerings for different purposes
by a single issuer in reliance on section 3(a)(3) and another exemption. 411
fronted the issues with greater specificity. Unlike the in terrorem effect created by vague
formal pronouncements such as those in Securities Act Release Nos. 4484 and 4552, discussed
in notes 220-238 supra and accompanying text, which promote an abundance of conservatism,
the no-action letters carry the weight of actual situations and may represent to the practitioners the scope of permissible conduct. Before the staff ceased responding to no-action requests concerning integration, the nonspecific approach in these letters may have been
intended by the staff to encourage no-action requests and thereby to enhance the scope of
the staff's oversight function. It is questionable, however, whether a "broad brush" approach
resulted in more or less communication with the agency.
409. See also DeLorean Motor Co., available Dec. 30, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcTION LErraas
(CCH), fiche 77, frame F13; SEC No-Action Letter, Skyland Int'l Corp., available Dec. 1, 1976,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FFa. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 180,856.
410. In Citizens & S. Fin'l Corp., available Nov. 12, 1973, [1973] SEC No-AcTION LaLrERS
(CCH), roll 11, frame 19148, 19149, a wholly owned subsidiary proposed to make an intrastate offering of twelve-month notes. The issuer's parent planned to offer its own twelvemonth notes pursuant to a registration statement within approximately six months of its
subsidiary's offering. The staff required, as a condition to obtaining a no-action letter, that
counsel for the two issuers represent that none of the proceeds from the parent's offering
would be applied to the subsidiary's business. A similar position was taken by the staff in
A.G. Becker & Co., available Feb. 18, 1975, [1975] SEC No-AcTIoN LarrERs (CCH), roll 2,
frame 01169. See note 402 supra.
411. See NCNB Corp., available Apr. 28, 1978, [1978] SEC No-AcTION LErraas (CCH),
fiche 43, frame J15. In many of these situations, a different security was being offered. See,
e.g., Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., available Aug. 15, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcTnON La-rras (CCH),
fiche 51, frame G19. Yet, the general purpose factor clearly has played a role in the staff's
decision. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Corp., available May 21, 1976, [1976] SEC No-ACTION Lx-rMas
(CCH), roll 5, frame 06231, in which the staff declined to integrate because "adequate safeguards were maintained by [the issuer] for separating the sources and application of the
money raised through the issuance of either type of investment." Id. Counsel in that matter
had based his conclusion that integration was inappropriate on the basis that "[s]ince the
availability of the 'exempt securities' exemptions in Section 3 of the [1933 Act] is not dependent upon the character of the transaction in which the securities are offered for sale and
sold, but rather upon the nature of the security itself, it follows that the availability of
the exemption provided by Section 3(a)(3) for [the issuer's] commercial paper is unaffected by
the Section 4(2) offering activities of [the issuer]." Id. at frame 06235. Counsel mentioned that
the §4(2) offering could, however, be affected by the offering of commercial paper. Id. The
staff addressed neither question. See generally I L. Loss, supra note 1, at 578 n.66, wherein
the author confronts one of these questions and concludes that "no question" of integration
can be raised with respect to offerings which involve securities of issuers which are described
in §3(a)(2) - (8).
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OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A detailed examination of the SEC staff's treatment of the five factors
comprising the SEC's integration formula will yield additional insight into
the definitions of some of these factors. Once accomplished, little difficulty
is likely to be encountered in recognizing a potential integration problem
and perhaps determining which of the five factors have been satisfied. This
is more significant than may first appear. The vast majority of integration
questions posed to the staff have met with favorable responses, despite the
fact that many involved situations in which most of the factors supported
integration. Certainly, if integration is unlikely unless at least four factors are
satisfied,412 refinement and clarification of the principles upon which securities
offerings are integrated may not be as necessary than would be the case were
the odds of integration greater.
In this view, the SEC staff has, through its no-action letters, furnished
considerable guidance on how to structure certain common financial transactions so as to avoid running afoul of integration. The way is reasonably
clear, for instance, for the issuer who wishes to make concurrent offerings
involving commercial paper, 413 industrial revenue bonds, 414 or foreign in412. There are several apparent "single factor" no-action letters. See, e.g., NCNB Corp.,
available Apr. 28, 1978, [1978] SEC No-AcrToN LErrEas (CCH), fiche 22, frame D19 (different
general purposes); Independent News, Inc., available Aug. 22, 1977, [1977] SEC No-ACrsON
LmarrEs (CCH), fiche 53, frame C5 (different plans of financing); SEC No-Action Letter,
Shockey Cos., available Dec. 13, 1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCI)
80,924 (different timing); Huntsville-Madison County Airport Auth., available Apr. 3, 1974,
[1974] SEC No-AarbON LLrRs (CCH), roll 4, frame 04987 (different classes of securities).
413. Ordinarily the staff will not integrate an offering by a bank or bank holding
company of commercial paper pursuant to §3(a)(3) and an offering, whether or not concurrent, of unsecured promissory notes in reliance on §4(2). The difference in the general
purposes of the offerings is the primary basis for this position. The commercial paper offering
is conducted to yield proceeds to finance current transactions while the proceeds of the notes
offering are used to finance long-term transactions. See, e.g., First & Merchants Corp., available
July 27, 1978, [1978] SEC No-ACTION LErER (CCH), fiche 36, frame FlI; Pittsburgh Natl
Corp., available Aug. 15, 1977, [1977] SEC No-ACTION LETrERs (CCII), fiche 51, frame G19;
Alabama Bancorporation, available July 8, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcTION Lrmzas (CCH), fiche
43, frame J15; RCA Credit Corp., available Dec. 6, 1976, [1976] SEC No-ACTnoN Lrrrals
(CCH), roll 12, frame 16227; SEC No-Action Letter, Citicorp, available Sept. 20, 1976, [19761977 Transfer Binder] FEm. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,778. There is no requirement that the
offerings be made to different investors. See NCNB Corp., available Apr. 28, 1978, [1978]
SEC No-ACTION LErrERs (CCH), fiche 22, frame D19. But see Liberty Natl Corp., available
May 21, 1976, [1976] SEC No-ACTION LETrERs (CCH), roll 5, frame 06231.
414. Industrial revenue bonds, exempt under §3(a)(2), are frequently sold concurrently
either in different series, one of which is tax exempt, or with another security. The staff
does not integrate these offerings although they are made for the same general purpose, at
the same time and for the same consideration as part of a single plan of financing. Although
undoubtedly there are public policy aspects to its decision to take no action (see note 419
infra), the staff relies primarily on the substantial difference in the characteristics of the
securities, which makes them attractive to different groups of investors. SLee Buckeye Int'l,
Inc., available Mar. 7, 1977, [1977] SEC No-ACTION LETTERs (CCII), fiche 14, frame 117 (revenue
bonds and notes); Polk County Indus. Dev. Auth., available Dec. 26, 1975, [1975] SEC NoACTION LMTERs (CCH), roll 12, frame 16277 (revenue bonds and notes); Agri-Quip, available
Sept. 20, 1974, [1974] SEC No-AcTION LEMRrs (CCH), roll 9, frame 12223 (revenue bonds and
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vestors.41. Moreover, most of the uncertainties have been removed from offerings by affiliated issuers.

416

equity); Huntsville-Madison County Airport Auth., available Apr. 3, 1974, [1974] SEC NoACTION LErras (CCH), roll 4, frame 04987 (two different series of revenue bonds); Industrial Dev. Bd.of the County of Anderson, Tenn., available Nov. 15, 1973, [1973] SEC NoACTION LETTERS (CCH), roll 11, frame 19539 (two different series of revenue bonds). There

is some question whether an offering of exempt securities under §3(a)(2) can be integrated
with other offerings. See note 411 supra.
415. Securities Act Release No. 4708 (July 9, 1964), 29 Fed. Reg. 9,828 (1964), creates
an exception to customary integration practice by permitting §4(2) offerings within the
United States of a security being offered simultaneously outside the United States to foreign
nationals "under circumstances reasonably designed to preclude distribution or redistribution
of the securities within, or to nationals of, the United States." Id. at 9,828. See generally
Dresser Indus. Canada, Ltd., available Oct. 31, 1977, [1977] SEC No-ACTION LETTERS (CCH),
fiche 67, frame F16; Great S.W. Corp., available Jan. 22, 1975, [1975] SEC No-AcTION LE-rraEs
(CCH) roll I, frame 00416.
Securities Act Release No. 4708 is silent on what types of precautions should be taken to
assure that the securities do not find their way into the hands of United States nationals.
Compare this release with SEC Rules 146(h), 147(f)(1)-(2), 240(g), 17 C.F.R. §§230.146(h),
.147(f)(l)-(2), .240(g) (1979). See also Wild Animal Kingdoms, Ltd., available Jan. 14, 1974,
[1974] SEC No-ATION LETTERs (CCH), roll 1, frame 00731 (staff suggested registration of
concurrent foreign and United States offerings, the latter pursuant to §4(2), because, despite
the precautions taken by the issuer against distribution or redistribution to United States
nationals, the staff was concerned that such redistribution might occur).
A similar dispensation for exempt public offerings pursuant to §§3(a)(9), 3(a)(ll) and
3(b) appears to be unavailable, apparently because of the possibility that a lawful public
after-market in the securities sold in the local exempt public offering will provide a vehicle
for foreign investors to dispose of their recently acquired securities to American nationals.
Cf. Seashore Invs., Inc. available Jan. 26, 1973, [1973] SEC No-ACTION LELrERS (CCH), roll 1,
frame 00262 (no-action request denied as to proposed simultaneous offerings of condominium
units coupled with a rental pool agreement to Texas residents pursuant to §3(a)(ll) and to
foreign nationals). This posture seems to overlook the fact that local §4(2) offerings receive
the protection of Securities Act Release No. 4708, although there may be a local public
trading market in which the foreign nationals might dispose of their securities.
416. Affiliated enterprises, or enterprises which are connected through a control relationship, are frequently used to exploit mineral reserves, to develop real estate, and in other
tax-sheltered investments. Ordinarily a number of limited partnerships are established, all
of which have one or more general partners in common. When each partnership is involved
in a separate development, has separate investors, and is financially independent, the staff
will not integrate concurrent offerings of securities by these partnerships solely because they
share general partners. See, e.g., Oklahoma Oil & Gas Co., available Nov. 16, 1978, [1978]
SEC No-ACTION LETTER (CCH), fiche 52, frame LI5; Canon Club Co., available June 26, 1978,
[1978] SEC No-ACTION LETTERs (CCH), fiche 31, frame I1; Vince Allen & Assocs., available
Dec. 13, 1976, [1976] SEC No-AcTION LETTERS (CCH), roll 12, frame 16258; Helmet Petroleum
Corp., available Aug. 18, 1975, [1975] SEC No-ACTION LETTERS (CCH), roll 8, frame 10654.
In mineral exploration projects, fractional undivided interests in leaseholds will frequently
be used in lieu of the limited partnership format. Integration will not occur so long as the
issuers maintain their separate identities. See Charles E. Watters, available May 24, 1978,
[1978] SEC No-AcTION LETrERS (CCH), fiche 26, frame 121 (integration). If pre-formation
interests in limited partnerships are sold, the proposed general partner may be the issuer
and the offerings will be integrated. See SEC No-Action Letter, J1C Drilling Cos., available
Sept. 23, 1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,765.
Regulation A creates the following exclusion from the amount of securities which may
be offered thereunder: "In the case of offering of interests in an unincorporated issuer
organized to hold title to, lease, operate or improve specific real property, interests in any
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Nevertheless, many financing situations continue to raise genuine questions
of integration because their resolution cannot be found by merely juggling
factors whose relative values are not absolute. Perspective is necessary; yet,
these nebulous factors and admonitions against fragmenting a single transaction are the extent of the perspective provided by the SEC's formal and
informal actions. The SEC's refusal to use its no-action letters as a platform
for the reasoned development of its enforcement standards suggests that
the integration determination turns on whether two offerings are in fact a
single transaction, and posits the five-factor formula as the road to discovering the answer. The formula, however, appears insufficiently focused to provide guidance for the structuring of complex financial arrangements. The
generality of its language and the existence of substantial overlaps in the
factors engender confusion. Inasmuch as the burden of proving an exemption
is on the issuer, the exemptions themselves are strictly construed, the staff is
no longer available to answer integration questions, and uncertainties and
delays in implementing financial planning can be ruinous, an issuer can
hardly take comfort in a flexible standard. This remains true even if the
issuer's best guess as to the standard's applicability will often be correct. A degree of ambiguity may be inevitable, but at minimum some elucidation of
the theoretical underpinnings of the methodology of integration is necessary.
Regulation of securities markets in a highly industrialized country with a
modified free enterprise economy requires a balancing of the interests of all
participants in those markets. Fundamental decisions in the regulatory process
should therefore consider not only investor protection but also industry's
interest in flexible access to the capital markets. Diminished access to the
marketplace and inhibited business flexibility may benefit investors, but the
reverse is also true. Restrictions on capital formation work to the detriment
of those who have already made their investments.
A policy-oriented approach to applying integration, if grounded in the
theoretical purposes of securities regulation, would optimize investor protection and business freedom. The ultimate question would not be whether
certain offerings are part of a single transaction, but rather should they be so
treated in light of the respective interests of the parties involved. Application
of the five integration factors would not then dictate a result, but would
serve only as a sorting mechanism which would identify those offerings
which could have been accomplished as a single transaction. Once identified,
affiliated issuer organized to hold title to, lease, operate or improve other specific real
property." SEC Rule 254(d)(5), 17 C.F.R. §230.254(d)(5) (1979). The property referred to in
this section must be specified by both issuers before any interests in the unincorporated
issuers are sold. SEC No-Action Letter, Restaurant Investors, Ltd., available Dec. 29, 1976,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RF. (CCH) 8O,876. The properties may not be
contiguous. Phoenix Ltd. Partnerships, available Nov. 18, 1977, [1977] SEC No-AcroN LETI
(CCH), fiche 22, frame D4. "Property" includes oil and gas leases if so denominated under
the state law of the jurisdiction in which the subject property is located. SEC No-Action Letter,
Thomas A. Latta, available May 1, 1978, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. Rut. (CCI-I)
81,590. In this letter, the staff established rigorous standards of financial independence of
the affiliated issuers, consistent with the staff position on the making of concurrent offerings
by affiliated issuers under other exemptions. See note 389 supra and accompanying text
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these offerings would be examined under a policy test, thus allowing the five
factors to be placed in perspective.
There is ample indication that the staff of the SEC has been approaching
integration in this manner, although it has continued to pay lip service to the
conclusiveness of the five-factor formula. The staff, on several occasions, has
permitted concurrent offerings under circumstances which indicate that the
offerings might readily have been conducted as a single transaction.417 The
apparent reason for its no-action stance was that the protection of investors
did not require integration under the circumstances.418 Moreover, in other
instances the staff opted to decline enforcement apparently for public policy
reasons. 419 Finally, on several occasions no action was taken although all
of the integration factors arguably were satisfied; business or other bona
fide interests made it impractical for the issuer to conduct the offerings as
a single transaction.20
Why then has the staff not articulated this approach to integration? One

possible explanation may be that a policy-oriented approach to integration
requires an analysis which is conceptually more difficult to articulate and
417. See, e.g., Buxton's Country Shops, available June 14, 1976 and June 25, 1976, [1976]
SEC No-AcrsoN LETTERs (CCH), roll 6, frame 08199 & 07560 (simultaneous §§3(a)(11) and
4(2) offerings); Founders Inv., Corp., available Dec. 26, 1972, [1972] SEC No-AcTION LETrEas
(CCH), roll 12, frame 19152 (same); SEC No-Action Letter, Kaiser Resources, Ltd., available
Aug. 1, 1973, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %79,493 (simultaneous private
and registered offerings).
418. Requests for no-action letters often contain opinions by inquiring counsel that integration is not necessary to protect investors. See, e.g., Hawkeye Bancorporation, available May
3, 1976, [1976] SEC No-ACTION LETrErs (CCH), roll 5, frame 06294, 06302-03; Safeguard
Mini Storage, available Aug. 24, 1974, [1974] SEC No-AcTION LETTERs (CCH), roll 8, frame
11256, 11261-62; no-action letters cited at note 417 supra.
419. See, e.g., SEC No-Action Letter, Midstate Tel. Co., available Oct. 7, 1976, [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 180,800 (method of financing recommended by
state public service commission); National Hous. Partnership, available Jan. 17, 1974 and
Apr. 11, 1974, [1974] SEC No-ACTION LETrERS (CCH), roll 1, frame 00677, 00678, roll 4, frame
05543, 05544 (no integration largely because "the congressional mandate provided [the issuer]
to secure financing for low and moderate income housing"). But see National Hous. Partnership, available Mar. 26, 1975, [1975] SEC No-ACTION LrTrERs (CCH), roll 3, frame 02792 (third
time not a charm). The staff is not always sympathetic in matters of public interest. See
General Plywood Corp., available Apr. 17, 1972, [1972] SEC No-AcTION LEERS (CCH), roll 4,
frame 05807 (§3(a)(11) not available to enable residents of community to purchase plant
which was scheduled to close down, thereby threatening substantial community unemployment).
420. See Affiliated Bankshares, Inc., available Aug. 9, 1973, [1973] SEC No-ACTION LETTERS
(CCH), roll 8, frame 14902. In that letter, the directors of a bank had acquired securities
in concurrent exchange offers made to them pursuant to §4(2) and to public shareholders of
the bank pursuant to a registration statement. The staff did not integrate these exchange
offerings and granted the no-action request of the directors to sell securities received in that
exchange under rule 144. The directors, who owned approximately thirteen-fortieths of the
outstanding equity of the bank, had agreed, more than two years before the exchange offer,
to sell their respective interests in the bank so that it would be worthwhile from the
purchaser's standpoint to seek administrative approval of the purchaser's proposed acquisition of the bank. The staff apparently concurred in counsel's opinion that to integrate the
two offerings might substantially hinder bona fide, publicly desirable efforts to acquire
banks. Id.
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apply than the five-factor formula. In addition, the staff may feel that policy
decisions as to the need for investor protection are the staff's domain and
not that of the practitioner. The objective basis for this second explanation
could be staff expertise. The position may also reflect the belief that a close
case should favor the investor.
If, on the other hand, the staff prefers the pseudo-objectivity of the fivefactor formula as a more understandable and workable tool, then why has
it not attempted either formally or informally to refine it? The likely answer
is two-fold. First, the staff seeks the benefits available from a flexible approach;
the greater the ambiguity in the five-factor formula the greater the latitude
which exists for implementing undisclosed considerations. Second, the staff
wants to encourage issuers to use rules 146 and 147 or Regulation A for
offerings of significant size,421 because these rules represent the mix of policy
considerations which the SEC views as reasonable.
This approach is not justified. The five-factor formula does little to
identify offerings which, in the interests of investors, ought to be registered.
If anything, it is overprotective of those interests. 4 22 This reasoning would
perhaps be supportable if a more precise balance of interests could not be
achieved or if the rules struck that balance and the five-factor formula served
to encourage their use. The rules, however, do not palliate the imbalance
created by the five-factor formula. They are very uncertain in their application, at least insofar as the availability of a safe harbor from integration is
concerned, 23 and they do not extend a safe harbor to unregistered offerings
424
which pose no threat to the interests of investors.
Several alternatives are available. The simplest would be to work within
the existing regulatory framework by retaining the five-factor formula, but
continue investor protection by moderately liberalizing the integration safe
harbor of the rules. Along these lines, a suggestion to reduce the "dry" period
required before and after a rule offering from six to three months has already been developed. 425 In addition, the rules' safe harbor should not be lost
simply because offerings of the same or a similar class of securities which
are not integrated with an offering pursuant to the rule are made within
421.

Section 3(a)(9) serves a significant public policy function and is aberrational for

purposes of this comparison. See notes 118-121 supra and accompanying text.
422. See notes 417-420 supra and accompanying text.
423. The uncertainties relate not only to the technical requirements of the safe harbor

from integration (see notes 347-348 supra and accompanying text), but extend as well to
those of other offerings. For example, if an unregistered offering not made pursuant to a
rule fails to conform to an exemption for any reason, it may be integrated with an offering
pursuant to a rule. This could conceivably occur many months after perfect compliance with
the rule. See SEC Rules 146(b)(1), 147(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§230.146(b)(1), .147(b)(2) (1979). Of
course, integration in such cases is not mandatory. See SEC No-Action Letter, Skyland Int'l
Corp., available Dec. 1, 1976, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] ED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %80,856.
424. If the staff were willing to provide no-action letters on integration matters, such a
letter conceivably might be obtained for these kinds of offerings. See notes 417-418 svpra
and accompanying text. However, this option may be unreasonably time-consuming under
the issuer's circumstances, and it still leaves the issuer open to potentially troublesome litigation brought by disaffected purchasers. See note 357 supra and accompanying text.
425. See notes 314-320 supra nd accompanying text.
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either of these "dry" periods.426 Finally, to eliminate major uncertainties concerning its availability, rule 147 should be amended to delete the absolute
limitations on the nature of the offerees and purchasers and on the timing
427
of interstate resales.
These changes would constitute significant improvements, even though
retention of the five-factor formula would perpetuate an irrational approach
to integrating securities offerings. Moreover, the "dry" periods of the rules
would continue to impose arbitrary restrictions on financing without demonstrably commensurate benefit to investors. A policy-oriented approach would,
as indicated, provide greater rationality despite its lack of objective criteria.
Rulemaking can minimize the frequency with which policy considerations
would be the sole guide to compliance. Whether integration is necessary is a
function of the degree of investor protection inherent in the exemption in
question. It appears feasible for the SEC to develop rules, similar to Regulation A and rules 146, 147 and 240, which will contain every precaution necessary to protect investors who are offered or purchase securities in the offerings
made pursuant to these rules irrespective of other offerings which may be
made by the issuer. 428 With the addition of a reasonable disclosure standard
in rule 147429 and creation of a limitation on the size of rule 146 offerings
426. See note 329 supra and accompanying text.
427. SEC Rule 147(d)-(e), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(d)-(e) (1979). A reasonableness standard could
be established along the lines applied to the nature of offerees and purchasers and the
number of the latter in private offerings pursuant to rule 146. SEC Rule 146(d), (g), 17 C.F.R.
§230.146(d), (g) (1979). The responsibility for premature interstate resales of securities acquired
in an intrastate offering pursuant to rule 147 would then be placed on the person making
the resale and those who assist therein, as long as the issuer took the proper precautions
against such an event as required in SEC Rule 147(f), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(f) (1979). This is
consistent with the allocation of responsibility for premature public resales of restricted securities under rules 144 and 146. SEC Rules 144(b), (g), 146(h), 17 C.F.R. §§230.144(b), (g), .146(h)
(1979). Adequate protection for offerees and purchasers in such resale transactions and against
adverse market impact of widespread resale efforts can readily be accomplished through
existing regulation of the broker-dealer community. See, e.g., SEC Rule 15c2-11, 17 C.F.R.
§240.15c2-11 (1979).
428. It is difficult to conceive why offerings under Regulation A are not treated like
offerings pursuant to rule 240 insofar as their susceptibility to integration is concerned. Some
arguably unjust results might be avoided by similar treatment. See, e.g., In re Herbert R. May,
27 S.E.C. 814 (1948), 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 616. Section 3(a)(9), on the other hand,
provides very little in the way of investor protection, and is fraught with such conceptual
difficulties vis-§-vis the purposes behind the registration requirements (see 1 L Loss, supra
note 1, at 573) that a policy applying integration to all such offerings appears appropriate.
See, e.g., SEC No-Action Letter, Skyland Int'l Corp., available Dec. 1, 1976, [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,856 (allowing exchange of notes for stock
issued in possible violation of §5 to qualify under §3(a)(9), where issuer is privately held
and exchange is clearly beneficial to its shareholders).
429. The SEC is not likely to decline to integrate offerings which conform with rule
147 unless the SEC is satisfied that the rule itself and state securities laws, alone or combined,
will provide adequate investor protection both at the time of the initial offering and in
the trading market. The SEC's consistent restrictive stance in its formal pronouncements
with respect to the intrastate exemption suggests that it deems that neither of these sources
meets that regulatory standard. Compare SEC Rule 147(e), 17 C.F.R. §230.147(e) (1979)
(issuer is absolutely liable for premature interstate resales) with SEC Rule 146(h), 17 C.F.R.
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within a specified period of time 4 30 each of these rules would provide that
43 1
protection.
Fragmenting a single transaction into multiple offerings, each of which
§230.146(h) (1979) (issuer need only take reasonable care to assure there will be no premature public resales of restricted securities). See generally Hicks, supra note 84, at 498
n.122. See also notes 295-296 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps the addition of disclosure
requirements in rule 147 would ameliorate the deficiencies in the regulatory structure perceived by the agency. Hicks, supra note 84, at 499-506.
430. Assuming the validity of the SEC's concern for minimizing the likelihood of premature public resales of restricted securities sold pursuant to rule 146, it might be necessary
to restrict rule 146 offerings to a specified number of purchasers (currently 35) within a defined period of time, such as the preceding consecutive 12 months. See Securities Act Release
No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972), [1972] 179 SEC. REG. & L. RElP. (BNA) F-1. See also note 296 supra.
This would obviate any integration problems caused by limiting the allowable size of offerings pursuant to the rule without also limiting the time period to be used as a reference in
determining whether the size limitation has been exceeded. See SEC Rules 240(e), 254(a)(1),
17 C.F.R. §§230.240(e), .254(a)(1) (1979).
431. After this article was researched and written, the SEC released for public comment
proposed rule 242, which if adopted would be promulgated under §3(b) of the 1933 Act and
"would allow certain corporate issuers to offer and sell up to $2,000,000 per issue of their
securities to an unlimited number of institutional-type purchasers and to 35 other purchasers."
Securities Act Release No. 6121 (Sept. 11, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 54,258 (1979). The proposed
rule "is intended to facilitate small business capital formation in a manner consistent with
the protection of investors by addressing the problems encountered by those issuers seeking
to utilize the [existing] exemptive provisions." Id. at 54,259. Some of these problems which
the proposed rule attempts to avoid are: the subjective determination of offeree and purchaser
qualification required to be made under rule 146(d); the difficulty of technical compliance
with the information requirement of rule 146(e); and the restrictive limits on the size and
scope of a rule 240 offering imposed by the provisions of rule 240(c) (no general advertising
or solicitation), rule 240(e) ($100,000 ceiling), and rule 240(f) (no more than 100 beneficial
owners). Proposed rule 242, if adopted, is likely to significantly reduce the use of rules 146
and 240 by corporate issuers. See [1979] 520 SEc. REG. & L. REP'. (BNA) A-3, A-5.
The proposed rule retains the issue concept of §3(b) and uses traditional integration
factors in determining what constitutes a single "issue" for purposes of applying the rule.
Securities Act Release No. 6121 (Sept. 11, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 54,258, 54,260. The following
safe harbor from integration, largely patterned after rule 146(b)(1), has been included in
the proposed rule: "For purposes of identifying a single issue, sales of securities occurring
more than six months prior to the commencement of an issue of securities pursuant to this
rule and sales of securities and offers in connection therewith occurring at any time after
six months from the completion date of the issue pursuant to this rule, shall not be considered part of the same issue so long as there are during neither of said six-month periods
any offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer of [t]he same or similar class as those
offered or sold pursuant to this rule: Provided, however, That offers or sales of securities
pursuant to the exemption from registration provided by Regulation A shall not result in
loss of the safe harbor described herein." Proposed Rule 242(b), id. at 54,263. The one significant difference between this provision and rule 146(b)(1) is that offers or sales of the
same or similar securities pursuant to Regulation A win not remove the integration safe
harbor created by proposed rule 242(b). See id. at 54,260. The SEC has indicated that it will
consider "other alternatives to this safe harbor approach which would not be overly restrictive
but would retain the integration concept" Id. The SEC noted in the release that "[o]ne
possible alternative would be to eliminate the proviso regarding sales within the six month
periods so that the safe harbor would be absolute," and has solicited "comments on the
effects of such an approach on the integration concept as a whole and with respect to the
proposed Rule." Id. The suggested approach is a laudable step in diminishing the scope
of integration. See notes 329 & 428 supra and accompanying text.
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fully conforms to one of these rules, is not then repugnant to the interests
of investors. Offerings which did not meet the requirements of the rules
would be judged from the standpoint of the appropriateness of integration
by the same policy-oriented standard which was used to formulate them. This
would achieve a more rational consistency and greater equipoise of the respective interests involved than exists under current integration practice
using the five-factor formula in combination with the integration safe harbors
of the rules.
VI.

INTEGRATION OF SECURITIES OFFERINGS UNDER
THE PROPOSED FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE

The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code (the
Code), a viable candidate to supplant the 1933 Act, retains integration of
securities offerings as an operative concept. 432 It is not known whether or in
what form the Code ultimately may be enacted by Congress. 433 A thorough
and fair evaluation of the Code's structure for integrating securities offerings
requires a full discussion of the nature and interrelationships of the Code's
principal transactional exemptions, a task beyond the scope of this article.434
Instead, this structure is evaluated briefly and some general comparisons are
435
drawn between integration under the Code and under the 1933 Act.
Unlike the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the Code requires registration of
432. ALl FED. SEC. CODE §299.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Official Draft]. The Code brings together, with substantial modification, the seven
federal securities laws administered by the SEC. See id., Introduction at xv & §101. See
generally Loss, Introduction: The Federal Securities Code - Its Purpose, Plan and Progress,
30 VAND. L. REV. 315 (1977).
433. The Code has received considerable support, including the approval of the Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the American Bar Association. However, not all
comment has been favorable. See Lowenfels, The Case Against the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 65 VA. L. REV. 615 (1979). As of September, 1979, the Code had not fared well
with the SEC. See [1979] 520 SEC. REc. & L. REP. (BNA) AA-4 to AA-6, in which SEC Commissioner John R. Evans is quoted as commenting that "[t]here may very well be some irreconcilable differences" between the SEC and the American Law Institute concerning the
Code. Id. at AA-5.
434. For example, the limited offering of the Proposed Official Draft §242(b), seems
susceptible of integration with certain nonexempt offerings. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE §511,
Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972) [hereinafter cited as TD1]. On the other hand, it has
been suggested that the private offering under §4(2) and rule 146 should be immune from
integration with registered offerings. See notes 320 & 428-430 supra. The limited offering is,
however, significantly different from the private offering. For example, offerees and purchasers
under the limited offering, unlike under the private offering, need not be wealthy or
financially sophisticated, nor is it necessary for the issuer to provide them with information
or access thereto. These differences militate against absolute immunity from integration for
the limited offering. This kind of discussion and comparison is impractical without considerable prior exposition of the limited offering concept under the Code.
435. For an extensive analysis of the Code, see Symposium: The American Law Institute's
Proposed Federal Securities Code (Part 1), 30 VAND. L. REv. 311 (1977); Symposium: The
American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Securities Code (Part 2), 32 VAND. L. REv. 455
(1979). See also ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, ALI Proposed Federal
Securities Code, 34 Bus. LAw. 345 (1978).
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companies rather than securities. 4 38 "[T]he basic theme [of the Code] is a
shift in emphasis from the occasional, hit-or-miss, static registration statement under the 1933 Act to permanent company registration followed by
continuous disclosure, on as current a basis as practical, more along the lines
of the 1934 Act."4 37 The Code does, however, require that specified disclosure
requirements be met prior to the commencement of any "distribution" of securities, 38 unless the securities proposed to be offered are exempt 43 9 or are
proposed to be offered in an exempt transaction - ° "Distribution," an important but undefined term in the 1933 Act,-' is defined by the Code as "an
offering other than (1) a limited offering or (2) an offering by means of one
or more trading transactions."4 2 The "offering concept" thus supplants the
issue concept of the 1933 Act. 443 "Offering" is defined in section 299.13(a)
of the Code as follows:
'Offering' is used in the sense that (1) offers of securities of different
classes are separate offerings, and (2) offers of securities of the same
class by or for the account or benefit of the same person (whether the
issuer or any other person) are separate offerings only if they are substantially distinct on the basis of such factors as the manner, time, and
purpose
of the offers, the offering price, and the kind of considera4 4
tion. -

445
The purpose of section 299.13(a) is to clarify when integration is applicable.
The offering concept as defined in section 299.13(a) not only identifies those
offers which constitute part of a distribution requiring disclosure, but also
purports to delineate the circumstances under which reliance upon more
than one of certain of the Code's transactional exemptions is impermissible.446 The Code contains several types of transactional exemptions; the
principal ones have counterparts in the 1933 Act.4 47 Offerings by means of
436. See Proposed Official Draft §402. See generally Bialkin, The Issuer Registration and
DistributionProvisions of the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. Ray. 327, 332-35

(1977).
437. Proposed Official Draft, Introduction at xxvi-xxvii.
438. Id. §502. All primary and secondary offerings are subject to these requirements. Id.,
Introduction at xxxii-xixxiii. See generally Bialkin, supra note 456.

439. Proposed Official Draft §§302-304. See generally Cheek, supra note 144, at 355, 384-94.
440. Proposed Official Draft §§512-514. See id. §§242(b)-(c), 303. See generally Cheek, supra
note 144, at 357, 362-71, 373-78, 380-84, 394-404.

441. See 1933 Act §2(11), 15 U.S.C. §77b(11) (1976).
442. Proposed Official Draft §242(a) (emphasis added). "Limited offering" is defined in
Proposed Official Draft §242(b) and "trading transaction" in §242(c). See generally Cheek,

supranote 144, at 357-77.
443.

See TD1 §267(a), Comment 2; Proposed Official Draft, Introduction at xxxii. On the

issue concept, see notes 178-180 supra and accompanying text.
444. Proposed Official Draft §299.13(a).
445. TDI §267(a), Comment 1. Section 299.13(a) is discussed in notes 452-471 infra and

accompanying text.
446. See Proposed Official Draft, Introduction at xxxii; TD1 §511, Comment 3 ("May two
or more exemptions be combined? The short answer, as today, is 'no' if either of the exemp-

tions suffers from a 'marital disability' in terms of the 'issue' or 'offering' concept.")
447. The Code's transactional exemptions are defined in Proposed Official Draft §§512-
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"transactions448 pursuant to any of four exemptions- the limited offering,
the trading transaction, the exercise of rights and conversion privileges, and
nonconversion exchanges - will not be treated together as a single offering.
That is, they will be deemed "substantially distinct from each other" per se
without regard for the factors enumerated in section 299.13(a).449 Nevertheless, these transactions presumably can be integrated with transactions made
pursuant to other transactional exemptions and with nonexempt transactions.450 The remaining transactional exemptions, local distributions and
small offerings, are clearly subject to integration.45 1
One of the most striking aspects of the Code's offering concept in section
299.13(a)452 is its similarity to the integration formula first enunciated in

the Unity Gold administrative proceeding 53 and later adopted in Securities
Act Release Nos. 443444 and 4552. 45 5 The manifested purpose of this carefully designed coincidence is to conform the substantive content of the
offering concept with existing law.456 This objective seems less than ideal in

light of the views expressed herein on the nebulous state of the law governing integration of securities offerings. Codifying the essence of the Unity Gold
integration criteria as characterizing the attributes of "substantially distinct"
offerings also appears questionable. 457 A note to section 299.13(a) indicates
that the SEC "will be able under its general rulemaking authority in §1804
to define 'offering' more specifically ....
,9458Nevertheless, it seems unlikely
514. These include exemptions for "small offerings" §5512(e)); "exercise of rights and conversion privileges" (§512(g)) and "nonconversion exchanges" (§512(h)); and "local distributions" (§514(a)). The 1933 Act counterparts are, respectively, rule 240, §3(a)(9), and §3(a)(11).
Section 303 of the Code, the expanded equivalent of §3(b) of the 1933 Act, grants authority
to the SEC to exempt any transaction from "any or all of the provisions" of the Code. Proposed Official Draft §303. In addition, the "limited offering" exclusion from the definition
of "distribution" in §242(a), the counterpart to §4(2) of the 1933 Act, is not delineated as a
transactional exemption but tends to operate as such. See Proposed Official Draft §242(b).
See generally Cheek, supra note 144.
448. "Transaction" is not defined by the Code but appears to be used in the sense
that "offering" is used in this article. See note 9 supra.
449. Proposed Official Draft §299.13(b) (emphasis added). See TDl §511, Comment 3.
Section 299.13(b) provides: "Within the meaning of section 299.13(a)(2), a limited offering, an
offering by means of trading transactions, and an offering by means of transactions exempted
by section 512(f) to (h) inclusive are substantially distinct from each other." Proposed
Official Draft §299.13(b). Trading transactions cannot be effected by an issuer unless the SEC
so provides by rule. Id. §242(c)(1)(A).
450. See TD1 §511, Comment 3 (partially quoted in note 446 supra).
451. See id.; Proposed Official Draft, Introduction at xxxii.
452. See text accompanying note 444 supra.
453. In re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 625 (1938). See notes 187-197 supra and accompanying text.
454. Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961). See text
accompanying notes 222-229 supra.
455. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962). See
text accompanying notes 230-233 supra.
456. TDI §267(a), Comment 1.
457. Proposed Official Draft §299.13(a)(2).
458. Id., Note. This note suggests that the SEC might render the definition more specific
"by means of a rebuttable presumption based on the expiration of a prescribed interval be-
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that the SEC in so doing could ignore altogether the criteria enumerated in
section 299.13(a)(2), especially in light of section 1804(a)(1)'s mandate that
any rules promulgated by the SEC for the purpose of defining terms must be
"consistent... with the definitions in and purposes of this Code."459 Greater
flexibility, and ultimately greater certainty, would likely occur if section
299.13(a)(2) stated only that separate offerings were those which were substantially distinct, leaving more precise definition to the SEC. The probable
result of this recommendation initially would be the promulgation of a rule
which adopts the Unity Gold criteria, thus reflecting existing law as intended
in section 299.13(a).460 As administrative creations, these criteria would not,
however, limit the breadth of subsequent development of the offering concept
as significantly as they would if codified in section 299.13(a).
Furthermore, there are differences in the current integration formulation
and the provisions of section 299.13(a). First, subsection (1) precludes integration of "offers of securities of different classes." 461 While this approach has
support under existing law,462 it is not wholly consistent with it and appears
somewhat generous. 463 Second, subsection (2) does not refer to the significance of whether the offers are part of a single plan of financing, although
this is a component factor of existing integration law.4 6 4 The reason for this

omission is not stated, but perhaps inclusion of this criterion is considered redundant. 46 5 However, this factor entails a more meaningful inquiry than do
some aspects of the current law which have been retained in the Code's
formula.46° Third, subsection (2) also integrates only those offers which are
made "by or for the account or benefit of the same person." 467 This requirement is not commonly included in current formulations for applying integration 46 8 but has been considered significant at both judicial and administrative

levels. 6 9 Finally, this last observation may also be made of the reference
to "offering price" in subsection (2).470
tween limited offerings." Id. Even assuming that limited offerings are the only types of
transactions which lend themselves to a more specific standard of integration, it is disconcerting to contemplate a return to the uncertainties posed by a rebuttable presumption. Compare
the relatively greater degree of certainty created by the irrebutable presumptions established
by SEC Rules 146(b)(1) and 147(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§230.146(b)(1), .147(b)(2) (1979), quoted
at text accompanying notes 299-300 supra.
459. Proposed Official Draft §1804(a)(1).
460. See note 456 supra and accompanying text.
461. Proposed Official Draft §299.13(a)(1). "Class of securities" is defined as "all securities
of an issuer that are of substantially similar character and whose holders enjoy substantially
similar rights." Id. §221. "The definition of 'class' is inevitably imprecise." TD1 §216,
Comment 2.
462. See notes 285-286 supra and accompanying text & note 332 supra.
463. See note 394 supra.
464. See text accompanying note 226 supra.
465. See notes 267 & 275 supra and accompanying text.
466. See notes 267-283 & 373-885 supra and accompanying text.
467. Proposed Official Draft §299.13(a)(2).
468. See text accompanying note 226 supra.
469. See notes 266 & 387-390 supra and accompanying text.
470. Proposed Official Draft §299.13(a)(2). See text accompanying note 226 supra & note
274 svp ra and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

85

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

It seems likely that despite the differences identified above, except perhaps
for the provisions of section 299.13(a)(1),471 the Code's offering concept will

perpetuate existing integration law. In attempting to codify the application
of this concept, the Code has not only ignored a significant opportunity to
discard the present complexities and indirection in this area but has erected
substantial barriers to any efforts to improve that doctrine.
CONCLUSION

Securities offerings are excessively and desultorily subjected to integration,
notwithstanding recent efforts by the SEC to ameliorate the intrusion of integration on financial planning. The agency has paid lip service to an amorphous five-factor formula when determining whether offerings constitute a
single transaction. This formula fails to identify the factual context in which
integration is appropriate. Moreover, its inefficacy as a tool for resolving integration questions will be perpetuated by its codification in the proposed Federal
Securities Code if the Code is adopted in its present form.
The staff of the SEC appears to make enforcement decisions regarding
integration on the basis of the degree of investor protection afforded offerees.
The SEC has not formally articulated this approach. It should. Although
lacking the ostensibly objective criteria of the current integration formulation, an approach which attempts to balance the respective interests of the
participants in the securities markets offers a greater likelihood of a proper
resolution of integration questions than that which can be achieved by mechanical application of the SEC's five factors. The staff's present unwillingness to render advice on integration for fear that its position likely will be
misconstrued or misapplied is attributable to the staff's reliance upon an
unworkable integration formula. By discarding this formula, the staff could
again lend to the public its needed expertise on integration.
Full disclosure of the particulars of a policy-oriented approach to solving
integration problems will not, however, provide the degree of certainty desirable in relation to the magnitude of the interests at stake. The formal administrative tools for bypassing integration problems are unduly narrow in
scope and pose significant interpretative and structural roadblocks to compliance. At minimum, these devices should be reshaped to facilitate adherence to and create a more rational and equitable balancing of the interests
of investors and those seeking to accumulate capital. Preferably the SEC
should exercise its rulemaking authority to eliminate the applicability of integration to all offerings made pursuant to a transactional exemption other
than section 3(a) (9). This can be accomplished almost entirely under existing
administrative regulations, perhaps with some restrained modifications which
would enhance investor protection without destroying the practical advantage
of the exemptions.
47 1.

See notes 461-463 supra and accompanying text.
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